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Summary 
This dissertation examines how scarce common resources are shared. It deals with common water 
flows that are largely self-governed by the user communities in semi-arid sub-Sahara Africa. More 
particularly, it studies how Tanzanian smallholder irrigators share irrigation water which is regularly 
in scarce supply. The dissertation includes three major parts in which different issues related to local 
water governance and competition over water are addressed.  
The first issue that is addressed is the distribution of common pool resources in socially 
heterogeneous communities. Whereas there is ample literature on the efficiency and sustainability of 
common pool resource governance in economically heterogeneous communities, little attention is 
paid to the distribution of resources or to the effect of social differences. Gender and the relative 
social status of the common pool resource users are two sources of social heterogeneity that relate to 
the users‟ positions in their communities‟ power structure. These social factors not only determine the 
value the users allot to the resource but also the extent to which the users abide by the prevailing 
norms that regulate resource distribution. Eventually, these social factors define the users‟ capability 
to gain access to the common resource.  
This issue is worked out in Part II. A framed field experiment, conducted with actual users of self-
governed smallholder irrigation systems in semi-arid Tanzania, is used to examine the effect of users‟ 
gender and relative social status on fairness in the distribution of water. Distribution behaviour under 
conditions of water abundance and water scarcity are looked at. More specifically, Part II investigates 
whether male and female irrigators share resources in a different way and whether they react 
differently to water scarcity. Furthermore, it examines if irrigators‟ social status affects the way 
irrigators share resources when water is abundant and when it is scarce and whether the effect is 
similar for male and female irrigators. It also determines to what extent real life observations 
substantiate the experimental findings.  
It is observed that female irrigators distribute water in an altruist way and male irrigators in a fair way 
when water is abundant in the experiment. A higher social status has a negative effect on the share 
irrigators propose to others but not so among female irrigators. When water is scarce in the 
experiment, all reduce the share they propose to others, although irrigators with a higher social status 
reduce it less substantially. On the whole, male and female irrigators with a relatively low social 
status propose more than equal shares of water in abundance but they do not when water is scarce. 
Female irrigators with a relatively high social status distribute water in an altruist way when it is 
abundant. Even if they reduce their proposed share in scarcity, they remain fair. Male irrigators with a 
relatively high social status distribute water in a selfish way throughout abundance and scarcity.  
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It is concluded that equity in the distribution of common pool resources is not evident. Embedded 
social differentiation linked to gender and social status plays a significant role for the willingness and 
ability to fairly distribute water in these rural African irrigation systems. Water scarcity further 
intensifies differences in distribution behaviour. Consequently, the gender- and status-related 
unfairness in the distribution of resources could challenge the sustainability of self-governed common 
water flows as it undermines trust, reciprocity, mutual commitment and resource provision. The 
differential water access that results from it could reinforce gender and status-based inequalities. 
Water scarcity is likely to exacerbate such drawbacks. Policy that builds on community governance of 
natural resources but remains blind for structural impediments to a fair distribution of water may fail 
to attain sustainable and equitable water governance, especially if climate change increases water 
scarcity.  
A second issue that is addressed in this dissertation relates to the local institutions for common pool 
resource governance. In fact, when natural resources are common property, there are particular ways 
and specific institutions to deal with resource access and competition. But user communities do not 
necessarily rely on a fixed set of institutions to govern access and conflict over common pool 
resources. Part III addresses some persistent fallacies about local resource governance institutions and 
their evolution by making use of data on how resource conflicts are solved in Tanzanian smallholder 
irrigation schemes.  
Part III starts from the observation that water governance in Tanzania‟s smallholder irrigation 
schemes has become ever more challenging because of increasing market penetration, declining 
predictability of water availability and widening institutional pluralism. Despite these trends, resource 
conflicts at the local level have generally been avoided. Instead, one observes processes in which 
actors involved in conflicts make and remake institutions. This renders these irrigation schemes 
interesting for studying water governance institutions under construction. By documenting how 
conflicts over water are solved in smallholder irrigation schemes in rural Tanzania, we show that 
resource conflicts are not necessarily disruptive nor do they inevitably lead to violence. Instead 
conflicts may prompt processes of pragmatic problem solving through which local resource 
governance institutions are reproduced.  
Another fallacy that is refuted in Part III is that institutional pluralism is systematically exploited in 
opportunistic ways. Actually, institutional pluralism can be an asset for the making and remaking of 
local resource governance institutions because it can be used in a creative way to resolve resource 
conflicts. As such, it can contribute to the development of more sophisticated and locally adapted 
resource governance institutions.  
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Part III also shows that pragmatic and creative conflict-solving in institutional pluralist contexts is not 
an impartial process. Actors‟ positions in the local power structure play a decisive role in this process, 
which risks further entrenching existing power imbalances. Therefore, despite its potential, actor-
driven development of resource governance institutions can also reproduce deeply entrenched power 
imbalances and gender roles. As such, it can hinder inclusion of less powerful resource users because 
the latter do not always have the capability to engage in creative conflict resolution.  
The third issue this dissertation deals with relates to resource conflicts. Studying competition for 
scarce natural resources inevitably leads to the debate on the relation between resource scarcity and 
violent conflict. Conflicts over water have been at the centre of attention for some time. Not only has 
a future of inter-state water wars been forecasted, also the internal, civil conflicts that mark the last 
decennia have been linked to an increasing scarcity of natural resources like water or cropland. While 
the literature provides bits and pieces of the answer on how resource scarcity and conflict relate, there 
is little evidence of a relation between resource scarcity and the individual predisposition towards 
conflictive behaviour.  
Part IV provides evidence of the relation between resource scarcity and the individual predisposition 
towards conflictive behaviour by making use of a framed field experiment. The experiment replicates 
water appropriation dilemmas in common water flows under circumstances of water abundance and 
water scarcity. It is conducted with smallholder irrigators from semi-arid Tanzania of whom we have 
data on their socio-economic characteristics. Three questions guide the analysis of the experimental 
findings. First, it is examined whether water scarcity induces a reduction of water extraction as the 
common pool resource thesis predicts; or whether it introduces competition as the resource scarcity 
conflict thesis predicts. Secondly, it is determined what types of irrigators are more inclined to react in 
a conflictive way to water scarcity. Thirdly, by putting the findings in a broader perspective, it is 
evaluated to what extent real life circumstances are such that resource scarcity could engender conflict 
in Tanzania.  
The experiment shows that water scarcity introduces competition. Water scarcity induces selfishness 
in the experiment despite the strong non-competition norms that regulate water appropriation in the 
irrigator communities and despite the fact that this is considered conflictive behaviour. But not all 
react to water scarcity in the same way. By combining experimental evidence and survey data it is 
found that mainly the poor, the ones with little extensive social networks and the ones for whom 
irrigation water is critical for agricultural production are more inclined to react in a conflictive way to 
scarcity by being selfish. Viewed from a wider perspective, it is concluded that circumstances in 
Tanzania could be conducive to resource scarcity conflicts. The ones who are more likely to react in a 
conflictive way to water scarcity in the experiment suffer from real economic and political 
inequalities which could form a basis for mobilisation for more violent ways of competing for scarce 
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resources. At the same time, water governance institutions entail exclusionary elements that are likely 
to disfavour the same people. These factors concur with climate change and other socio-economic 
developments that increase competition for increasingly scarce water. 
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Introduction 
This research is about sharing water, which is an essential and scarce common resource in semi-arid 
development contexts. Water is an intriguing type of good with unique characteristics. Access to and 
conflicts over water have far-reaching implications for people‟s livelihoods in development countries. 
Water is a complicated matter...  
The increasing demand for water and the rising competition for it are issues of recent concern. 
Climate change reduces rainfall and increases variability in rainfall. This puts water governance and 
equity in the distribution of water under additional strain. Population growth and economic 
developments, such as a more market oriented rural agriculture, further contribute to a higher demand 
for water.  
These evolutions make that water governance and equity in the distribution of water have become 
security issues. From a security perspective, it is important to understand the relation between 
accessing scarce natural resources and conflict. Decentralised water governance is expected to avoid 
conflict to some extent. But a detailed understanding of how conflicts are generally avoided and what 
specific local resource governance institutions can accomplish this is lacking. Besides, little is known 
about individual incentives to react in conflictive ways to resource scarcity even if conflict essentially 
originates from individuals‟ behaviour (Verwimp, Justino, & Brück, 2009). Even less is known about 
how social or economic disparities may produce different incentives. Therefore, an understanding of 
individual predispositions to conflictive behaviour in response to resource scarcity and insights into 
local governance of resource conflicts are essential to counter possible water scarcity conflicts, 
especially in the light of increasing scarcity and rising competition.  
The last decennia are also marked by decentralising natural resource governance and building on local 
governance of natural resources assuming that this will enhance efficient, sustainable and equitable 
resource use. But this is not necessarily the case. There is a substantial literature on what 
circumstances and which community characteristics are conducive to efficient and sustainable use of 
common pool resources use. Equity is not as well researched even if it is essential to maintain trust 
and reciprocity which are key elements in local governance of common pool resources. Equitable use 
of natural resources also aids to avoid conflicts that may root in frustrations due to discrepancies in 
resource access. Therefore, a realistic and convincing account of local natural resource governance 
will reveal why it does not necessarily produce an equitable distribution of available resources. Such 
an account will uncover how such inequalities come about and how they are reproduced. This can aid 
policy makers to more adequately address these issues.   
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Besides, the distribution of natural resources, especially of essential agricultural production factors 
like water, is of uttermost relevance from a development perspective. The distribution of water has 
important implications for livelihood opportunities of semi-subsistence farmers in a development 
context. The livelihoods of smallholder semi-subsistence farmers tend to be particularly vulnerable to 
inadequate and insecure water access. In general, their production systems and their livelihoods are 
heavily dependent on natural resources like water and they have limited access to appropriate 
technology to deal with high variability in resource access (Orindi & Huggins, 2005). Moreover, 
uncertainty about adequate water supplies forms an additional risk in the production process. This 
may lead to ex-ante risk management by choosing less water dependent crops and by abstaining from 
investment in more water dependent cash crops like tomatoes. Such low risk portfolios typically 
generate lower return and may contribute to a poverty trap (Dercon, 2005). 
This dissertation is structured as follows. The introductory Part I includes a review of theoretical 
perspectives on access to and conflict over water and a discussion of the methodology and research 
design. It also elaborates on water resources and water policies in Tanzania. Part II deals with sharing 
common water flows. It looks at the effect of gender and social status on fair distribution of water in 
smallholder irrigation schemes by means of a field experiment. Part III treats of local common pool 
resource governance. It provides an analysis of institutions for conflict resolution in Tanzanian 
smallholder irrigation schemes. Part IV deals with water scarcity conflicts. It uses a framed field 
experiment with irrigators in semi-arid Tanzania to analyse the propensity to react in a conflictive way 
to water scarcity. Part II, Part III and Part IV are separate essays. The dissertation ends with a general 
conclusion.  
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Access to and Conflict over Water: Theoretical Perspectives 
Water is a productive natural resource that is essential, non-substitutable, renewable, rival, diffuse and 
not lootable. It has a low marginal value but a high total value. Scarcity makes such resources 
valuable and raises competition for it (Ekins, Simon, Deutsch, Folke, & De Groot, 2003; Le Billon, 
2001; Savenije, 2002).  
In particular, this dissertation treats of competition for common water flows. When natural resources 
are neither private nor public property but are common property, there are particular ways and 
specific institutions to deal with competition. The literature on common pool resources in new 
institutional economics tackles such issues. However, this strand of literature pays little attention to 
the fact that institutions that deal with competition are shaped by the agency of those implicated in the 
common pool resources. It largely ignores that competition for scarce common pool resources 
involves contestation among socially and economically differentiated users who can exercise more or 
less power to shape institutions and to gain access to resources (Leach, Mearns, & Scoones, 1999) 
(Cleaver, 2002; Mehta, Leach, & Scoones, 2001). Such issues are the domain of the post-
institutionalist literature.   
Studying competition for water unavoidably leads to the ongoing debate about the relation between 
renewable natural resources and violent conflict. There are three main lines of thinking. According to 
the environmental security literature scarcity of renewable natural resources such as water is a likely 
cause of violent conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1999). The common pool resource (CPR) literature purports 
that conflicts over scarce resources can be overcome with a suitable set of institutions (Ostrom, 1990). 
The political ecology literature admits that competition for scarce natural resources can give rise to 
violent conflict. But it does not necessarily do so. Nor is the relation a direct causal one. This strand of 
literature argues that conflicts that appear to arise over scarce resources are likely to be embedded in 
history and in broader social tensions. They are likely to happen in concurrence with other factors that 
are conducive to violent conflict (Le Billon, 2001; Peluso & Watts, 2001; Turner, 2004).  
While the analysis of conflict often takes a macro-perspective, conflict essentially originates from 
individuals‟ decisions. A micro-level perspective is more appropriate to understand why individuals, 
who repeatedly interact with their surroundings, decide to engage in violence, for instance while 
competing for natural resources (Verwimp et al., 2009).  
In the following sections we first describe the particular characteristics of water. Then we review the 
main contributions of the different strands of literature that deal with access to resources, resource 
governance and conflicts over resources. We discuss some of the shortcomings and identify the gaps 
in the literature that will be addressed in this research.   
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Water: A Special Type of Good 
Water has unique characteristics (Savenije, 2002). First, water is essential. Without it there is no life, 
no economic production and no environment. Besides, water has no substitutes. Secondly, water is 
scarce. The amount is limited by the amount of freshwater that circulates through the atmosphere in 
an interconnected system. The fluid and rival nature of water makes that this system risks congestion 
and is characterised by downstream externalities. Moreover, the fluidness and bulkiness make that 
water is mostly not freely tradable. Only to some extent water can be traded, for instance in the form 
of „virtual water‟ which is the water used in the production of a good or service (Allan, 2003)2. 
Besides, a market for water would not be homogeneous. Some users, like domestic users and industry, 
demand a small amount of water and have a high willingness to pay. Other users, like farmers, have 
higher demand but a lower willingness (and ability) to pay. The environment has no ability to pay. 
The market may not be the best suited forum to make trade-offs between these different user 
categories (Savenije, 2002). Besides, treating water as a private, tradable good is objectionable given 
the fact that water is critical natural capital, is essential and non-substitutable (Ekins, Simon et al. 
2003; (Savenije, 2002). 
As a good, water shows similarities with public goods because of its low excludability, the societal 
dependency and the (high) provision costs that result in positive externalities that are not easily 
remunerated (Savenije, 2002). Water differs from public goods because of its rival nature 
(Apesteguia, 2006). In most of its forms, water has the characteristics of a common pool resource. A 
common pool resource is a natural or man-made resource system, whose size or characteristics make 
it costly, but not impossible, to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use 
(Ostrom, 1990, p. 30).  
The Literature on Common Pool Resources in New Institutional Economics  
Classical economic theory is well suited to predict the exchange of private goods in full-information, 
competitive market settings (Cardenas & Ostrom, 2004). But it is ill-adapted to explain interactions 
over common pool resources or public goods. These are characterised by their low-excludability. 
Besides , providing public goods and common pool resources (CPR) entail social dilemmas where 
individual incentives may oppose group incentives (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008). The behaviour of 
individuals who contribute to the provision and who use public goods or CPR is not only motivated 
by economic factors such as material preferences, technology, and endowments. It is also motivated 
by social and psychological factors such as bounded rationality, social norms or social preferences 
(Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008). Individuals may be motivated by a combination of self-interest and 
                                                     
2
 Virtual water is defined as the volume of freshwater used to produce the product, measured at the place where 
the product was actually produced (Hoekstra & Chapagain, 2007). 
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other preferences, such as altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion, or conformity (Velez, Stranlund, & 
Murphy, 2009). The challenge is to construct a theory of human behaviour building on the classical 
economic model while including a wider range of motivations for individuals‟ behaviour (Cardenas & 
Ostrom, 2004).  
Ostrom (1990) took on the challenge to build a theory on common pool resources (CPR). This theory 
refutes Hardin‟s (1968) pessimistic view on the commons. In this view, open access to common pool 
resources inevitably leads to unsustainable overuse of the resources. The theory on CPR also counters 
Olson‟s (1965) view that rational self-interested individuals will not act in their common interest 
unless it concerns a small group or unless there is coercion. Such views led to presumptions that only 
central government should control natural resource systems or else that privatisation should provide 
incentives for sustainable and efficient resource use.  
Ostrom (1990) theoretically and empirically proved that users of common pool resources can make 
binding contracts to commit themselves to a cooperative strategy. Institutions, as rules of the game, 
are able to produce commonly beneficial outcomes by substituting for incomplete contracts, by 
minimising the cost of monitoring others‟ behaviour and by reducing uncertainty (Mehta et al., 2001; 
Ostrom, 1990). In fact, institutions as rules of the game transform key elements involved in individual 
decisions. They have three functions that affect individuals‟ decisions to cooperate. First, institutions 
reinforce social norms that are consistent with rules. Secondly, they allow people to gather 
information about behaviour of others. Thirdly, they entitle people to monitor others‟ behaviour and 
reward or punish it by means of (non-)material incentives (Cardenas & Ostrom, 2004).  
To understand the dilemmas CPR users are faced with and how institutions can produce commonly 
beneficial outcomes, it is useful to distinguish between the stock of resources, such as a water 
reservoir, and the resource units (Ostrom, 1990). Ensuring the provision of CPR requires the 
construction and maintenance of the resource stock and a regulation of resource unit extraction so that 
extraction rates do not adversely affect resource itself. Since it is costly to exclude users from the 
resource system, users may be tempted to free ride and may refrain from contributing to provision.  
The willingness to contribute to provision of the resources depends on whether the assignment of 
access rights and the duties are considered fair, economic, certain and properly enforced (Ostrom, 
1990). More specifically, the marginal returns of appropriating resource units and contributing to 
provision in the CPR system should be higher than the marginal costs. In addition, the risks associated 
to uncertain access to resources, caused for instance by conflicts over resource access, should be 
sufficiently reduced so that CPR users can invest in productive activities that otherwise would not be 
economically viable. 
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But, to protect access rights of users and to avoid overuse of the resource, CPR users should be able to 
credibly commit to their rules on appropriation (Ostrom, 1990). At each instance of resource 
extraction, CPR users may evaluate if following the appropriation rules is their best strategy, given 
others‟ strategies and given the potential to be detected and the costs associated to (social) sanctions. 
Credible commitment is not straightforward. In most CPR systems, there are no external enforcers. 
Promises of keeping one‟s commitment if others keep theirs may not suffice. In many CPR systems, 
credible commitment is ensured via mutual monitoring. The extent to which appropriators will 
comply with the rules still depends on various factors such as the specific institutions, the physical 
attributes of the resource system and the user-specific costs and returns associated to resource use and 
rule breaking. 
In developing communities, where the state is often weakly present at the local level, the institutions 
in place to provide public goods and CPR and to regulate the use of CPR often consist of local norms 
and rules of conduct (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008). Such norms and rules of conduct are generally 
context-specific and may vary with the local economic conditions. Moreover, there is evidence that 
behaviour in small-scale communities in developing countries is more norm-driven and less sensitive 
to the strategic environment than in western society (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008; Joseph Henrich et 
al., 2006).  
Empirical research and theorisation on how institutions interact with behavioural predispositions and 
economic decision making and on how institutions determine or constrain choices is ongoing 
(Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008). This implies that various issues are still widely debated. 
Generally, the assumption of rational agents is relaxed in new institutional economics and in the CPR 
literature (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008). It is recognised that agents make decisions in complex and 
uncertain situations, characterised by asymmetric information, market imperfections and self-
enforcing mechanisms. Agents are seen as boundedly rational. This means that agents face cognitive 
limitations since they cannot grasp all necessary information, for instance on others‟ actions and 
others‟ discount rates. Agents can also make systematic cognitive errors and biased judgments. 
Besides, it is acknowledged that agents‟ behaviour is socially embedded and mediated by social 
relations  
While the social embeddedness and the influence of social relations on individuals‟ behaviour are 
acknowledged in this literature, in general an instrumental view on social capital is adopted. Social 
capital commonly refers to the mechanism of social relationships as such networks, norms and trust to 
induce people toward cooperation (Hayami, 2009). Not only is this literature criticised for being 
„undersocialised‟, it is also blamed for being depoliticised (Leach et al., 1999). Institutions function as 
coordinating devices as well. This means institutions can harmonise otherwise conflicting preferences 
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and actions that result from self-interested behaviour (Platteau, 2005). The CPR literature is criticised 
for not taking into account that institutions take shape while agents, with conflicting interests and with 
different degrees of power, bargaining strength and influence, negotiate over scarce resources (Leach 
et al., 1999; Saleth & Dinar, 2004). It also tends to overlook that agents‟ decisions over resources are 
embedded in their community‟s power relations (Leach et al., 1999; Mehta et al., 2001).  
Lastly, this literature generally focuses on efficient and sustainable use of CPR. It devotes little 
attention to equity in the entitlement to resources even while it recognises that a resource distribution 
that is regarded fair by the users is important to sustain trust, reciprocity, mutual commitment and 
CPR provision (Baland & Platteau, 1998; Ostrom, 1990).  
The Post-Institutionalist Literature on Common Pool Resources 
While appreciating the advances made in understanding collective action and CPR governance, the 
post-institutionalist literature argues that the CPR literature ill-reflects the complexity and dynamics 
of institutions and presents a depoliticised and undersocialised picture of institutions for resource 
governance. It raises several points of critique.  
A first point of critique concerns the effect of community heterogeneity on CPR governance and 
resource entitlements. The CPR literature is mainly dealing with the effect of economic heterogeneity 
on shared beliefs, shared norms and sanctioning mechanisms and the consequences for the sustainable 
use of CPR (e.g. (Baland, Bardhan, & Bowles, 2007; Ruttan, 2008). The post-institutionalist literature 
focuses on other sources of community heterogeneity. It looks at heterogeneity linked to social 
factors, to the prevailing power structure or to the different functions that CPR have for different 
users. Ultimately, this literature is interested in the entitlements to resources that result from CPR 
governance and the equity thereof. It starts from the contested nature of resource claims. It argues that 
the fact that actors are positioned differently in social and power relations in their communities makes 
that some claims may prevail over others (Bogale & Korf, 2007; Leach et al., 1999; Mehta et al., 
2001).  
Secondly, the post-institutionalist literature criticises the new institutional economics and CPR 
literature for disregarding the dynamic relationship between individuals and institutions (Cleaver, 
2002; Mehta et al., 2001). In fact, post-institutionalists link structure and agency and argue that 
people‟s actions shape structural mechanisms like institutions (Long & Long, 1992). In their view, 
structure, rules and norms emerge as the result of people‟s practices and actions, intended or 
unintended. These structures, rules and norms shape people‟s actions through orientation. They 
constrain and enable certain possibilities (Giddens, 1984). Hence, in this literature institutions are not 
viewed as the rules themselves, but as the regularised patterns of behaviour that emerge from 
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underlying structures or sets of „rules in use‟ (Leach et al., 1999, p. 237). Rather than existing as a 
fixed framework, institutions are constantly made and remade through people's practices (Berry, 
1989). Such a view allows understanding the dynamics that originate from institutional and legal 
pluralism, which are a reality in many development contexts (Leach et al., 1999; Meinzen-Dick & 
Pradhan, 2002). Such an actor-oriented approach of understanding institutions approach also allows to 
take into account the influence of social difference and of power relations on the way institutions take 
shape (Leach et al., 1999). Cleaver (2002) elaborated on this.  
Cleaver (2002) argues that social power plays an important role in processes of institutional shaping. 
Some individuals are freer to act and less bound by constraints. This depends on their characteristics 
like their wealth, gender or status in society. Otherwise, social power can be strategically used by 
putting more weight on shaping the rules to favour one‟s interests. Since institutions, as coordinating 
devices, take shape while actors with conflicting interests and with different degrees of social power 
negotiate over scarce resources, entitlements to resources are likely to be skewed by differences in 
social power as well.  
It is necessary therefore to recognise differences in social power amongst resource users and to 
understand the origin and determinants of such inequalities. But one should be aware that social 
relations and power relations are dynamic and that the degree of individuals‟ social power is not 
necessarily reflected from specific social roles or productive identities (Cleaver, 2002). 
Cleaver‟s (2002) stance on agency is in between the assumption that individuals are (boundedly) 
rational and the more sociological, „oversocialised‟ view that leaves little room for actors‟ choices 
(Granovetter, 1985). She portrays individuals as agents who are embedded in their cultural 
environment and in the social structure of their communities and who act, consciously and 
unconsciously, upon circumstances that confront them. While doing so, they borrow, blend or 
reinterpret (elements) from „informal‟ and „formal‟ institutions. In an ad-hoc way, their practices 
shape institutions, i.e. the regularised patterns of behaviour.  
Thirdly, the post-institutionalist literature not only highlights dynamism in the institutions but also in 
the environment itself. Institutions undergo changes through people‟s practices but also under 
influence of other factors beyond their control like policy or market changes. The environment and 
the resource systems undergo changes under the influence of more or less exogenous forces like 
climate change but also via the way they are governed by the community. This implies that the 
outcome of institutional design on the environment and on entitlements is unpredictable (Leach et al., 
1999). 
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The post-institutionalist literature is appreciated for adding nuance to the CPR literature and for 
emphasising the contested nature of resources and the endogenous and socially embedded nature of 
local institutions for CPR governance. Yet, it is faced with some important challenges some of which 
will be addressed in this dissertation. First, the post-institutionalist framework for analysis, like the 
one presented by Leach et al. (1999, p. 234), holds too many endogenous relationships between too 
many variables on too many scales and entails too many dynamics so that it becomes next to 
impossible to formally test any hypothesis (Figure 1). Therefore, in this dissertation only some of the 
relations presented in this framework are analysed (Dotted circles in Figure 1). This research looks at 
the way endowments are transformed to entitlements while taking into account the effect of social 
differentiation. The analysis is limited to institutions for common pool resources governance at a 
micro-level and meso-level. The dynamics of such institutions are studied by looking how they are 
shaped while solving resource conflict in the wake of increasing market penetration, increasing 
climate variability and greater institutional pluralism. The effect of one particular ecological dynamic, 
namely scarcity, is taken into account.  
Secondly, post-institutionalists assume agency of individuals within the constraints of their cultural 
and social context and its institutions. But they seem to avoid any model in which they can 
systematically observe individuals‟ decisions and in which they can uncover such constraints. In this 
research a framed field experiment is used to address this shortcoming (in Part II and Part IV). 
Thirdly, other major challenges lie in the fact that the post-institutional theoretical framework is not 
grounded in solid empirical proof that could convince the ones they criticise, being new institutional 
economists, practitioners and policy makers involved in resource management. In the remainder we 
specify the empirical shortcomings of the post-institutionalist literature and explain how these issues 
are tackled in this research.  
A first empirical shortcoming relates to the role of social power and social differentiation in 
negotiations over entitlement to resources and in the shaping of institutions (Cleaver, 2002; Leach et 
al., 1999; Mehta et al., 2001). While warning for measuring social identity and social power by 
merely looking at specific social roles or at certain productive identities, no measurable indicators are 
suggested for these main variables. In this dissertation two indicators of structural social inequalities 
embedded in the communities, gender and social status, are singled out. One‟s relative social status in 
the community is used as a proxy indicator for one‟s social power in the community (See p. 39 for a 
definition). A direct measure of actors‟ relative social status is used, based on the perception of 
community members.  
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Figure 1: Environmental Entitlements Framework (Leach et al., 1999, p. 234)
3
  
There is a second empirical challenge. Post-institutionalists emphasise the need to examine the layer 
of property practices. This means the way resource governance institutions are shaped through 
contestation, reproduction and transformation should be uncovered while studying the role of social 
power. Additionally, the way social power is played out during negotiations that transform resource 
claims into entitlements should be examined (Bogale & Korf, 2007; Cleaver, 2002; Leach et al., 
1999). Often such analyses are based on ex-post interpretations of processes of institutional shaping 
and on ex-post observations of (differentiated) entitlements (Cleaver, 2002; Sehring, 2009). Possibly, 
a lot of information is lost in this way, for instance on the inception and dynamics of such processes. 
It could also introduce a selection bias as only cases will be observed where agency shaped 
institutions and where power relations played a role.  
In this research a case-based approach was adopted to provide empirical evidence on the layer of 
property practices. In Part III, it is analysed how disputes over resources are solved while observing 
how those involved in the disputes borrowed from different sets of institutions, blended rules and 
norms or used new styles of thinking. By explicitly relating such processes of institutional shaping to 
individual characteristics that link to structural social inequalities embedded in the communities, it 
                                                     
3
 Dotted circles are added to indicate the aspects covered in this dissertation. 
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was shown that this happened in a socially embedded way. Additionally, in Part II, individual 
behaviour in a framed field experiment was related to individual characteristics like gender and social 
status. This provided empirical evidence that social differentiation can put (internalised) constraints 
on individual decisions on resource sharing. 
A third empirical challenge lies in studying the dynamic nature of institutions and the environment. 
Studying dynamics requires specific research methods. With the case-based approach adopted in this 
research some of the local dynamics of institutions could be uncovered (Part III). By introducing 
resource scarcity in a framed field experiment some of the (exogenous) dynamics of the environment 
could be replicated. As such, we could study the effect of resource scarcity on individual resource 
sharing behaviour and on (conflicts over) entitlements (Part II and Part IV). 
Access to and Conflicts over Resources from a Political Ecology Perspective 
Political ecology arose as a critique against the apolitical perspectives adopted in environmental and 
developmental research. It argues that the transformation of nature into commodities is a political 
process. This process of transformation involves contestation and negotiation over control and access 
to natural resources and over the means to turn them into commodities. Contestation and negotiation 
happen within political arenas in which power constellations, social relations and social identities may 
play a decisive role. The process of transformation of nature into commodities can happen in a 
peaceful, cooperative way, but it can also happen in an atmosphere of conflict. This depends on the 
pattern of social relations and the quality of the institutions (Le Billon, 2001).  
From this perspective, political ecology criticises the environmental security literature, the literature 
on post-cold war armed conflict and the common pool resource literature for having a simplistic, a-
historical and depoliticised view on the relation between resources and violent conflict (Le Billon, 
2001; Peluso & Watts, 2001; Turner, 2004). Political ecology scholars argue that providing answers 
on the causes of resource-related conflicts requires an analysis of related and underlying factors. It 
requires that the physical aspects of resources, the political economic features and the moral and 
material incentives behind resource-related conflicts are analysed. It also requires an understanding of 
how resource-related conflicts are embedded in history and in broader social tensions (Le Billon, 
2001; Turner, 2004).  
Political ecology points to some other weaknesses in the literature on resource-related conflicts. First, 
while the environmental security literature purports there is a causal relation between resource 
scarcity and conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1999), the literature on post-cold war armed conflict links 
resource abundance to conflict (Paul Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). But in fact, it depends on the type of 
resource whether resource abundance or resource scarcity potentially lead to conflict (Le Billon, 
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2001). When it concerns point resources that are easily lootable and have a high marginal value, 
abundance may be a driver for conflict. When it concerns diffuse, non-lootable resources with a low 
marginal value, scarcity may lead to conflict. But, neither abundance nor scarcity of resources is a 
necessary or sufficient driver of conflict.  
Secondly, physical scarcity (or abundance) is often pointed out to be the main cause of resource-
related conflicts. The political ecology literature states that such conflicts develop as social 
phenomena. While physical availability is one aspect, the relative abundance or scarcity of resources 
is partly socially constructed as it depends on livelihoods, markets and commodity chains (Le Billon, 
2001). Turner (2004) argues that at first sight conflicts may seem to relate to resource scarcity. But a 
closer look may reveal underlying social tensions, protection of moral issues, different views on 
resource commoditisation or longer-term strategic motives. Or, resource-related conflicts can have 
roots in feelings of marginalisation and frustration about corruption and injustice (Benjaminsen, 
Maganga, & Abdallah, 2009).  
Thirdly, another critique on the environmental security literature is that it is empirically grounded in 
the analysis of cases where environmental scarcity coincided with (political) violence. Cases with 
environmental scarcity but no violence have been neglected. This selection bias and the a priori 
attention to scarcity as causal mechanism make it difficult to make out why violent conflict occurs in 
some and not in other cases (Bogale & Korf, 2007; Turner, 2004). 
To approach resource-related conflicts from a political ecology perspective, the following issues 
should be addressed (Turner, 2004). First, it is essential to study both cases of conflict and 
cooperation (Bogale & Korf, 2007). Secondly, a distinction should be made between scarcity-induced 
or availability-induced conflicts because the underlying logic behind scarcity-induced and 
opportunity-driven competition is different. Thirdly, it should be determined whether conflicts are 
actually over natural resources or if these are social conflicts in which resources are implicated. 
Fourthly, if indeed the conflict concerns competitive struggles over resources, it is essential to discern 
to what extent it is an ad-hoc scramble or it is part of more strategic contests over maintaining access 
to resources in the future. In this regard, one should acknowledge that access to resources is 
constantly negotiated in small scale communities (Berry, 1989). While there will always be conflicts 
of interests over resources, violence is generally not the preferred option to deal with this (Turner, 
2004). Hence, where access and use of resources are contested, it is necessary to explore all kinds of 
political action that are applied to deal with this. While examining resource-related conflicts, it is 
important to uncover how social power is exercised in the negotiations that follow conflict of interests 
and to assess how moral claims, historical precedent, and community norms are invoked. It is also 
necessary to investigate how different accounts of the conflict may serve certain interests. Finally, an 
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analysis that looks at the social roots of resource-related conflicts requires a thorough understanding 
of the social and political hierarchy in small scale communities.  
This research partly embraces a political ecology perspective. First, water scarcity is a real issue in 
our case study sites. Besides, trends like increasing market penetration and climate variability 
potentially increase scarcity and competition for accessing the resource. Yet, while disputes arise in 
the cases studied here, they do not lead to violence. Secondly, this research examines to what extent 
community norms, factors linked to structural inequalities and (social) power can explain how 
resources are shared and how disputes over resources are resolved. While political ecology sticks to a 
more ethnographic approach, this research combines this with a micro-economic and institutional 
economic approach.  
A Micro-Level Analysis of Conflict 
In the last decennia there has been a growing interest in the economic literature to understand the 
drivers of violent conflict. Much of the literature on the drivers of violent conflict have an 
international, national or regional focus (Verwimp et al., 2009). Yet, cross-country studies are not 
suited to capture triggers or stops of violence that are only visible at the micro-level. It is impossible 
to make inferences about individual decisions to start or participate in violence. Within country, cross-
regional studies that relate indicators or predictors of violence to local economic conditions are an 
improvement (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). But such analyses often suffer from data quality and 
endogeneity problems. They may also face a selection bias if data on violence is collected from 
western, English media. As with cross-country studies, no inference is possible on individual 
motivations to join in or start violence. Besides, there may be problems of reverse causality in the 
sense that conflict may cause poverty but poverty may be a driver for conflict as well. 
Essentially, the decision to participate in violent conflict or to behave in a violent way is made at the 
individual or household level (Justino, 2009; Verwimp et al., 2009). What is needed is a micro-level 
analysis of the motives of individuals, households or groups to participate in violent conflict or to 
react with violent confrontation. But there is little systematic theoretical or empirical research that 
links behaviour of individuals, households, or groups with processes of violent conflict, with support 
to armed groups or with participation in collective violence (Verwimp et al., 2009). Recently, some 
advances have been made in this field. We review some of that literature in Part IV.  
One of the problems of a micro-level analysis of violent conflict is confronted with, is data collection 
(Verwimp et al., 2009). Security, ethical and logistical problems complicate data collection during 
conflict. Some use data collected before and/or after the conflict whether or not collected purposely. 
They then relate individual or household characteristics to other data on conflict. Many focus on post-
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conflict consequences for livelihoods. Others link individual or household characteristics to 
perpetration in the genocide in Rwanda (Verwimp, 2005) or to recruitment into armed groups 
(Guichaoua, 2009; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008).  
Furthermore, while there is evidence that material incentives are not always a (major) factor in 
individual decisions to fight, there is a better theorisation of potential economic motivations for 
conflict than of psychologically and socially related motivations (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). Some 
argue that moral, ideological or ethnic grievances play a bigger role in the decision to use violence or 
to participate in violence. But in analyses linking non-material incentives to violent behaviour often 
crude measures for non-material factors, like political grievances or marginalisation, are used. There 
is a need to improve on such measures and to test their association with actual behaviour. Recent 
behavioural and experimental economic research has shown that non-material incentives like fairness 
and grievances are salient in decision making. For instance, it has been shown that individuals are 
willing to punish others for breaking social norms at a considerable private cost. Experimental 
economics is one of the ways forward to shedding a light on individual decisions to participate in 
violence. 
In this research some of the issues raised here are addressed. A micro-level analysis is adopted. The 
individual decisions to react with conflictive behaviour to water scarcity are studied using a framed 
field experiment. The experiment permits to evaluate the importance of material incentives like 
payoffs and other incentives like fairness norms to explain behaviour. In addition, individual 
behaviour is related to individual characteristics that are of a material and non-material nature, such as 
the individual‟s social status position in the community. Another quality of experiments is the ability 
to elicit a reaction to different circumstances by the same people. Observational data cannot provide 
the same information as people may not be able or not be willing to answer to (hypothetical) questions 
about the likelihood behaving in a conflictive way in various circumstances. The predictive value of 
an ex-ante assessment of individuals‟ potential conflictive or violent behaviour measured in an 
experiment could be called into question. Yet it may provide some answers to why some individuals 
behave in confrontational way and others do not.  
Sharing Scarce Common Resources: Research at the Crossroads  
Studying common water flows and conflicts over water while having a background in micro-
economic development research while pursuing a PhD in political sciences challenged us to engage in 
multi-disciplinary research. The topic of our research led us to the new institutional economic 
literature and to the literature on micro-level analysis of violent conflict, both situated in the economic 
sciences. It also led us to the post-institutional literature and political ecology literature that are rooted 
in political and social sciences. New institutional economics and post-institutionalism both provide 
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important insights in how local social order comes about and how it coordinates actors‟ preferences 
and actions. Micro-level analysis of violent conflict and political ecology both provide a framework 
for understanding conflicts over resources. But each framework has its shortcomings. Economic 
models have the advantage of both using solid models for empirical analysis and being able to 
formally test hypothesis. But they have been criticised for having too little attention for the social 
reality in which actors make decisions as well as for being depoliticised. Sociology has been at the 
forefront for theorising about interdependencies between social reality and actor‟s decisions but most 
models have an „oversocialised‟ view (Granovetter, 1985). Sometimes a formal analytical framework 
is lacking. The literature grounded in political sciences and development studies provides insight in 
power. The idea that power drives development processes is not new, but explicitly integrating power 
as a parameter in these processes is relatively recent (Eyben, Harris, & Pettit, 2006). Another idea that 
has entered development thinking is that power and differentiation linked to the social structure of the 
community have a serious impact on actors‟ capabilities and their access to resources (Collinson, 
2003; Leach et al., 1999). But the need to develop a formal framework for analysing how power 
relations shape institutions and influence actor‟s decisions in non-polity domains remains.  
The focus and methods of each of the theoretical frameworks discussed above differ and different 
questions are asked. But each framework contributes to understanding competition for scarce common 
resources. The lack of bridging between these theoretical frameworks and the fact that none of these 
went far enough to get the whole, complex picture have been a personal frustration. We agree that the 
undersocialised and depoliticised analyses in new institutional economics and in micro-economic 
analyses of violent conflict miss out on some important explanatory variables. And while the post-
institutional literature and political ecology literature pose the questions we want to address, we are 
concerned with their empirical shortcomings. Their analyses are not always empirically validated in 
such a way that they can convince new institutional or development economist and policy makers who 
are used to rigorous (statistical) analysis and who sometimes doubt the replicability and 
generalisability of qualitative research (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994).  
That is why, in this research, we address questions similar to the ones posed in the post-institutional 
and political ecology literature. These deal with the influence of social structural differences like 
gender, social status and power relations on sharing common resources, on entering into conflict over 
scarce resources and on resolving resource conflicts. But to answer these questions, we adopt a 
multidisciplinary approach for theory and empirics and use more rigorous and quantitative methods 
for empirical validation. We keep a micro-level perspective while doing so.  
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Data and Methodology  
Selection of the Case Study and Sampling Procedures 
The topic of this research is access to and conflicts over water in a development context. The research 
is defined to studying access to and conflict over productive water that is derived from common water 
flows. More particularly, this research looks at productive water derived from commonly governed 
smallholder irrigation schemes. The choice for irrigation water is motivated by its contribution to 
agricultural livelihoods in development contexts. The choice for smallholder irrigation schemes is 
motivated by the fact that governance of irrigation water can be allotted to a well-defined community.  
 
 
Figure 2: Tanzania and the Rufiji River Basin (United Republic of Tanzania, 2002, p. 49; World Atlas)
4
 
                                                     
4
 Red lines represent basin boundaries, blue lines are rivers and blue areas are water bodies. 
Rufiji River basin 
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Access to and conflicts over water in semi-arid sub-Sahara Africa, more particularly in semi-arid 
areas of Tanzania, are studied (Figure 2). Semi-arid sub-Sahara Africa has been chosen because its 
changing „landscape‟ provides an interesting background. Many countries in sub-Sahara Africa 
adopted or renewed their policies for governance of water and other natural resources, their policies 
for agricultural development and their policies for decentralisation (Ribot, Lund, & Treue, 2010). In 
many sub-Sahara African countries, economic development brings about an increasing integration of 
the village level in regional, national and global markets (Reardon & Barrett, 2000). Other changes 
with a significant impact are population growth and climate change (United Nations Development 
Programme, 2006). Another reason to choose semi-arid sub-Sahara Africa is the fact that the 
discourse that links water scarcity to violent conflict puts it in the centre of attention (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2006). 
The reasons to choose Tanzania are twofold. First, Tanzania provides a representative example of the 
changing landscape in sub-Sahara Africa. The second reason is pragmatism. Thanks to two and a half 
years of work experience in the country, both in rural and urban Tanzania, we could rely on the 
network we had built up in the Tanzanian NGO and research community. Besides, our knowledge of 
the local language, Swahili, proved to be an indispensable asset in conducting field research.  
Figure 3: Mufindi District in the Rufiji River Basin (Bernacset, 1981) 
Yet, the topic is central in this research. Therefore, this research could have been done in another 
development setting. This does not mean that conducting the research in a different setting would 
 
 
Mufindi District Rufiji River basin 
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have produced exactly the same results. The context of Tanzania is expected to have had a significant 
influence on the findings because of the socially and culturally embedded nature of resource 
governance institutions. 
Within Tanzania, Mufindi district has been selected. Mufindi district is located in the Southern 
Highlands in Tanzania. Its water sources are part of the Rufiji River basin (Figure 3). Mufindi district 
is chosen because of the relative importance of irrigated agriculture for both food and cash crops 
(Majule & Mwalyosi, 2005; Mkavidanda & Kaswamila, 2001). More particularly, the field study has 
been conducted in the lowlands of the district (altitude between 1,500 and 2,000 meters). These are 
characterised by a semi-arid climate with an average annual rainfall between 600 and 700 mm that is 
concentrated in one rainy season that lasts from (end) November till April (Chang‟a, Yanda, & 
Ngana, 2010; United Republic of Tanzania, 1999, 2006b). This makes that farmers and irrigators are 
confronted with a recurrent seasonal scarcity of water.  
In the semi-arid lowland areas of Mufindi district, five sites have been selected where “traditional”, 
smallholder irrigation is practised (Figure 4). The objective was not to have a sample of irrigation 
schemes representative for the district. Nevertheless, the five irrigation schemes are similar to other 
irrigation schemes in the semi-arid lowlands of Mufindi district and in the wider region. The irrigation 
schemes have been selected according to our research requirements and in accord with the Mufindi 
district authorities. Local experts on smallholder irrigation have helped in selecting the sites.  
“Traditional” smallholder irrigation schemes in Mufindi district typically consist of a system of canals 
diverted from a river (Figure 5). Most irrigation schemes can be attributed to a specific village or 
neighbourhood
5
 (Koopman, Kweka, Mboya, & Wangwe, 2001; Majule & Mwalyosi, 2005; 
Mkavidanda & Kaswamila, 2001). Most irrigation schemes could be easily demarcated using 
participatory mapping (see further). 
                                                     
5
 Obviously, there are downstream users and upstream users located outside the villages or communities to 
which the irrigation schemes can be attributed. But as our research focuses on allocation and conflicts within the 
community, we did not collect data on (problems with) external downstream and upstream users. 
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Figure 4: Agro-ecological Zones in Mufindi District (Dotted Circle Indicates Field Study Area) (United 
Republic of Tanzania, 2006b) 
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Via participatory mapping, inventories of all irrigators cultivating a plot in each of the irrigation 
schemes were obtained. From these inventories random samples of irrigators were drawn to 
participate in the different data collection exercises. The samples of irrigators from each of the 
irrigation schemes are representative for the scheme in question.  
Some data was collected via group exercises. To ensure that different types of irrigators were 
represented in the group exercises a mixed group of irrigators was invited via the village chairman or 
village executive officer. It was seen to it that the group was mixed with regard to gender, upstream 
and downstream location in the irrigation scheme, age, size of the irrigated plot and economic well-
being. Data has been collected in two rounds. The first round of data collection took place from June 
until August 2008. The second round took place in May 2009. 
 
Figure 5: Smallholder Irrigation Scheme 
The Relationship between Access to Water and to Land 
Generally, access to water depends on access to land. One could argue therefore that appropriation of 
land and conflicts over land should also be treated in this research. Yet, competition for water follows 
a different dynamic and a different logic.  
More particularly, in the irrigation schemes studied here, competition for irrigation water arises more 
frequently than competition for plots of land. Once irrigable land is acquired, people will want to 
extract water on a regular basis. While extracting, people will compete with other water users. 
Besides, the dilemma of sharing irrigation water differs from competing for land. Irrigation water is 
common pool resource and land is a private good. Therefore, accessing water and land are subject to 
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different conditions and different transactions. For instance, entitlement to land may depend on 
inheritance and entitlement to water may depend on contributions to maintenance of irrigation canals.  
In the context of commonly governed smallholder irrigation schemes like the ones studied here, the 
transactions involved in water appropriation are also less elaborate than those involved in land 
acquisition. Generally, water is appropriated by directing the water flow to one‟s plot of land in the 
irrigation scheme. This normally happens without many structured transactions. Land in such 
irrigation schemes is generally acquired via inheritance, via allocation by the village or traditional 
leaders and occasionally via sale or rent. Land acquisition involves more structured transactions.  
The focus of this research is on competition for water. Therefore, it deals with users‟ frequent 
interactions over extracting a share from a common water flow and conflicts that (could) arise over 
this. Competition for land is dealt with indirectly. Part III of this dissertation, which deals with 
resource conflicts and their resolution, treats some cases where disputes have arisen over land in the 
irrigation schemes. In most cases, the distribution of land in the irrigation schemes is a given fact 
when disputes over water crop up. Land distribution in the irrigation schemes is exogenous in the 
analyses based on a framed field experiment (Part II and Part IV). The experiment measures how 
irrigators distribute the common irrigation water presuming that they can access water via a plot of 
land that borders an irrigation canal. Being an upstream or downstream user in the experiment was 
independent of the irrigators‟ actual position in the irrigation schemes.  
The Position of the Researcher  
Research and data collection does not happen in a vacuum and in one way or another it has an impact 
on the communities and individuals implicated in data collection. Several measures have been taken 
to minimise the risk of a negative impact on the research subjects and to minimise possible 
uncontrollable interferences of the researcher and the research team on the data collected. These 
measures include informed consent, assurance of anonymity, risk assessment and a careful selection 
of the research team. 
First, all data was collected with informed consent from the research subjects. At the onset of every 
data collection exercise, research subjects were informed that the research was conducted for Ghent 
University in Belgium with permission from the Tanzanian Commission for Science and Technology, 
the Mufindi District Council, the village chairman and the village executive officer. The purpose and 
the limits of the research were explained. To avoid raising expectations of future interventions it was 
important to make clear that the research would not bring direct changes in the village. 
Understandably, research subjects counted on the research to have some impact. It was guaranteed 
that the findings and policy recommendations of the research would be shared with government 
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authorities and non-governmental bodies at village, district and national level while respecting 
anonymity. This was effectively done during the second round of data collection in May 2009. Based 
on the data collected in 2008, a feedback workshop was held in the district capital Mafinga in May 
2009 with district officials and NGO workers and a draft report was distributed. As every village was 
revisited during the second round of data collection the opportunity was taken to briefly give feedback 
to the village chairman. Additionally, copies of the participatory maps of each of the irrigation 
schemes were handed over. Furthermore, findings and draft papers were shared with REPOA, a Dar 
es Salaam based research institute, and the Tanzanian Commission for Science and Technology.  
Secondly, anonymity of research subjects was assured. At the start of every data collection exercise, 
research subjects were guaranteed that their names and names of other villagers would not be shared 
with third parties. The names of individuals and villages do not appear in the databases nor in any 
output this research produced. Names have been changed by codes. The coding and identity of 
respondents are kept in separate files by the principal researcher. 
Thirdly, there was a possibility that sharing resources and conflicts over resources were contentious 
issues in the studied irrigation communities. As a measure of risk management, the research team had 
considered possible opportunities for dialogue and mediation if data collection endeavours would 
have provoked tensions. If security risks would have arisen, the research project could also have 
reconsidered its approach. Additionally, information about possible tensions was sought on 
beforehand by consulting the district agricultural and livestock officer and village leaders. 
Nevertheless, suspicion vis-a-vis the research and reluctance to participate was initially encountered 
in one of the irrigation schemes. In fact, the main river feeding this particular irrigation scheme 
eventually flows into Ruaha River. Ruaha River is used by various sectors and efforts of integrated 
water resource management try to reconcile needs while sustaining the river flow. In this regard, plans 
had been made for a large-scale irrigation project for rice cultivation further downstream according to 
the people using the irrigation scheme and their leaders. The people using the irrigation scheme 
claimed to have been told to abandon small-scale irrigation in favour of the rice project. At first, there 
was suspicion that this research had something to do with these plans and the aims of this research 
project were distrusted. Eventually, after a lengthy discussion about the research team‟s affiliation and 
aims, trust was established and people were willing to participate.  
Fourthly, the research team was carefully selected and trained. The research team included ten 
interviewers, two research assistants, the team leader/facilitator and the principal researcher. The ten 
interviewers conducted the surveys. They were selected via the principal researcher‟s network and via 
a notice posted at the Sokoine University of Agriculture in Morogoro. A preliminary selection was 
made on the basis of the curriculum vitae of the candidates. A final selection took place at the end of a 
four-day training workshop. The training workshop was meant to practice on how to conduct the 
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surveys. It included an exercise in the field. The selected interviewers held a bachelor degree in 
agricultural engineering, rural development or agricultural economics and had ample experience with 
collecting data in rural areas in Tanzania. Two of the interviewers used to reside in Mufindi district. 
This was useful to give prior notice to village leaders as they knew the way. One of them was able to 
interview the few respondents who did not speak Swahili in the local language (Kihehe). In the field, 
the interviewers were supervised by the team leader and the principal researcher.  
Two research assistants were selected via the same canal as the interviewers. The research assistants 
had more experience, had conducted field research independently and had a higher degree. One of 
them held a master degree in agriculture. The other held a master degree in rural development and 
was acquainted with qualitative and quantitative data collection methods. The fact that the latter was a 
woman was important as some female respondents were more comfortable to address issues or 
concerns to her. Both research assistants assisted in the group discussions, mapping and ranking 
exercises and took notes. They also translated much of the data collection tools. The female research 
assistant also assisted in the semi-structured interviews in the second round of data collection. 
The team leader/facilitator supervised the research team and facilitated during all data collection 
exercises, except the survey, during both rounds of data collection. He was a former colleague of the 
principal researcher at a local NGO in Mufindi district. He held a degree in agriculture and had 
yearlong experience in extension work and data collection in rural Mufindi district. Another asset was 
his network in the district council and in the villages of Mufindi district.  
The principal researcher had work and research experience in Mufindi district as well as a fair 
knowledge of Swahili. Her experience in the district was appreciated by respondents as it proved she 
was not a “fly-in fly-out” researcher. Her knowledge of Swahili permitted to introduce herself and the 
research in Swahili. This reduced the distance with the research subjects. It also permitted her to 
actively follow the discussions and to understand and address issues that were raised during data 
collection.  
Working with a Tanzanian research team and the principal researcher‟s own experience in Tanzania 
facilitated to establish credibility and trust among the research subjects. Yet, there is a danger that the 
team leader‟s experience in extension work and the principal researcher‟s foreignness made that 
people attempted to give a good impression by trying to give „the right answer‟. The only way to 
assess and control for such effects would have been to replace the team leader and the principal 
researcher. But the advantage of having the same persons asking exactly the same questions in the 
framed field experiment, the ranking and mapping exercises, semi-structured interviews and the focus 
group discussions probably outweighs this danger. Another danger is that people tried to show they 
were in need of assistance. At one point, there was a feeling one of the village chairmen tried to do so. 
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But in the group discussions, the team leader/facilitator was always attentive to domination of the 
discussion by specific individuals. Besides, much of the data was collected at the individual level, 
which reduced the chance people‟s answers were influenced by others.  
Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods  
The multidisciplinary nature of the research and the research questions called for an empirical strategy 
using a mixed method approach. Both qualitative and quantitative methods have been applied for data 
collection (Cresswell, 2003). Mixed methods research is sometimes criticised by scholars who believe 
qualitative and quantitative methods are incompatible or should at least be kept separate because of 
the different scientific paradigms they are based on (e.g. (post-) positivism versus constructivism). 
Sometimes scholars who adhere to one or another paradigm question the underlying assumptions of 
other research paradigms and their associated research methods. Some scholars argue that purity of 
paradigms should be safeguarded (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003).  
Mixed methods research has several advantages though (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). First, by 
mixing methods the complexity and multiple facets of social phenomena can be elucidated. A more 
convincing and robust explanation of observed social processes can be provided. Besides, some of the 
facets can be better captured using qualitative, others using quantitative methods. Secondly, mixed 
methods research can answer questions that other methods cannot. It offers the opportunity to 
simultaneously test predicted relationships and answer questions about how that predicted relationship 
actually comes about. Thirdly, a mixed methods approach can be a pragmatic solution to challenges 
posed by multidisciplinary research (Cresswell, 2003; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). 
Data Collection 
Qualitative data was collected by means of focus group discussions, participatory mapping, 
participatory social status ranking and semi-structured interviews. Quantitative data was collected by 
means of a survey and a framed field experiment. All data on irrigators gathered via the different data 
collection methods can be linked through a unique individual identification code.  
All data was gathered during the first round of data collection from June until August 2008, except for 
the semi-structured interviews. These were conducted during the second round of data collection in 
May 2009.  
The data collection methods were designed and tested in consultation with two researchers from 
IDPM in Antwerp. Two researchers from the Soil Water Management Research Group at Sokoine 
University of Agriculture in Morogoro gave advice. Local experts on irrigated agriculture associated 
to the Mufindi District Council and to a local NGO, Incomet 2001, were also consulted. The survey 
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included an experiment measuring time preference whereby future payments had to be made to 
respondents. This was facilitated by the microfinance bank MuCoBa based in Mafinga. All data 
collection was done with consent from the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology 
(COSTECH), the Mufindi District Council, the village chairmen and village executive officers. 
a. The Level of Inquiry 
Since the research adopts a micro level of analysis of resource appropriation and resource conflicts, in 
principle the level of inquiry has been the individual. Individual level data also permits to assess the 
effect of individual characteristics such as gender and social status on appropriation behaviour and 
conflictive behaviour.  
In all data collection exercises, except in the focus group discussions, information has been collected 
about individual irrigators. The operational definition of an irrigator is the person in the household 
mainly responsible for cultivating the plot in the irrigation scheme and for making decisions regarding 
irrigated agriculture regardless of whether this person personally owns or rents the plot.  
Some survey data, however, concerns the irrigators‟ households. This includes data on housing or 
assets, for instance, which individuals typically share with their households. The household has been 
defined as the group of people who normally occupy one or adjoined housing units and make joint 
provisions for food and other essentials for living. It includes people that are not residing in the house 
at the time of the interviews, such as students or people travelling. 
b. Qualitative Methods of Data Collection: Participatory Mapping 
Participatory mapping of the five irrigation schemes studied in this research had two purposes (Figure 
6). One of the purposes was to obtain inventories of all irrigators cultivating a plot in each of the 
irrigation schemes from which random samples could be drawn. Such inventories of individuals using 
the irrigation schemes were absent even if most villages in Tanzania list all households and 
individuals living in the village.  
The other purpose was to obtain maps of each of the irrigation schemes as the irrigators perceived 
them. Sometimes participatory maps are avoided because they remain spatially confined to the social, 
cultural and economic domain of those who draw the map (Alcorn, 2000 ). In this case, obtaining a 
map and inventory of the irrigators‟ community that reflects the perception of the irrigators was 
exactly the objective as it is the arena perceived by the CPR users that is relevant for CPR 
governance. A physical survey by an outsider risked to wrongly define this arena or to miss out on 
locally important features.  
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Figure 6: Participatory Mapping 
One of the drawbacks of participatory mapping is that what is drawn on the maps and who is 
identified on the maps is sensitive to who is drafting the maps (Alcorn, 2000 ). To counter this, we 
invited a mixed group of 20 people who cultivate in the irrigation scheme to participate in the 
mapping exercise. The group was mixed with regard to gender, upstream and downstream location in 
the irrigation scheme, age, size of the irrigated plot and economic well-being. In each irrigation 
scheme, the participants were invited via the village chairman or village executive officer6. We 
assumed that the irrigators invited for mapping were well informed on the physical aspects of the 
irrigation scheme and were well acquainted with other irrigators in the same irrigation scheme. This 
seemed to be a realistic assumption since we observed little disagreement on the layout of the 
irrigation schemes and on who was cultivating which plot.  
Another risk is that some (elite) members of the community may dominate the participatory mapping 
exercise (Alcorn, 2000 ). To avoid this, the facilitator made sure every participant had the opportunity 
to provide input to mapping. There was special attention to equally involve women and youth in 
mapping because we expected they could possibly highlight different aspects or identify irrigators 
who would otherwise be neglected. To avoid that those holding the pen would dominate the exercise, 
we provided ample marker pens for drawing and distributed them purposely to young men, elder men, 
elder women and young women (Pretty, Guijt, Thompson, & Scoones, 1995 ).  
                                                     
6
 In some irrigation schemes, the village chairman was an irrigator himself and participated as well. 
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Figure 7: Participatory Map of Irrigation Scheme Mutua 
 
Figure 8: Participatory Map of Irrigation Scheme Isanu 
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The mapping of the irrigation schemes required a delimitation of the boundaries. Three of the five 
irrigation schemes had real physical boundaries. Figure 7 shows a participatory map of one of these 
irrigation schemes. The other two irrigation schemes were located in a valley and stretched out 
upstream and downstream. Figure 8 shows a participatory map of one of the irrigation schemes 
located in a valley. Mapping had to be delimited to a part of the irrigation scheme that hosted about a 
hundred irrigators who cultivate on aligned plots and most of whom reside in the same village. The 
participants decided on the boundaries. This may have been somewhat arbitrary as they stopped when 
they reached a hundred irrigators on the list.  
Practically, the exercise ran like this. Participants were asked to first draw the primary, secondary and 
tertiary canals on the map and to add any other marking features, such as bridges, intakes or swampy 
areas. Then, they indicated the direction of the water flow. After that, they drew the plots and 
identified the irrigator of each plot drawn on the map.  
c. Qualitative Methods of Data Collection: Focus Group Discussions 
In each of the irrigation schemes, the same participants took part in a focus group discussion after the 
mapping. The aim of the focus group discussion was to get a sense of the rules, norms and 
enforcement mechanisms for governing irrigation water in each of the irrigation schemes. Concretely, 
participants were asked what rule of thumb was applied to allocate and share water in the irrigation 
scheme at the time of data collection and during the previous dry season. They were asked where and 
when problems with water distribution such as disputes, stealing and so on, arose. Participants 
described what the problems entailed and who was involved. They were probed for their opinion on 
who was wrong and what was wrongful about their behaviour. Lastly, they explained how the 
problems were resolved, whether a compromise was reached, whether a mediator was involved and 
whether a fine or compensation was paid. Via these questions, an indication of the underlying norms 
and beliefs for water allocation and water sharing in the irrigation schemes was obtained. 
At first the participants were reluctant to admit that problems or conflicts over water distribution had 
arisen in their irrigation schemes. They emphasised they lived peacefully together and shared water 
without friction. We assured that we believed that they managed and shared water in a peaceful way. 
We underlined that it is normal that disagreements arise occasionally. We explained that the aim of 
the research was to understand how they solved their problems. Only then, the participants were 
willing to give information on problems and disputes that had arisen in the irrigation schemes. 
During the focus group discussions the role of the team leader/facilitator was crucial to ensure 
everyone participated in the discussion and no one could dominate the discussion. He actively 
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involved women in the discussion because they were more likely to keep quiet. This was effective and 
useful since women sometimes came up with other cases or other interpretations of the facts.  
d. Qualitative Methods of Data Collection: Participatory Ranking 
It has been argued that networks of personal relations and social power are important variables in 
processes of institutional evolution. Such relations and one‟s social position and power in the 
community‟s hierarchy greatly determine one‟s capability to shape institutions (Cleaver, 2002). 
Besides, distribution of resources and entitlement to resources are strongly connected to broader 
socio-political structures that underlie inequalities in the community, such as gender and social status 
(Leach et al., 1999). This is especially true in patriarchal, status-based societies in rural Africa 
(Platteau & Abraham, 2002; Silbersmidt, 2001). 
Yet, institutional theory is often deficient in identifying indicators that unambiguously reflect the 
degree of social power of resource users. Resource users can have overlapping identities and social 
roles. Social status, which is a collective judgment of the relative position of an individual in society 
and which is an important source of (social) power, may depend on various other ascribed or achieved 
characteristics (Cleaver, 2002; Weiss & Fershtman, 1998). Evaluating actors‟ social status and power 
in their community on the basis of their productive identities such as „farmers‟ or „traders‟, or on their 
social roles such as „leaders‟ or „youth‟, is problematic. It is based on assumptions about the relation 
between status, power and these social positions that cannot be easily validated (Cleaver, 2002).  
A contribution of this research consists of using a direct measure of actors‟ relative social status that is 
based on the perception of community members. This avoids relying on assumptions that are hard to 
validate. Besides, when it comes to distribution of irrigation water, the social hierarchy as it is 
perceived by the community of irrigators is more likely to be pertinent than any hierarchy drafted by 
an outsider based on whichever categorisation.  
To obtain such measure of actors‟ relative social status we conducted a participatory ranking exercise 
in each irrigation scheme with the same 20 participants that were involved in mapping and in the 
focus group discussions (Figure 9). Divided into four subgroups, the participants ranked all irrigators 
identified on the maps by social status. They did so by putting cards with the irrigators‟ names on a 
ladder that represented the social hierarchy in the community (more details on the participatory 
ranking exercise can be found in Part II and Part III).  
In order to rank irrigators according to their social status in the community, a common understanding 
of the concept „community‟ and the concept „social status‟ was essential. Community was defined as 
the group of irrigators using the specific irrigation scheme. This was likely to be the arena where 
people dealt with the governance of their common water flow.  
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Coming to common understanding and to an accurate translation of the concept social status was even 
more important but also more challenging. The original aim of the ranking exercise was to measure 
the relative power status of every irrigator in the irrigation scheme. But, as one‟s relative social status 
is highly positively correlated to one‟s relative power status in a society and more likely to be 
commonly understood, we opted to establish a ranking according to social status. „Hadhi ya jamii‟ and 
„uwezo‟ were used as the Swahili translations for social status. „Hadhi ya jamii‟ literally means „status 
in society‟ but this term is not widely used. „Uwezo‟ means „ability‟ and is generally interpreted as 
economic ability. The term also holds the notion of power (Kamusi Project). The participants were 
instructed to interpret ability broadly, including the ability to attain what one wants, the influence one 
can have on others, the ability to be respected and to be listened to. The concept of a social status 
hierarchy was represented by a ladder. If one is high on the ladder one is positioned high in the social 
status hierarchy, low on the ladder corresponds to a low position in the social status hierarchy (Singh-
Manoux, Marmot, & Adler, 2005). A thorough description and a hypothetical example by the 
facilitator further aided to come to a commonly understood concept of social status and a social status 
hierarchy.  
 
Figure 9: Participatory Ranking 
Still, the internal validity of the social status measure could be called into question. One could think it 
measures (economic) well-being rather than social status. In Part II the social status indicator is 
checked for correlations with wealth indicators like asset holding, housing quality and sources of 
income outside agriculture. Social status and economic well-being were found to be positively 
correlated. But economic well-being is not the sole determinant for social status. Additionally, post-
ranking group discussions about the advantages and disadvantages of having a relatively low or high 
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social status in the community confirmed the common understanding and internal validity of the 
concept. These discussions also highlighted the pertinence of social status as source of differentiation 
in the studied irrigation communities. 
In order to improve the quality of the measure for irrigators‟ relative social status in the community 
and reduce subjectivity we let four subgroups rank the same irrigators. These rankings were then 
transformed into a mean score. The mean score is less sensitive to subgroups ranking irrigators in the 
„wrong‟ way, for instance out of resentment or because they think some form of assistance could 
follow (Van Campenhout, 2007). It was also important that the participants were assured that the 
ranking remained secret. To prove so, the research team made sure the participants witnessed that the 
piles with ranked irrigators‟ name cards were put in a sealed envelope that remained with the principal 
researcher. To avoid embarrassment, overestimation or underestimation of one‟s own social status, the 
participants were not expected to rank themselves. Cards with names of subgroup participants were 
put aside. Another quality control measure consisted of close monitoring of the subgroups. This was 
done to ensure understanding of the ranking exercise and the concepts and to avoid that some 
individuals dominated the exercise.  
Finally, the participants were compensated for the half day they spent successively in the mapping 
exercise, the focus group discussion and the ranking exercise. Each participant received 1,000 TSH
7
.  
e. Qualitative Methods of Data Collection: Semi-Structured Interviews  
Institutions for conflict management are part and parcel of the institutional set-up for common 
resource governance (Ostrom, 1990). Initially, it was assumed that a clear-cut set of institutions for 
conflict management would be in place at the level of the irrigation schemes and that these would be 
easily identifiable. Yet, there was no fixed set of institutions for conflict management. At the 
irrigation scheme level, conflicts over water or land were observed to be solved in a pragmatic way 
and it was concluded that the institutions for conflict management were „under construction‟ (See Part 
III).  
Another initial assumption was that information on conflict management in the irrigation schemes 
could be obtained by scrutinising archives of local courts and other organisations involved in conflict 
resolution. But complaints over access to resources and disputes between irrigators were not treated in 
the formal bureaucratic set-up. One of the reasons is that all irrigators in the studied irrigation systems 
extract water without holding an official water right. As the preliminary assumptions proved wrong, 
the empirical strategy had to be adapted.  
                                                     
7
 With 1 US$ = 1,200 TSH 
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Instead, disputed resource claims and problems related to accessing water or land in the studied 
irrigation schemes became the starting point. These disputes formed the unit of analysis. The 
consecutive actions by various actors involved in the disputes were examined and the way the 
disputes were settled was investigated. As such the institutions for conflict management were 
uncovered. This proved to be a more useful strategy to study the flexible and pragmatic set of 
solutions for resource conflicts and to uncover actor-driven processes of institutional evolution.  
This micro-level case based analytical approach to studying conflict resolution and actor-driven 
processes of institutional evolution also allowed to explicitly take social differentiation and power 
relations into account. Concretely, the way of dealing with resource conflicts and the outcome of the 
conflicts were systematically related to the indicator for the relative social status of both the one(s) 
that were affected and the offender(s). Additionally, the way of settling disputes and the outcome was 
related to the gender of those involved. 
Irrigators who had been involved in resource conflicts in the recent past were identified via the 
participatory maps and via the survey data, which were collected during the first round of data 
collection (June until August 2008). These irrigators, the village chairmen (VC), the village executive 
officers (VEO) and, if present, irrigation scheme leaders took part in individual semi-structured 
interviews during the second round of data collection in May 2009. In total, ten men and six women 
reported on 25 different cases. Most cases occurred less than five years prior to data collection.  
The individual semi-structured interviews included questions on the subject and severity of the 
conflict, on irrigators involved and the location of their irrigated plot, on timing and recurrence of the 
conflict, on who mediated the conflict or who enforced rules and on sanctions. Lastly, also the 
respondent‟s viewpoint was asked on what rules or norms were broken and who turned out to have 
won or lost the conflict.  
Most respondents did not hesitate to talk about the cases. Some of them did. Some guarantees were 
needed to make them overcome their hesitation. Interviews were conducted in private, anonymity was 
assured and the respondents were guaranteed their account would remain secret and would appear 
with coded names in any research output. It also helped that it was the research team‟s second visit to 
their village. 
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f. Quantitative Methods of Data Collection: An Individual Survey 
An individual survey with structured questions was conducted (Figure 10). The survey included 
standard questions on socio-economic characteristics, questions on irrigation and production on 
irrigated fields and questions on accessing irrigation water in the two latest dry seasons and problems 
related to that. It included questions on (financial) reciprocity networks. The General Social Survey 
questions that measure beliefs in trust, helpfulness and fairness were also included (Karlan, 2005, p. 
20). The survey was further composed of a framed field experiment measuring risk aversion and a 
framed field experiment measuring time preference (for details see (D'Exelle, Van Campenhout, & 
Lecoutere, forthcoming)
8
. While most of the questions in the survey measure data at the individual 
level, some enquire about household level data such as housing quality or household assets.  
The respondents were interviewed face-to-face. To the maximum possible extent interviewers sought 
out a private spot to conduct the interview. Before commencing the interview, the interviewers briefly 
informed the respondents about the research team and about the aims of the research. Anonymity was 
assured. The interviewers started after the respondent gave consent to be interviewed. The complete 
interview took on average 45 minutes. In some cases, it took longer, for instance when the interview 
had to be conducted in Kihehe instead of Swahili or when the respondent had many types of crops in 
her irrigated fields. Respondents were compensated for their time spent in the interview by means of 
the payoffs that were earned in the framed field experiments on risk aversion and time preference.  
In total 228 irrigators participated in the survey. All irrigators who were identified during 
participatory mapping and who were available at the time of the survey were interviewed. It was seen 
to it that all irrigators who participated in the framed field experiment on sharing irrigation water were 
interviewed. The time lapse between the participatory mapping and the survey was approximately one 
month. About 35% of the irrigators identified on the maps could not be interviewed because they were 
not available at the time we conducted the survey. Some travelled, some moved, some fell ill and one 
of them died. As the average social status score and the proportion of women in the group of irrigators 
who were not available for the survey are not significantly different of those who indeed were 
available, we can reasonably believe that a (self-) selection bias remains limited.  
                                                     
8
 A range of questions, including the framed field experiments on risk aversion and time preference, that were 
taken up in the survey used for this research has been incorporated in a 1000-respondents survey on market 
integration and in a 600-respondents survey on microfinance conducted in the same district. The data on these 
variables from the three surveys can be pooled. 
44 
 
 
Figure 10: Individual Interviews 
The irrigators to interview were invited via the village chairman whom was given notice two days in 
advance. If people did not show up on the appointment, the interviewers went to their homes or their 
fields to look for them. Per irrigation scheme, there were two days to conduct the interviews with a 
team of ten interviewers, except in one village where only one single day could be used.  
There are indications of interviewer biases in the time preference experiment (D'Exelle et al., 
forthcoming). These need to be controlled for when using data from that experiment. Such biases may 
also exist in the data from the risk aversion experiment. Possibly, as instructions for these experiments 
were given by different interviewers, interviewer differences in demeanour or attitude may have 
influenced respondents‟ choices. Other questions in the survey did not need elaborate instructions and 
did not result in any payoff. Therefore, an interviewer‟s bias is less likely.  
g. Quantitative Methods of Data Collection: A Framed Field Experiment  
The Pros and Cons of Framed Field Experiments 
Economic experiments are an appropriate tool to identify and qualify the role of institutions, social 
norms, social preferences on individuals‟ behaviour and the outcomes (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008). 
They offer methods to test behavioural hypotheses in CPR environments and in environments where 
individual behaviour may be driven by other motives than pure self-interest. Economic experiments 
also make it possible to elicit a reaction to different circumstances by the same people. Observational 
data cannot provide the same information as people may not be able or not be willing to answer to 
(hypothetical) questions about their behaviour in various circumstances.  
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Laboratory experiments with university students playing abstract games, however, may not produce 
outcomes that are valid predictors of real world behaviour (Velez et al., 2009). Regular laboratory 
experiments focus on the importance of material payoff incentives and downplay the importance of 
other (non-material) incentives. Yet, it is widely recognised that the context of subjects‟ lives, their 
culture, beliefs, group identity, social context and personal identity can influence behaviour in 
experiments (Cardenas & Ostrom, 2004; Velez et al., 2009). The material payoff can be transformed 
into an internal subjective game under influence of the subject‟s identity, the group and the repeated 
nature of the interactions (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008). Therefore, framed field experiments 
explicitly bring in context and other information on the group and the individual apart from material 
incentives. In addition, the research subject-pool for framed field experiments is drawn from actual 
CPR or public goods users (Cardenas & Ostrom, 2004; Harrison & List, 2004). By framing the 
research subjects are presented with a CPR dilemma that closely resembles the dilemma they face in 
their everyday lives (Velez et al., 2009). It assures that research subjects play the game the 
experimenter intended (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008). This increases the external validity of the 
results as compared to abstract laboratory experiments conducted with university students (Velez et 
al., 2009).  
Data gathered via the framed field experiment can be combined with survey data on demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics and beliefs in social values of each of the research subjects and their 
group. This helps to explain the variation in behaviour and cooperation levels across the same 
experimental design (Cardenas & Ostrom, 2004). 
There are some limitations attached to framed field experiments however. First, despite the 
advantages of framing, some argue that framing may prompt norm-driven behaviour while the 
objective should be to look for non-situation-specific, robust behaviour (Cardenas & Carpenter, 
2008).  
Secondly, behaviour in experiments is sensitive to the framing. Therefore, when the framing is 
different, experiments with the same objective structures and incentives may produce different 
behaviour (Cardenas & Ostrom, 2004). To reduce the risk that variations in framing induce variations 
over different sessions, standard instructions, procedures and examples can be used. And, if feasible, 
the same experimenter should run the different sessions to reduce variations in framing and to avoid 
an experimenter bias. 
Thirdly, sometimes the robustness of behaviour observed in framed field experiments is called into 
question. Proof that behaviour measured in such experiments is somewhat robust is provided by the 
fact that framed field experiments produced similar results when they were repeated with different 
people in the same communities (Henrich et al., 2006).  
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Fourthly, some question the external validity and question that the behavioural propensities captured 
in experiments correlate with real-life economic activity (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008). To the extent 
possible, this can be crosschecked with real-life observations via other methods, for instance via 
surveys. A direct way of evaluating the external validity is via post experiment questions that assess to 
what extent participants recognise elements from real life in the experiment.  
Fifthly, the methods used for sampling and the possibility of earning payoffs through the experiment 
sometimes raise scepticism about the validity of the findings (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008). If 
sampling happens via voluntary participation, this may introduce a (self-) selection bias, especially if 
it is known that payoffs can be earned. A random sample drawn from a population is ideal but not 
always feasible. Payment of payoffs earned in experiments is sometimes questioned. The fact that 
payoffs introduce strategic behaviour is of course intentional. Others have ethical concerns about 
‘spoiling’ participants and hampering free cooperation to research. Yet, participants’ time is not free. 
Therefore it is appropriate to compensate the time they spent in the experiment. A rule of thumb is 
compensating a half day session with the equivalent of a one-day or two-day‟s wage.  
Sixthly, limited literacy and numeracy, low levels of education and different ways of (abstract) 
reasoning can hamper understanding of the instructions and the protocol of the experiment. This can 
introduce a bias (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008). Prior testing in the field helps to reveal many of the 
pitfalls and ambiguities. These challenges can be countered by using unsophisticated tables, 
production functions and decision cards that show both figures and symbols. Reading instructions 
aloud, providing posters of tables and decision cards and using examples aids as well. Although care 
should be taken while providing examples as they can favour certain strategies (J. C. Cardenas & 
Carpenter, 2008). Furthermore, an experimenter who is familiar with dealing with lowly educated 
participants can anticipate problems of understanding.  
Seventhly, participants may doubt the credibility of the experimenter and her team if they spent little 
time in the community. This can bias results. Working with locally-known experimenters is a 
solution; teaming up with people who have credibility is close substitute (Cardenas & Carpenter, 
2008). Likewise, the fact that a foreign team conducts an experiment in the village may raise false 
expectations among participants. It is important to be honest about the aims and the limitations of the 
experiment.  
A last challenge of framed field experiments is crosstalk (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008). Participants 
may share their experiences of the experiment with others who will participate later and this may 
introduce a bias. This can be avoided by organising sessions simultaneously or by allowing only a 
short time lapse between sessions. Crosstalk could also create selection problems if participants are 
sampled through voluntary participation because it can affect who will participate.  
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The Scope and the Limits of the Framed Field Experiment Used in this Research 
The framed field experiment, on which a large part of the analysis in this dissertation is based, has 
been conducted with actual users of common water flows living in semi-arid conditions. More 
particularly they are users of smallholder irrigation schemes in which appropriation of water is largely 
self-governed by the user community. The experiment was framed as water appropriation from the 
common irrigation schemes and replicates dilemmas that irrigators experience in real life.  
When spatially-fixed irrigators appropriate water from common irrigation water flows, irrigators 
located upstream can repeatedly determine how many of the available units of water they will extract. 
Their water extraction will affect the remaining units for the subsequent irrigator(s) located 
downstream. This can be mimicked in a framed field experiment by a repeated distribution game in 
which a participant, who is randomly assigned to be an upstream user, can propose a split of an 
available twelve hours to extract irrigation water. The number of hours corresponded to a certain 
payoff, representing the harvest from irrigated agricultural production, payable at the end of the 
experiment. The downstream user, permanently paired to the upstream user, receives the remainder of 
the hours available for water extraction. Yet, she is not a passive receiver in reality. Therefore, in each 
round of the game, she could react to her received share to the upstream user by opting to remain 
silent, to communicate appreciation or dissatisfaction or to punish the upstream user. The latter 
implied a minor cost for the downstream user and a small fine for the upstream user, deductible from 
the final payoff.  
In reality, irrigators in semi-arid areas appropriate water in circumstances of water abundance and 
water scarcity. Therefore, the experiment started with five rounds in which water is abundant and total 
water availability was sufficient for both upstream and downstream user to reach a threshold – set at 
four hours – that represents a critical water input required for irrigated agricultural production. Above 
the threshold, payoffs rose with hours of water extracted; below the threshold, payoffs were minimal. 
Then followed ten rounds in which water is scarce. Water scarcity entails there is an insufficient 
supply of resource units to fulfil the users‟ needs (United Nations Development Programme, 2006, p. 
133). It was mimicked by fixing the threshold at seven hours, which renders it impossible for both 
users to reach above threshold payoffs. In addition, payoffs per hour of water extraction were lower 
and increased only half as fast per extra hour
9
.  
                                                     
9
A more detailed description of the experimental design and protocols can be found in the text in 
Part II and Part IV. The actual protocol and instructions as they were used in the field can be found in the 
Appendix I. 
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The focus of this study is on sharing common resources. Therefore, unlike other CPR games and 
irrigation games, the framed field experiment used here did not include a stage that replicates the 
contribution to provisioning common resources. For instance, the design of our experiment and the 
irrigation game introduced by Cardenas, Johnson &Rodriguez (2009) differs in the following aspects. 
In the experiment used here, there is no first stage in which irrigators contribute to a public fund 
(provision) before making appropriation decisions. The decision of each upstream user in this 
experiment is similar to the decision of an upstream user in location D in the irrigation game in which 
she shares a given amount of resource units with one downstream user (in location E). The amount of 
resource units an upstream user in location D can share, depends on the contributions to the public 
fund and the appropriation decision by upstream users in location A, B and C. In our experiment, the 
amount of resource units to be shared remains exogenous and fixed over rounds.  
In the experiment used here, scarcity is introduced in a different way than in other experiments. In 
many experiments that replicate the inherent social dilemma of CPR, like the one used by Rutte, 
Wilke, & Messick (1987) and Oses-Eraso & Viladrich-Grau (2007), the primary underlying concern 
is safeguarding resource provision. To safeguard resource provision, appropriation levels should be 
such that they sustain the resource stock and do not cause negative externalities on other users. In 
these experiments, resource scarcity makes the resource stock smaller, which affects appropriation 
behaviour because provision is more rapidly compromised. But this lower amount of available 
resource units under scarcity conditions does not necessarily imply that users‟ needs cannot be 
fulfilled. Yet, when it concerns a common water flow resource scarcity raises problems of water 
distribution rather than sustainability problems. Appropriation from a common water flow is 
sequential and entails vertical downstream externalities (Cardenas, Janssen, & Bousquet, 2008). By 
consequence, appropriation mainly affects the remaining resource units for subsequent users located 
downstream and does not necessarily affect the resource stock. Moreover, scarcity entails there is an 
insufficient supply of resource units to fulfil the users‟ needs. That is why, in the experiment used 
here, water scarcity is replicated by making the available resource units insufficient to fulfil the water 
needs of both the upstream and downstream user.  
The framed field experiment used here allows assessing how participants who are upstream users in 
the experiment share available resources when water is abundantly available. It also allows examining 
how they share resources when water is scarce and the water needs of either upstream and 
downstream users cannot be satisfied. The repeated nature of the game corresponds to real-life 
repeated interactions between irrigators. The repetition could induce incentives for cooperation and 
could invoke reciprocity. Or it could prompt more sophisticated strategies like rotation that make it 
possible to obtain efficiency gains while guaranteeing equal sharing over time (D'Exelle, Lecoutere, & 
Van Campenhout, 2010). Furthermore, the effect of communication or punishment by the downstream 
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user on the upstream user‟s appropriation behaviour can be evaluated. The ability to communicate or 
to punish are attributes that are known to augment fairness in dictator games (Frey & Bohnet, 1995). 
The likelihood of punishment by the downstream users in response to their received share could be 
assessed as well. But this fell out of the scope of this research. Lastly, since individual survey data and 
social status ranking data of each experiment participant was available, variation in behaviour in the 
experiment can be linked to individual and group level layers of information.  
The participants of each session were randomly and secretly assigned to be upstream or downstream 
users and paired up. Whether irrigators were assigned to be upstream or downstream users in the 
experiment was independent of their actual position in the irrigation schemes. It referred to the type of 
decision they had to take in the experiment, respectively a decision about the distribution of water or 
about the reaction to a received share of water. It was assumed that, in reality, each irrigator had a 
neighbour located upstream and downstream and that he was confronted with both types of decisions.  
Participants did not have any information about the participant they were paired to. Apart from the 
influence of institutional factors, behaviour in the experiment and possible social distance effects are 
dependent on one‟s personal preferences and on internalised behavioural implications of one‟s 
position in the irrigator community (Cardenas, 2003; Cardenas & Ostrom, 2004). One could argue 
that social distance effects and relational aspects of social factors like gender, power and relative 
social status may have had stronger effects on behaviour if these characteristics of the paired 
participant were known. Yet, providing this information risked influencing behaviour in 
uncontrollable ways. It could also complicate understanding of the game as prior testing proved. It 
possibly jeopardised anonymity as well.  
Validity and Robustness of the Experimental Findings 
To maximise the external validity and robustness of the findings obtained via the framed field 
experiment, several issues were addressed. First, ex-ante, key informant interviews and focus group 
discussions were organised to gain information about the rules, norms and enforcement mechanisms 
that underlie governance of irrigation water in the studied irrigation schemes. This information aided 
to shape the experimental design such that it closely replicates dilemmas the irrigators experienced in 
real-life.  
Secondly, the design of experiment was pilot-tested with irrigators that belonged to an irrigators‟ 
community in Mufindi district that is not part of this study. It could be reasonably assumed that the 
irrigators who participated in the pilot test had similar characteristics as the irrigators who took part in 
the experiment. The pilot-testing revealed several pitfalls that were addressed in the final design of the 
experiment. For instance, the protocol and instructions had to be simplified to ensure understanding 
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and to reduce the length of the session. The tools had to be adapted to enable all participants, also 
those with limited literacy or numeracy, to use them. Providing participants with information about 
specific characteristics of the paired participant had to be avoided because it produced on overload of 
information to process before making a decision. It also was a challenge to the experimenter team to 
look up the data on the participants‟ characteristics on the spot. The location needed two separate 
rooms where the two groups – the upstream and downstream participants – could sit comfortably.  
Thirdly, all participants were irrigators who faced dilemmas similar to those in the experiment. They 
were not recruited via voluntary participation but via a random sample drawn from their irrigation 
community‟s population. More specifically, per irrigation scheme, participants were randomly 
selected from those identified on the participatory maps. They were invited via the village chairman. 
Sessions included irrigators from the same irrigation schemes. Per irrigation scheme, maximum four 
sessions of the experiment were conducted, each with maximum fourteen irrigators.  
Fourthly, the external validity of the findings can be evaluated in a direct way on the basis of the post-
experiment question: “Did you recognise many, some, few or no elements from real life in the 
exercise?”. Most upstream users in the experiment recognised many elements from real life in the 
experiment (59.2%; N=78). A minority of the upstream users did not recognise any elements (13.2%). 
The other upstream users recognised some elements. Most downstream users recognised many 
elements, few did not recognise any (resp. 54.5% and 9.1%; N=77). Other downstream users 
recognised some elements. The external validity of our findings can also be assessed in an indirect 
way by cross-checking with real life in the irrigation schemes. Real-life data is available via the 
individual survey, focus group discussions and the semi-structured interviews. 
Fifthly, the robustness of the findings can be assessed by checking whether there are notable 
differences between irrigator communities. In general, the average proposed share in the abundance 
treatment of the experiment does not significantly differ between irrigation schemes. Only in one 
irrigation scheme (Kitangzi), it is significantly lower than in two of the other irrigation schemes 
(Mutua and Ika)
10
. Another way to evaluate the robustness of our findings would be to repeat the 
experiment with other irrigators from the same irrigation schemes. However this was beyond the 
scope of this study.  
As a robustness check, the findings can also be compared with those from similar experiments. As the 
design of our experiment slightly differs from other framed CPR and irrigation games, findings 
however are not entirely comparable. The average proposed share by male upstream users when water 
is abundant in our framed field experiment is 0.50 (0.21); by female upstream users 0.57 (0.17). In the 
                                                     
10
 Average proposed share in the abundance treatment in Kitangzi is 0.44(0.24), in Mutua 0.58 (0.36), in Ika 
0.55 (0.41). 
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baseline treatment of the irrigation game conducted by Cardenas et al. (2009), participants in location 
D, who have to make a similar decision as the upstream users in this research‟ experiment, on average 
keep three tokens and leave two for participants in location E. This corresponds to an average 
proposed share of 0.40. Female participants are more likely to extract in a fair way.  
A one-to-one comparison between dictator games and the distribution game played in our experiment 
is impossible since we used framing and experiment participants face dilemmas they know from real 
life. Therefore, selfish behaviour is expected to be countered by social proximity and social norms, 
which are known to prevent excessive extraction in CPR settings (Velez et al., 2009). The repeated 
nature of the game and the opportunity for the downstream user to communicate or sanction the 
upstream user may also ease selfishness (Frey & Bohnet, 1995; Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994). Still, 
the decisions of upstream users in the experiment resemble the decisions taken by dictators in dictator 
games. A comparison may be informative. In dictator games conducted in western societies, the 
proposed share ranges between 0.31 and 0.5 (Colin F.  Camerer, 2003). In Tanzania, a student 
population proposed an average share of 0.3 in a dictator game that follows a trust game (Holm & 
Danielson, 2005). Gender did not affect behaviour. Somewhat unexpectedly, the Hadza, a hunter 
gatherers population in Tanzania, were found to exhibit unfair behaviour in dictator games while they 
are considered to adhere strongly to egalitarian norms (Marlowe, 2004). The average share proposed 
was 0.10. Women were observed to offer less than men. The average proposed shares in our framed 
field experiment are higher than in the dictator games described above and there are gender 
differences
11
. The higher proposed shares are probably partly due to the different design of the game, 
the repeated nature and the framing and partly due to the social norms that the participants 
internalised and referred to in the game (Cardenas & Ostrom, 2004).  
h. Quantitative Methods of Data Collection: The National Sample Census of Agriculture 2002/2003  
In Part IV, we check whether inequalities observed at the irrigation scheme level also exist in the 
wider region. To do so, we use data on agricultural households in Iringa region, gathered via the 
National Sample Census of Agriculture 2002/2003 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2006)
12
. We 
obtained permission to use the data from the National Bureau of Statistics and received a copy of parts 
of the national dataset. 
 
                                                     
11
 In our experiment, the average proposed share by upstream users is equal to 0.52 (0.20) when water is 
abundant and is equal to 0.45 (0.22) when water is scarce (and giving is more expensive). Women offer more 
than men. 
12
 An agricultural household is defined as a household where one or more persons have or operate at least 25 
square meters of arable land for agricultural production and/or own or keep at least one head of cattle or five 
goats/sheep/pigs or 50 chicken/ducks/turkeys during the agricultural year 2002/03. Agricultural holdings larger 
than 20 hectares or with more than 50 cattle, 100 goats/sheep/pigs or 1000 chicken are excluded. 
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Water in the Tanzanian Context  
In this section we will first discuss water resources in Tanzania. Thereafter, we will review the main 
ideas of the mainstream discourse on water and water governance and raise some points of critique. 
Lastly, we will shed a light on water governance policies in Tanzania and some of their shortcomings.  
Water Resources in Tanzania 
Tanzania‟s stock of annual renewable water resources amounts to 89 cubic kilometres (United 
Republic of Tanzania, 2002). The water resources include rivers, lakes, wetlands, springs, reservoirs 
and groundwater aquifers. Tanzania has several great freshwater lakes that cover approximately 
60,000 square kilometres in total. Many are shared with neighbouring countries. The country is 
divided in nine river basins
13
 (Figure 11).  
Tanzania has a tropical climate and is divided into four main climatic zones. These include the hot 
humid coastal plain, the semi-arid zone of the central plateau, the high-moist lake regions and the 
temperate highland areas. In most of the country there are two rainy seasons: the Masika (long rains), 
that fall from mid-March to the end of May, and the Mvuli (short rains) that come intermittently 
throughout November and December. Some areas, such as the South-Western Highlands which 
include Mufindi district, get a prolonged rainy season that starts end November and continues to the 
end of April (Chang‟a et al., 2010). The different types of climate and rainfall patterns cause regional 
and temporal variability in rainfall and variability in river flows. Also water reservoirs and 
groundwater aquifers are unevenly spread across the country.  
 
                                                     
13
 River basins are the geographic area contained within the watershed limits of a system of streams and rivers 
converging toward the same terminus, generally the sea or sometimes an inland water body (Molle et al., 2007, 
p. 587). 
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 Rivers 
 River Basin Boundary 
 Water bodies 
Figure 11: River Basins in Tanzania (United Republic of Tanzania, 2002, p. 49) 
The total Tanzanian population is estimated to amount to 44,5 million in 2011 and expected to grow 
at about 3% per annum (National Bureau of Statistics, 2009). This comes down to an average water 
availability of approximately 2,000 cubic meters per person per year. The fast growing population 
makes that Tanzania is projected to fall below the water-stress threshold of 1,700 cubic meters per 
person by 2017 and below the 1,000 cubic meters per person water-scarcity threshold by 2036 (ceteris 
paribus)
14
. As water resources and replenishment are not equally spread over the country, the average 
water availability however varies considerably by area. 
                                                     
14
 Population projections based on 2002 census data (National Bureau of Statistics, 2009) 
Rufiji River basin 
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Climate change, increased climate variability and inter-annual climate variability, such as El-Niño 
effects, have made rainfall less predictable in many East African countries and particularly in 
Tanzania (Chang‟a et al., 2010; Dixon, Smith, & Guill, 2003). The South-Western Highlands, which 
include Mufindi district, are largely vulnerable to climate variability and will become even more 
vulnerable under the projected climate change. Mean annual rainfall is expected to decrease by 6% 
due to the doubling of carbon-dioxide concentration in the atmosphere. Additionally, an increase in 
the frequency and severity of droughts and floods is expected (Chang‟a et al., 2010). Although 
climate change is not addressed directly in the national water policy of 2002, it is recognised at the 
highest level (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 2010; Nkwame, 2010).  
Furthermore, a rising demand for domestic and productive water is likely to diminish the stock of 
water resources (United Republic of Tanzania, 2002). For instance, the demand for water for 
traditional small-scale irrigation has increased over the last decades. While its potential for food 
insecurity prevention and income generation for smallholder farmers is recognised, there is also a 
concern that its water use is inefficient (Adams, Potkanski, & Sutton, 1994; United Republic of 
Tanzania, 2002). 
Water Policies 
a. The Global Discourse on Water Governance  
The current mainstream development discourse on water shows a growing concern for water scarcity. 
When it comes to ways to deal with water scarcity, two schools can be distinguished in this discourse. 
One school argues that the economic valuation of water should provide the necessary incentives to use 
water more efficiently. Along the same line of thinking are those that argue that the productivity of 
water should be increased, for instance by raising the “crop per drop”. (United Nations Development 
Programme, 2006). The other school is conscious about the heterogeneity of water users and the 
common pool resource characteristics of water. This school argues that the allocation of scarce water 
resources should be the outcome of a process of integrated decision making while weighing up the 
disadvantages and advantages of alternative options (Savenije, 2002). There are two approaches to 
weighing up the disadvantages and advantages. In one approach, water is regarded as a scarce 
resource that should be deployed where it generates the greatest wealth and increases the total 
productivity of water (United Nations Development Programme, 2006). Another approach to 
allocating water takes into account that the marginal product and the marginal value of water are 
different for different type of users. This approach, situated in the „redistribution camp‟ appears to 
receive less attention though. 
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The marginal value of water is substantial for semi-subsistence farmers and smallholder irrigators in 
development countries because water is an essential production factor, critically needed to sustain in 
their livelihood. Approaches aiming to maximise the total productivity of water via the market or via 
integrated decision making hold the risk that semi-subsistence farmers and irrigators will be pushed 
out of the market. This issue however relates to the underlying development model and to the trade-
off between efficiency and equity. The school that aims to maximise the total productivity of water 
appears to adhere to the idea that generally “growth is good for the poor”. It seems to disregard 
concerns about equity and pro-poor growth endeavours to achieve growth without a trade-off with 
redistribution (Dercon, 2003). 
Besides, the mainstream discourse on water tends to overlook the fact that power and powerlessness 
determine the distribution of access to key commodities, such as water, among and within different 
groups in society (Leach et al., 1999) (Collinson, 2003) (United Nations Development Programme, 
2006). Political and social exclusion in the distribution of resources and in the redistribution of 
resources that may result from newly-introduced policies for water management do not always receive 
the necessary attention.  
b. Water Governance Policies in Tanzania  
Natural resource management and water management in Tanzania has a colonial legacy (Kabudi, 
2005). The colonial state aimed to access and control the abundant natural resources in the country. 
Therefore, it vested all natural resources in the Governor on behalf of the colonial state. People were 
alienated from ownership, access rights and use rights with regard to natural resources. To access and 
use natural resources people were required to have permits or licenses. The application of “customary 
law” with regard to natural resource ownership, use and management was tolerated to the extent that it 
did not conflict with the interests of the colonial state.  
In the post-colonial era, all natural resources remained vested in (the president of) the state (Kabudi, 
2005). Access and use of natural resources is (officially) regulated by statutory law. Similarly to the 
colonial situation, in practice there is a large grey zone where both statutory and “customary” laws co-
exist. Natural resource management still happens in a context of legal pluralism, especially at the 
more decentralised level (Maganga, 2002).  
Initially, the postcolonial state adhered to socialism. The fact that natural resources and water 
resources remained vested in the state put public good characteristics on them. The central 
government provided funding for capital and maintenance costs of water distribution development 
(Huggins, 2000). Since the late 1980s, central government has become less involved in provision. Its 
role shifted to regulation, control and monitoring (Huggins, 2000). In the national water policy 
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adopted in 1991 water remained vested in the state. The payment for water rights was reintroduced as 
a means to recover some of the costs involved in provision of water.  
In keeping with the current global discourse on water governance Tanzania renewed its policies for 
water resource management in 2002. In the current national water policy all water in Tanzania 
remains, “by constitution and law, vested in the United Republic of Tanzania”. The addition that 
“every citizen has an equal right to access and use of the nation's natural water resources for his and 
the nations‟ benefit” should be in favour of an equitable distribution of water (United Republic of 
Tanzania, 2002, p. 17). Yet, official water rights are still a prerequisite to accessing it.  
The renewed National Water Policy (NAWAPO) strives towards a harmonised framework for water 
resource allocation (United Republic of Tanzania, 2002). Its foundation is an integrated, multi-
sectoral water resource management in order to attain economic, social and ecological sustainable use. 
This should at the same time ensure that all social and productive sectors and the environment receive 
their adequate share of the water resources. The modi operandi are decentralisation of allocation, 
participation and representation of water users in water user associations (United Republic of 
Tanzania, 2002) (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005). The NAWAPO however hesitates between 
treating water resources as common pool resources that can be managed by the users and as a private 
good that can be regulated via market transactions (United Republic of Tanzania, 2002). The 
NAWAPO leaves space for both communities and the private sector to be involved in provision 
(Huggins, 2000). 
The NAWAPO has some shortcomings in our view. It includes competing objectives and statements 
that can legitimise non-equitable allocation of water and that can disadvantage small-scale users, 
reducing their water security instead. Human water needs are the first priority and the environment the 
second in the NAWAPO. The allocation of water to other uses is subject to (unspecified) social and 
economic criteria. But the main objective is to increase the productivity of water (United Republic of 
Tanzania, 2002). The emphasis on efficient use of water and the principle of treating water as an 
economic good in order to raise productivity can threaten the entitlement to water of small-scale 
users, like semi-subsistence farmers and irrigators or livestock keepers. Their use of water may be 
considered inefficient if measured for instance by the „crop per drop‟ ratio. Moreover, semi-
subsistence farmers, irrigators and livestock keepers, who are in general relatively poor, may have 
difficulty paying for water rights. The ecological sustainability argument can easily be misused as 
well.  
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Figure 12: Smallholder Irrigated Agricultural Production 
The sector of semi-subsistence smallholder irrigation has a particularly low priority in Tanzania‟s 
water, agricultural and irrigation policies (Figure 12). Small-scale, extensive irrigation is blamed for 
inefficient water use and for water resource depletion at the expense of the environment and domestic 
users in the NAWAPO (United Republic of Tanzania, 2002). The agricultural sector development 
programme and the national irrigation policy mainly provide for investments in large-scale irrigation 
schemes (United Republic of Tanzania, 2006a, 2009). They plan to improve smaller-scale irrigation 
and to provide funds for investing in these at the district level. The two main criteria to compete for 
funds for development of smaller-scale irrigation schemes via the district are the economic rate of 
return and the farmers‟ contribution to the capital investment costs. These are two stringent criteria for 
semi-subsistence smallholder irrigators. 
Lastly, the participatory approach to water resource management advocated by the NAWAPO 
remains a challenge. On the one hand, the government management style remains generally top-down 
and directive (Huggins, 2000). On the other hand, the NAWAPO is based on over-optimistic 
assumptions that all water users will have equal opportunity to participate in water resource 
management and that user representation and decentralisation of management will automatically 
result in unbiased and politically neutral responses to the users‟ needs. And thus lead to an equitable 
distribution of water. Various studies show that these assumptions are not always valid (Cleaver & 
Toner, 2006) (Ribot et al., 2010). In fact, in the process of negotiating for water rights, power 
relations are very important. Elites can negotiate better water rights for themselves than less powerful 
members of society because they control the decision-making processes that legitimise the rules for 
allocation and distribution of water ((Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan, 2002). The views and needs of the 
representatives of user sectors like the smallholder irrigation sector, who are often elite members, are 
not necessarily the same as other users‟ (Cleaver, 2002). Lastly, considering the mere fact that many 
small-scale users do not hold an official water right and are not regarded a legitimate water user, their 
participation in integrated water management is not straightforward.  
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The NAWAPO is not likely to do away with legal and institutional pluralism with regard to local 
water management (Maganga, 2003). NAWAPO has no specific guidelines on how water should be 
governed at the local level, for instance within the sector of smallholder irrigation. According to the 
NAWAPO, resource governance at the local level should be organised via Water User Associations 
within the confines of the NAWAPO, laws and water acts in force (United Republic of Tanzania, 
2002). In reality, it is organised in more „informal‟ ways. Yet, little is known about these informal 
ways and the extent to which they contribute to sustainable, efficient and equitable water 
management. 
c. “Customary” Ways of Water Governance in Tanzania 
While a formal legal framework has been imposed on natural resource management since colonial 
times, natural resources have long been managed under “traditional” governance systems (Orindi & 
Huggins, 2005). Many (elements) of these still prevail over formal governance systems at the local 
level (Sokile, Mwaruvanda, & van Koppen, 2005). Such traditional governance systems are often 
locally specific, adapted to the particular environment or livelihood systems (Maganga, 2002; Orindi 
& Huggins, 2005). There are some commonalities. Institutions governing water and land are often 
intertwined and may also have other social functions. In many cases, entitlement to water is inherently 
connected to land access (Orindi & Huggins, 2005). Often, traditional resource governance systems 
are embedded in and interwoven with the existing customs, traditions, norms, beliefs and folklores 
(Sokile et al., 2005). Generally, maintaining social harmony while sharing (common) natural 
resources is highly valued. In many cases, the community interests prevail over individual benefits 
(Orindi & Huggins, 2005). There tends to be a preference for reconciliatory ways of conflict 
resolution or conflict mitigation (Maganga, 2002). Yet, under such customary systems, entitlements to 
natural resources are often gender-biased and differentiated according to age and status (Adams, 
Watson, & Mutiso, 1997; Orindi & Huggins, 2005; Potkansky & Adams, 1998). Traditional resource 
governance systems however are not static. They evolve, become infused or blended with elements of 
formal governance systems (Cleaver, 2002). This research will provide insights into what “informal” 
water governance looks like at the local level. 
d. The Role of the State in Natural Resource Governance 
In principle, Tanzania evolved from a centralised governance model to a more decentralised 
governance model (Mollel, 2010). In keeping with the current developments, the local government 
reform programme (LGRP) aimed for democratic decentralisation. It devolved more power, 
responsibilities and resources to local government authorities (Chaligha, Henjewele, Kessy, & 
Mwambe, 2007). In practice, democratic decentralisation is not yet established for various reasons. 
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One of the reasons is that the power of local government authorities remains curtailed by central 
government (Ribot et al., 2010). 
 As argued before, statutory water management policies have a marginal role at the local level and 
higher level government authorities are not strongly present at the local level (Sokile et al., 2005). The 
role of local government authorities in local water resource governance remains dubious. On the one 
hand, the NAWAPO does not explicitly assign an active role for local government in water 
governance. On the other hand, the LGRP indirectly increased the potential of village government to 
intervene in water and land management. The role of (local) government authorities in local resource 
governance will be discussed in more detail in Part III.  
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Part II: Sharing Common Water Flows 
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The Effect of Gender and Social Status on Fairness in Common Water 
Flows: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Tanzania 
 
 
 
Abstract  
A framed field experiment is used to examine the effect of the gender and social status of users of self-
governed common irrigation systems in rural sub-Sahara Africa on fairness in the distribution of 
water. When water is abundant in the experiment, women distribute water in an altruist way, men in a 
fair way. A higher social status has a negative effect on the share users propose to others but not so 
among women. When water is scarce in the experiment, all reduce the share they propose to others, 
although users with a higher social status reduce it less substantially. On the whole, men and women 
with a relatively low social status propose more than equal shares of water in abundance but they do 
not when water is scarce. Women with a relatively high social status distribute water in an altruist 
way when it is abundant. Even if they reduce their proposed share in scarcity, they remain fair. Men 
with a relatively high social status distribute water in a selfish way throughout abundance and 
scarcity. The gender- and status-related unfairness in the distribution of resources could challenge 
the sustainability of self-governed common water flows as it undermines trust, reciprocity, mutual 
commitment and provision. The differential water access that results from it could reinforce gender 
and status-based inequalities. Water scarcity likely exacerbates such drawbacks. Policies building on 
community governance of natural resources should acknowledge the underlying causes of inequity in 
the distribution of resources and actively address these, especially as climate change is expected to 
increase water scarcity. 
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Introduction  
Equity in the distribution of common pool resources (CPR) has received little attention in the 
economic literature on CPR. Yet, a distribution of CPR that is considered fair by the users is essential 
to build and reinforce trust, reciprocity norms, and mutual commitment, which form the pillars of self-
governance of CPR (McKean, 1986 in: Baland & Platteau, 1998; Ostrom, 1990). It is therefore one of 
the criteria for judging the performance of community institutions for natural resource governance 
(Agarwal, 2000). Moreover, when it concerns common water flows, a fair distribution is fundamental 
for a sustainable provision. If downstream users deem upstream users do not distribute resources in a 
fair way, downstream users may fail to contribute to provision activities, which are equally important 
for upstream users (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom & Gardner, 1993). Besides, fairly sharing common water 
flows is especially challenging when water is (temporarily) scarce, which is common in semi-arid 
areas in sub-Sahara Africa. Under certain circumstances, the distribution of scarce resources can even 
be a security issue (Bogale & Korf, 2007; Turner, 2004). The distribution of resources also has 
important implications for livelihood opportunities, especially if it concerns an essential good like 
water. In this regard, the post-institutionalist literature has emphasised the need to address political 
and social exclusionary factors in the distribution of resources (Collinson, 2003; Leach et al., 1999). 
Investigating fairness in the distribution of CPR is crucial to avoid an overly romantic and simplistic 
picture of self-governance of resources, blind to possible structural causes of inequality. Else, this 
may be a pitfall for policies that build on community self-governance of water resources and expect 
this to result in efficient, sustainable and equitable use of resources (Leach et al., 1999; Mehta et al., 
2001). Moreover, as climate change is expected to increase water scarcity, the distribution of water 
may become a more pressing development and security concern (United Nations Development 
Programme, 2006).  
While fairness norms are important features of CPR institutions, it is not evident that all CPR users 
comply with fairness norms and distribute water in a fair way under all circumstances (Agarwal, 
2000; Baland & Platteau, 1998; Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994). Water scarcity and CPR users‟ 
gender and their relative social status are expected to affect the willingness and ability to distribute in 
a fair way. The incentive structure and behaviour of CPR users is likely to be influenced by gender 
and social status specific preferences, behavioural norms and reputation mechanisms. Such norms and 
reputation mechanisms may be especially important in patriarchal and status-based societies in rural 
Africa where gender and social status are linked to economic and socially embedded inequalities 
(Agarwal, 2007; Platteau & Abraham, 2002; Silbersmidt, 2001). While the implications of social 
factors on incentives and behaviour are admitted, they are rarely analysed in CPR environments using 
quantitative methods (Cleaver, 1998). 
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In this article, we use a framed field experiment to examine the resource distribution behaviour of 
users of a common irrigation system in rural sub-Sahara Africa in function of their gender and their 
relative social status in the community. We look at their distribution behaviour under conditions of 
water abundance and scarcity. More specifically, we address the following questions: do male and 
female irrigators share resources in a different way? Do they react differently when water becomes 
scarce? Does irrigators‟ social status affect the way they share resources when water is abundant and 
when it is scarce? Does this apply in the same way to male and female irrigators? And, to what extent 
do real life observations substantiate the experimental findings on irrigators‟ resource distribution 
behaviour? 
The article is structured as follows: in the first section we review the CPR and experimental literature 
that deals with the relation between gender, social status and distribution behaviour. In the second and 
third section we describe the methods for data collection and the context. In the fourth section we 
present the results and relate these to the literature and to real life behaviour in the irrigation 
communities in the fifth section.   
Literature  
Common pool resources (CPR), like communal forest, fishing grounds or irrigation systems, are 
natural or man-made resource systems that are sufficiently large to make it difficult and costly to 
exclude potential beneficiaries (Ostrom, 1990, p. 30). The rival nature of the resources distinguishes 
CPR from public goods (Ostrom et al., 1994). Refuting Hardin‟s (1968) prediction that exploitation of 
the commons inevitably leads to a tragedy of overuse, Ostrom (1990) proved that self-governance by 
the community of CPR users can successfully avoid overexploitation and distributive conflicts. CPR 
self-governance is based on trust, reciprocity norms, and mutual commitment, which substitute for 
formal institutions and complete otherwise incomplete contracts (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008; 
Ostrom, 1990). 
Fairness norms are important features of institutions of self-governed CPR as they should ensure a 
distribution of CPR that is considered fair by the users (Agarwal, 2000; Baland & Platteau, 1998; 
Ostrom et al., 1994). To accomplish a fair distribution of CPR, high rates of conformity to fairness 
norms are needed (Ruttan, 2008). Conformity to shared norms is often ensured through community 
sanctioning mechanisms like social pressure or (social) sanctions that raise the cost of non-
cooperative behaviour (Hayami, 2009; Velez et al., 2009). Norms may also be internalised in which 
case people face internal costs like guilt, shame or anxiety upon defying norms (Ostrom, 1990). 
Additional incentives to conform to fairness norms may derive from one‟s own benefit from equality 
(inequity aversion) or from community members that set the example (strong reciprocators) (C. F.  
Camerer & Fehr, 2006; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999).  
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Ensuring widespread adherence to fairness norms and maintaining a fair resource distribution is 
especially challenging when it concerns common water flows in semi-arid areas. The dilemma in the 
distribution of resources is bigger than in other CPR because appropriation from a common water 
flow is sequential and engenders vertical downstream externalities. This means appropriation by 
upstream users affects the remaining resource units (and the quality) for subsequent downstream users 
(Cardenas et al., 2008). When water is scarce, which is common in semi-arid areas, and the resource 
stock is insufficient to provide for all users, the dilemma in the distribution of resources becomes even 
more stringent (Cardenas et al., 2009).  
Socio-economic heterogeneity in the community of CPR users is another challenge to compliance 
with shared norms. Heterogeneous CPR users may have different incentives to abide by rules that 
restrict extraction because they do not face symmetric benefits and costs from using the resource 
(Ruttan, 2008). Heterogeneous CPR users may also place different non-monetary values on the costs 
and benefits of abiding by fairness norms and distribution rules (Cardenas, 2003). 
Issues of fairness and resource distribution are also strongly connected to broader socio-political 
structures that underlie inequalities in the community (Agarwal, 2007; Leach et al., 1999). Two 
sources of structural social differentiation are CPR users‟ gender and relative social status in the 
community. Gender refers to the “socially determined ideas and practices of what it is to be female or 
male” (Reeves & Baden, 2000). Social status is a collective judgment of the relative position of an 
individual in society based on her traits and assets and is an important source of power (Weiss & 
Fershtman, 1998). Inequalities that relate to gender and status do not only imply differences in 
economic endowments but are also socially embedded in specific social norms and perceptions. 
Specific behavioural norms, imposed or internalised, and reputation mechanisms associated to status 
and gender can thus shape people‟s incentive structure and behaviour (Agarwal, 2007; Brauer & 
Bourhis, 2006). This is especially true in patriarchal and status-based societies in rural Africa 
(Platteau & Abraham, 2002; Silbersmidt, 2001). Social status and gender do not only influence 
economic behaviour in real life, but also in the experimental laboratory where all participants play the 
same role and are given the same level of resources (Hong & Bohnet, 2007). In what follows, we will 
review what the experimental and CPR literature says about the effect of gender and social status on 
distribution behaviour.  
First, gender differences in distribution behaviour can be due to differences in social preferences that 
are independent of what others do or are expected to do (Greig & Bohnet, 2009). Women have been 
found to be more generous than men in the dictator games conducted with student populations 
(Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001; C.  Eckel & Grossman, 1998). Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) 
specified that women are more generous than men when it is relatively expensive to give. When the 
price of altruism is lower, however, men begin to give more than women. Women also have a 
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preference for sharing evenly whereas men are more likely to be either perfectly selfish or perfectly 
selfless (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001). In field experiments framed as water appropriation in 
irrigation systems conducted with actual irrigators, female users generally extract a fair share of 
resource units. They even reduce the share they extract if unfair behaviour is heavily fined (Cardenas 
et al., 2009).  
Secondly, in CPR environments, gender is observed to influence compliance with fairness norms and 
resource appropriation. In many cases, women‟s capabilities to appropriate resources are restricted in 
an unfair way. Women also have stronger incentives to abide by appropriation rules such as 
prescriptions of fairness (Agarwal, 2007). Generally women, and especially poor women, are more 
inclined than men to avoid rule breaking, reprimand and conflict (Agarwal, 2007; Cleaver, 1998). 
They may do so because they rely more on informal reciprocal support systems and they have to 
preserve social ties more (Cleaver, 1998).  
In contrast, women sometimes have weaker incentives than men to comply with rules that ensure 
sustainable or fair resource appropriation levels. This may be the case if the costs associated to use 
restrictions are higher for women than for men, while the benefits are lower (Agarwal, 2007). Costs 
may be higher for women because they are highly dependent on the resource and have few exit 
options (Agarwal, 2007; Pandolfelli, Meinzen-Dick, & Dohrn, 2007). For example, in Tanzania 
women infringed forest extraction rules more frequently than men because they rely heavily on the 
forest reserve for firewood (Chitiga & Nemarundwe, 2003). Benefits from use restrictions may be 
smaller for women because of gender inequalities. Due to intra-household inequalities, women may 
profit less from income from CPR or from redistributed benefits generated by use restrictions 
(Agarwal, 2007; Pandolfelli et al., 2007). In some cases, women are not deterred by rules they did not 
help design. Women may violate appropriation rules that men (unintentionally) made unfeasibly 
restrictive or may circumvent taboos preventing them from accessing resources (Adams et al., 1997; 
Pandolfelli et al., 2007). Sometimes, use restrictions are relaxed to allow poorer women to secure their 
minimum water needs (Cleaver, 1998). 
Thirdly, there are various reasons why one‟s social status could affect fairness and resource 
distribution. Members of high-status groups may act more altruistically than members of low-status 
groups because they may be better off, or because they want to demonstrate their superiority and 
preserve their status (Hong & Bohnet, 2007; Liebe & Tutic, 2010). The social norm of „noblesse 
oblige‟ can prescribe members of high status groups to donate more to others in less favourable 
positions than members of low-status groups (Liebe & Tutic, 2010). People of low-status groups may 
prefer equality because of fears not to receive what they deserve without equality (Hong & Bohnet, 
2007).  
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Dictator games, conducted with pupils from different German high school systems, which are 
associated to different social status, showed that average donations per school increased with status. 
On a disaggregated level, however, the relation between social status and altruistic behaviour is not 
clear-cut (Liebe & Tutic, 2010). Hong and Bohnet (2007) conducted risky dictator games with 
university students with different characteristics associated to high or low status in Northern 
American society, such as gender, race, religion and age. They found that low-status groups have 
strong inequality risk aversion while high-status groups exhibited strong inequality risk proneness. In 
low-status groups, a concern for disadvantageous inequality appears to outweigh efficiency 
considerations and being other-regarding.  
Social status and power are generally seen as strong positive correlates (Weiss & Fershtman, 1998). 
According to the literature on social power in psychology, power is an impediment to rule compliance 
and fairness (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 
2006). Powerful individuals are less motivated to pay attention to others because they have many 
resources and are less dependent on others (Fiske, 1993). Being more powerful gives people the 
capacity to resist the influence of others and to behave according to their internal states. This may 
explain why powerful individuals are more likely to transgress social norms (Keltner et al., 2003). 
Power can also enhance incentives for self-interested behaviour. For instance, individuals who gained 
power in an experiment think they deserve the more powerful position. They believe they have the 
right to exploit their power and think they deserve more (Ball & Eckel, 1998).  
Fourthly, also in CPR situations, users‟ relative social status in the community and the power it allots 
to them influence their compliance to fairness norms and their resource distribution behaviour. There 
are indications that high status and powerful CPR users will be less fair. CPR users with a higher 
status may be wealthier and/or have larger interests in the resource. In that case, resources may be 
more valuable to them. This reduces their incentives to share equally (Ruttan, 2008). Possibly, their 
status makes they can get away with violations of rules. For example, in the Taita hills in Kenya, 
upstream users, who are more powerful as they accumulated wealth and prestige, extract more than 
their share. They count on downstream users leaving their infringements unchallenged (Fleuret, 
1985). In Sonjo in Tanzania, priests, who play a leading political and social role, distribute irrigation 
water. Their restraint from selfishness is the moral obligation to strive for collective well-being. But 
when water is scarce, this does not stop priests from selfish appropriation, nor do possible social 
sanctions (Potkansky & Adams, 1998). Also in Indian irrigation systems, village elite and better-off, 
highly placed farmers break water allocation rules more often than non-elite, especially if they have 
not crafted the rules (P. Bardhan, 2000). 
But there are also reasons why high status and powerful CPR users would be more compliant to 
fairness norms and other resource distribution rules. CPR users with a high status in the community 
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may also encourage compliance with norms that regulate water appropriation by taking a leadership 
role or by setting the right example (P.  Bardhan & Dayton-Johnson, 2002). Or, if higher status CPR 
users have large interests in the resource, they may coerce others to comply with use restrictions as 
this serves their purpose (Ruttan, 2008; Vedeld, 2000). Else, if they are economically less dependent 
on the resource, they may more easily comply with use restriction than users with a lower status (P.  
Bardhan & Dayton-Johnson, 2002; Ruttan, 2008). 
While there is ample evidence that social factors like gender and social status influence preferences 
and incentives for fairness and for compliance to fairness norms, their impact on fair water 
distribution behaviour in irrigation systems has rarely been analysed. We will now describe the 
methods we have used to assess that impact. 
Methods  
The data was collected from June until August 2008 in five smallholder irrigation schemes that are 
largely self-governed by the irrigators. The irrigation schemes are situated in the semi-arid lowland 
areas of Mufindi district in Tanzania, which are part of the Rufiji river basin. Mufindi district was 
chosen because of the importance of irrigated agriculture for food crops and crops for local markets. 
Rainfall is uni-modal and concentrated in one rainy season. The rest of the year it remains dry. This 
confronts irrigators with seasonal water scarcity (Mkavidanda & Kaswamila, 2001; United Republic 
of Tanzania, 2006b).  
Initially, in each of the irrigation schemes, participatory mapping exercises were conducted with 
twenty randomly selected male and female irrigators. In total, the plots of 351 irrigators were 
indicated on five maps. An irrigator is defined as the person in the household responsible for decisions 
on and cultivation of the irrigated plot. Next, focus group discussions were organised to get a sense of 
the rules, norms and enforcement mechanisms for governing irrigation water in each of the irrigation 
schemes.  
Thereafter, participatory ranking exercises were conducted to measure irrigators‟ relative social status 
in the irrigation community based on the perception of the community members (Laws, Harper, & 
Marcus, 2003)
15
. In each of the irrigation schemes, four randomly composed subgroups of the twenty 
irrigators who did the mapping ranked all irrigators identified on the maps by social status. They did 
so by putting cards with the irrigators‟ names on a ladder with four rungs16. High (low) rungs 
                                                     
15
 Social status was translated in Swahili as „hadhi ya jamii‟, which literally means „status in society‟, and as 
„uwezo‟, which implies economic ability but also the ability to attain your goals, to influence others and to be 
respected. The notion of power is present in the term „uwezo‟ (Kamusi Project). 
16
 Participants were not expected to rank themselves nor users they were not well acquainted with. Rungs could 
be removed (added) if participants distinguished less (more) than four categories. 
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represented high (low) social status (Singh-Manoux et al., 2005). This resulted in (maximum) four 
rankings for each irrigator. Each ranking was transformed into a score, equal to the value assigned to 
the rung divided by the total number of rungs on the ladder. The mean of subgroup scores makes up a 
measure of irrigator‟s social status relative to other irrigators of the same scheme. This measure 
ranges from 0.24 to 1, with 1 corresponding to the highest social status. Then, we standardised the 
social status measure per irrigation community by subtracting the mean for the irrigation community 
from each individual‟s social status and by dividing this by standard deviation for the irrigation 
community. The standardised indicator of social status ranges from -1.91 to 1.98. Positive (negative) 
values represent a relative social status that is higher (lower) than the irrigation community‟s mean. 
After ranking, the advantages and disadvantages of having a high and low social status in society were 
listed during group discussions.  
Subsequently, we administered structured individual surveys to all available irrigators identified on 
the maps (N=228). The survey included questions on socio-economic characteristics of the individual 
and their household, on irrigated agricultural production, on access to irrigation water in the two latest 
dry seasons and on belief in trust, fairness and helpfulness
17
.  
Finally, irrigators‟ water distribution behaviour was observed via a framed field experiment that was 
designed to replicate dilemmas that irrigators experience in real life. This contributes to the external 
validity of the findings (Velez et al., 2009). The dilemma in appropriation from common water flows 
with spatially fixed irrigators consists of upstream users who can repeatedly determine a split of the 
available units of water, whereby their appropriation affects the remaining units for the subsequent 
user(s). This dilemma can be mimicked by a repeated distribution game in which the upstream user is 
the „proposer‟ who can propose to split off twelve hours during which irrigation water can be 
extracted. The number of hours corresponds to a certain payoff, representing the harvest from 
irrigated agricultural production, paid out at the end of the experiment. The downstream user, 
permanently paired to the upstream user, is the „receiver‟. She is not a passive receiver in reality. 
Therefore, in each round of the game, she could react by opting to remain silent, to communicate 
appreciation or dissatisfaction or to punish the upstream user. The latter implied a minor cost for the 
downstream user and a small fine for the upstream user, deductible from the final payoff. 
In practice, in each round, the upstream user indicated the proposed hours split on a card that was 
passed on to the paired downstream user. Then, the downstream user indicated one of the four 
possible reactions on the same card that went back to the upstream user. Thereafter, the subsequent 
round started and the upstream user proposed a split another time and a new card went to the 
downstream user for reaction, and so on. Participants were not informed about the number of rounds.  
                                                     
17
 Based on the General Social Survey (GSS) questions (Karlan, 2005, p. 20). 
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In reality, irrigators appropriate water in circumstances of water abundance and water scarcity. 
Therefore, the experiment started with five rounds in which water is abundant and total water 
availability was sufficient for both upstream and downstream users to reach a threshold – set at four 
hours – that represents a critical water input required for irrigated agricultural production. Above the 
threshold, payoffs rose with hours of water extracted; below the threshold, payoffs were minimal. 
Then followed ten rounds in which water is scarce. Water scarcity entails there is an insufficient 
supply of resource units to fulfil the users‟ needs (UNDP, 2006:133). It was mimicked by fixing the 
threshold at seven hours, which renders it impossible for both users to reach above threshold payoffs. 
In addition, payoffs per hour of water extraction were lower and increased only half as fast per extra 
hour. The payoff structure for water abundance presented in Table 1 was available to upstream and 
downstream users in the five rounds with abundance; that for water scarcity in the ten scarcity 
rounds
18
. 
Per irrigation scheme, maximum four sessions of the experiment were conducted, each with 
maximum fourteen irrigators from the same irrigation scheme randomly selected from those identified 
on the maps. In total, 13 sessions were conducted with 156 irrigators, of which 52 are female. At the 
end of the experiment, each participant received the sum of payoffs minus fines or punishment costs if 
any. On average participants received 2460 TSH.  
 Water Abundance Water Scarcity 
Hours 
Upstream 
User 
Upstream 
User 
Downstream 
User 
Upstream 
User 
Downstream 
User 
0 50 500 50 350 
1 50 500 50 325 
2 50 475 50 300 
3 50 450 50 250 
4 175 425 50 200 
5 250 375 50 125 
6 325 325 50 50 
7 375 250 125 50 
8 425 175 200 50 
9 450 50 250 50 
10 475 50 300 50 
11 500 50 325 50 
12 500 50 350 50 
Table 1: Payoff per Hour of Water Extraction 
                                                     
18
 Payoffs are measured in Tanzanian Shilling (TSH), with 1 US$ = 1200 TSH. The table and every other tool 
used both figures and symbols to ensure understanding by lowly educated people. Tools and instructions can be 
found in 
Appendix I and Appendix II. 
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The participants of each session were randomly assigned to be upstream or downstream user and 
paired up
19. Upstream and downstream users were seated in separate rooms. Participants were not 
informed about the gender and social status of the participant they were paired to. Behaviour in the 
experiment and possible social distance effects, therefore, are dependent on internalised awareness 
and internalised behavioural implications of one‟s gender and one‟s relative social status in the 
irrigator community (Cardenas, 2003; Cardenas & Ostrom, 2004). One could argue that social 
distance effects and relational aspects of gender and social status may have had stronger effects on 
behaviour if gender and social status of the paired participant was known. Yet, providing this 
information risked influencing behaviour in uncontrollable ways and complicating understanding of 
the game, as proved by prior testing. It possibly jeopardised anonymity as well.  
Context  
Rural households living in the semi-arid lowlands of Mufindi district mainly depend on semi-
subsistence smallholder farming to provide for their livelihood. Most households keep small livestock 
to supplement their diet or for trade. Some keep small herds of cattle as savings, for milk or for trade. 
Other activities include crop trade, petty trade, brick or charcoal production, seasonal labour and beer 
brewing.  
Agricultural production is primordially based on rain-fed cultivation with the use of rudimentary 
technology and minimal inputs. Irrigated agriculture permits production of food crops out of the 
season for rain-fed agriculture. Irrigation is also used for the production of vegetables and cash crops 
for local and regional markets, like tomatoes and onions. In most cases, the right to use and take 
decisions on the plot of irrigated land is in the hands of either the husband or the wife in the 
household. The husband generally owns (or rents) the plot. 
The irrigation schemes consist of networks of locally dug river diversions and canals. Occasionally 
locally made wooden gates, earthen dams or sandbags are used to manage the water flow. By 
exception, concrete intakes or technically more advanced gates are used. Flooding and capillary 
absorption make the soil of the plots in the irrigation schemes moist enough to farm. Alternatively, the 
proximity of water permits bucket irrigation. The irrigation schemes comprise a patchwork of plots 
most of which are relatively small (on average one acre) and cultivated by one irrigator. Less than one 
third of the irrigators use two or more plots and only a few own large plots (up to 13 acres).  
The principal norms and rules for governing water appropriation in the irrigation systems are the 
following: competition and distributive conflicts are avoided to the extent possible in order to 
                                                     
19
 Being up- or downstream user in the experiment was independent of irrigators‟ their actual position in the 
irrigation schemes. We assumed that, in reality, each irrigator has a neighbour located upstream and downstream 
and is therefore familiar with decisions up-and downstream users have to make in the experiment.  
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maintain harmony in the community. Furthermore, there are strong beliefs that everybody has a right 
to water. A fair distribution of irrigation water is regarded essential.   
Gender relations in rural Tanzanian communities, like the ones studied here, are characterised by 
patriarchal socio-cultural norms and values that constrain women‟s rights and privileges, their access 
to resources and decision-making power (Mzinga, 2002)20. Women are structurally subordinate to 
men and dependent on men for their access to means of production even if economic hardship caused 
women to take up a role as breadwinner, a role previously reserved for men (Silbersmidt, 2001). 
An ILO report (2000) states that women in Mufindi district do most of the agricultural work but have 
limited access to and control over any income derived from it. Women‟s access to resources, such as 
land, generally passes via their husband or male relatives, although recent changes in land legislation 
should facilitate women‟s direct ownership of land. Additionally, women‟s decision-making powers 
are limited. They have little or no voice in local village government. Yet, since a policy directive 
issued in 1997, at least 25% of all village councillors elected should be women.  
Our impression is that patriarchal structures and norms are still in place in the studied irrigation 
communities. Even if, de jure, women‟s decision-making powers may have increased, de facto, 
women are hesitant to give their opinion or to openly challenge a men‟s opinion in a mixed public. 
Also intra-household relations remain patriarchal.  
As elsewhere in sub-Sahara Africa, rural Tanzanian communities are status-based societies rather than 
open societies with democratic decision-making and with socio-economic differentiation based on 
differences in preferences and skills. In such societies, people who occupy the upper rung of the social 
ladder provide an authority structure that imposes its rule. People of lower ranks have no choice but to 
comply. Most socio-economic interactions in these communities are embedded in the existing social 
hierarchy that is cautiously conserved (Platteau & Abraham, 2002).  
A high status in these societies may be lineage- and age-based (Platteau & Abraham, 2002). For 
instance, among the Iraqw in Tanzania, the (descendants of the) founder of the community is on top of 
the social ladder and leads the elder council, which constitutes the highest rung of status and 
authority. Nowadays, the local government has taken over most of the functions of the elder councils, 
but still elders (are supposed to) guard the community‟s welfare and represent the population. Older 
men, but also older women, may derive their authority and respect from their role in the local 
community as well (Snyder, 2001). People of lower ranks include young age classes, women, recent 
                                                     
20
 Patriarchy is used to describe male superiority over women and the conditions that privilege men and put 
women in a subordinate position vis-à-vis men (Silbersmidt, 2001, p. 658).  
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immigrants, people with secondary rights to land, like herders, or poor and dependent farmers 
(Platteau & Abraham, 2002).  
The pertinence of (social) status as a source of differentiation in the irrigation communities is evident 
from the (dis)advantages of having a high or low social status listed during the post-ranking group 
discussions. According to the irrigation community members, advantages of having a high social 
status include respect, decision power and being informed about village affairs. Other advantages are 
having better access to resources, credit and services and higher well-being. Disadvantages include 
time-consuming responsibilities and the obligation to keep up the status. The latter demands a 
particular consumption pattern and makes it impossible to seek (informal) assistance or 
reimbursement.   
A low social status is associated to marginalisation, which reveals itself in “being like slaves”, having 
no freedom to independently make decisions, being defenceless, being uninformed, being ill-
appreciated for one‟s opinion, not receiving recognition and limited access to services. Not 
unexpected, such profound deprivation of capabilities results in ill-being, like poor living conditions, 
low income, poor nutrition, failing to send children to school and being unable “to fulfil one‟s 
dreams”. Among the few advantages of a low social status are easy access to informal assistance and 
the ability to work as casual labourer.  
Additionally, we have looked for correlations between individual and household characteristics and 
the standardised social status indicator in the survey sample (Table 2). Patriarchy is reflected in the 
fact that being female and being a female household head is negatively correlated to social status. As 
expected, being involved in the formal or traditional government or council positively correlates to 
social status. Also if one‟s father was involved in the formal or traditional government or council, this 
increases one‟s social status. Unexpectedly, age and time of residence do not correlate to social status 
in the studied communities. Economic well-being and social status are positively correlated. Larger 
asset holding in terms of (irrigated) land, livestock, bicycle, iron roofing on the house positively and 
significantly correlate with social status. Destitution, measured by having experienced food insecurity 
in the last two years, and having no off-farm income opportunities negatively correlate to social 
status. Having primary education positively correlates with social status, while having no education 
negatively correlates with it.  
In this article, we examine if irrigators‟ gender and social status affects fairness in the distribution of 
irrigation water in water-abundant and in water-scarce conditions. Scarcity is expected to render the 
dilemma of fairly distributing resources more difficult. Gender and social status are expected to affect 
distribution behaviour because they relate to economic differences and to differences in social 
preferences, behavioural norms and reputation mechanisms.  
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Individual or Household Characteristic Social Status 
Female -.295
**
 
Female household head -.260
**
 
Age -.060 
Non-lifetime resident .038 
Food insecure (HH) -.189
**
 
No off-farm income -.231
**
 
Value of total livestock (HH) .223
**
 
Owning cows (HH) .282
**
 
Owning bicycle (HH) .422
**
 
Iron roof (HH) .390
**
 
No education -.335
**
 
Primary education .252
**
 
Acreage irrigated land (HH) .168
*
 
Acreage total land (HH) .219
**
 
Member of village government/council .300
**
 
Member of traditional government/council  .115° 
Able to make important decisions in kinship group  .214
**
 
Father was member of village government/council .145
*
 
Father was member of traditional government/council  .153
*
 
Father was able to make important decisions in kinship group  .061 
Significance levels two-sided: ° = 10%, * = 5%, ** = 1%; N=228 
(HH): measured at the household instead of the individual level 
Table 2: Correlations between Social Status and Individual and Household Characteristics  
Results  
More specifically, we will address the following questions by means of a framed field experiment that 
mimics the distribution of irrigation water: does gender affect distribution behaviour? Does gender 
make a difference for reactions to water scarcity? Does the relative social status of irrigators affect 
distribution behaviour in water abundance and in scarcity? And does this happen in the same way for 
male and female irrigators?  
First, both experimental and case studies suggest that men and women will share available resources 
in a different way. To examine this, we estimated the share of hours, out of twelve hours available for 
irrigation water extraction that upstream users propose to the paired downstream users under 
conditions of both water abundance and scarcity in the framed field experiment. Upstream users‟ 
gender is used as an explanatory variable. It is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the upstream 
user is female. The treatment (scarcity) is also included as a fixed effect, which we interact with the 
female dummy. We used Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis whereby we controlled for 
clustering within individuals
21
. Table 3 presents the results. Table 4 shows whether differences in 
                                                     
21
 One could argue that this simple model is likely to suffer from omitted variable bias. The nature of our 
experiment is such that current appropriation behaviour is a function of the downstream user‟s reaction in the 
previous round. But including this as an explanatory variable is not straightforward. The downstream user‟s 
sanctioning behaviour is a direct function of the upstream user‟s appropriation behaviour. Hence, including the 
downstream user‟s reaction would make our model a dynamic panel data model. It is well known that, in such a 
model, the appropriation behaviour is likely to be correlated within individuals over time, which renders the 
76 
 
estimated proposed shares by men and women in water abundance and water scarcity are significant 
with a Wald F-test. The proposed shares are based on the estimated model and calculated by assigning 
the value 0 and 1 respectively, to the dummy variable female and by assigning the value 0 and 1 
respectively, to the dummy variable scarcity. 
The results demonstrate that, on average, male upstream users propose an equal split of the available 
hours (=.500). Female upstream users however propose a share of hours that is significantly larger 
than an equal split and significantly larger than that of male upstream users (respectively 
0.500+0.072=0.0572 and 0.500; see Table 4 for F tests). The difference between proposed shares by 
female and male irrigators is equivalent to almost one additional hour.  
Variable β S.E.
a
 t P>|t| 
Intercept .500 .023 21.27 .000 
Scarcity -.057 .017 -3.35 .001 
Female .072 .038 1.91 .060 
ScarcXFemale -.043 .042 -1.03 .304 
R² .034    
Root MSE .215    
F(3,77) 8.21    
Prob>F .000    
N 
Strata 
Units  
1170 
1 
78 
   
Dependent variable = Proposed share 
a
 Corrected for clustering within individuals  
Table 3: Linear Regression Estimating Proposed Shares while Interacting Gender with Water Scarcity 
Treatment  
When water scarcity is introduced, material incentives change. Do men and women react differently 
to this? We observe that both male and female irrigators significantly lower their proposed share (-
0.057) (Table 3). Female irrigators however do not reduce their proposed share more than male 
irrigators (insignificant coefficient of the interaction effect of scarcity and female). But as women‟s 
proposed share was higher when water is abundant, the share they eventually propose when water is 
scarce is slightly, but insignificantly, higher than the share men propose (0.500+.072-.057-.043=0.472 
versus 0.500-0.057=0.443; see Table 4 for F tests). When water is scarce, women‟s proposed share is 
not significantly different from an equal split, whereas men‟s is significantly lower.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
downstream user‟s reaction in the previous period endogenous. The standard solution to estimate the model in 
first differences and use suitably lagged levels of the endogenous variable as instruments is uninteresting for us, 
as this deletes all time invariant variables from the model, which are key in this study. However, to get a sense 
of the magnitude of this omitted variable problem, we ran an additional set of regressions. The reasoning of this 
analysis, as well as the results, are presented in the Appendix III. Overall, we find that excluding the 
downstream user‟s reaction in the previous round has little effect on the other variables.  
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Compares Proposed Share With Proposed Share F(1,77)= Prob>F= 
By male in abundance By female in abundance 3.65 0.0597 
By male in abundance Equal split 0 0.9894 
By female in abundance Equal split 5.90 0.0175 
By male in scarcity By female in scarcity 0.51 0.4794 
By male in scarcity Equal split 8.73 0.0042 
By female in scarcity Equal split 0.60 0.4426 
Table 4: Wald F Test for Significant Differences between Estimated Proposed Shares 
It seems that men and women respond in a similar way to a change in material incentives. When water 
is scarce, both men and women lower the share of water they propose. But, as women distribute water 
in an altruistic way when water is abundant and men distribute water evenly, the reduction due to 
scarcity results in selfish distribution behaviour among men and fair distribution behaviour among 
women.  
Secondly, distribution behaviour is expected to be influenced not only by gender but also by one‟s 
relative social status. Figure 13 represents average shares proposed in each round of the experiment 
by male and female upstream users with a relatively high and low social status. We centred the 
standardised social status indicator on the mean for the sample of upstream users (=.0299). Low social 
status includes 40% of the upstream users with the lowest centred standardised social status, i.e. 
smaller than or equal to -0.47. High social status includes 40% of the upstream users with the highest 
centred standardised social status, i.e. greater than or equal to 0.25. Both low and high social status 
groups are split up by gender
22
. Round one to five in the experiment mimic water abundance, round 
six to 15 mimic water scarcity. 
Figure 13 illustrates that male upstream users with a high social status tend to propose less than equal 
shares throughout the experiment
23
. Men with a low social status and women with a high social status 
however, propose on average more than an equal share when water is abundant. In rounds with water 
scarcity, low social status men tend to propose less than equal shares. Women with a high social status 
generally propose (more than) equal shares. Initially, women with a low social status propose more 
than an equal share in water abundance. The proposed share drops below an equal split in the fifth and 
last round with abundance. It remains lower than an equal share throughout the water scarcity 
treatment.   
                                                     
22
 The figure does not show proposed shares by the 20% upstream users with centred standardised social status 
larger than -.47 and smaller than 0.25 as this is less interesting for our analysis. 
23
 As some groups by gender and social status are small, differences in distribution behaviour can be sensitive to 
decisions of one or a few individuals in the group. Therefore, we cannot draw any conclusion on the 
significance of differences on the basis of Figure 13. 
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Figure 13: Upstream Users‟ Proposed Share of Hours of Water per Round by Gender and by Social Status 
To examine the significance of the differences in distribution behaviour by gender and by social 
status, we have estimated the proposed share in the experiment as a function of participants‟ gender 
and social status and the interaction of these variables. We did so for water abundance and for scarcity 
by including interaction effects of the (scarcity) treatment with gender, with social status and with the 
interaction of those two characteristics. The standardised social status indicator has been centred on 
the mean for the sample of upstream users in the experiment (=.0299) to facilitate interpretation of the 
results. The variable scarcity takes the value 1 for rounds with water scarcity. We used Ordinary Least 
Squares regression analysis and controlled for clustering within individuals, the results of which are 
described in Table 5. Table 6 shows significance of differences in estimated proposed shares in water 
abundance and scarcity by reference types of upstream users using Wald F-tests. The reference types 
of users include men and women respectively, with a high (low) social status. Their proposed share is 
based on the estimated model. It is calculated by assigning the value 0 and 1 respectively, to the 
dummy variable female and assigning value 1 (-1) to the variable that represents the centred 
standardised social status
24
.  
                                                     
24
 Standard deviation of the standardised social status for the sample of upstream users in the experiment=1. 
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In water abundance, the share irrigators propose decreases with higher social status as is shown by the 
significant, negative coefficient of the variable social status (-0.061). However, the interaction effect 
of being female and social status is significantly positive (0.083). It largely annuls the negative effect 
of social status on the proposed share among women.   
Consequently, estimated proposed shares by women with a high social status and by women with a 
low social status do not significantly differ from each other, but they are significantly higher than an 
equal share (resp. 0.503+0.079-0.061+0.083=0.604 and 0.503+0.079+0.061-0.083=0.560; see Table 6 
for F tests). Proposed shares by men with a high social status are significantly lower than those by 
men with low social status (resp. 0.503-0.061=0.442 and 0.503+0.061=0.564). Proposed shares by 
high status men are significantly lower than an equal share, those by low status men significantly 
higher. It also follows that proposed shares by men and women with a low social status do not 
significantly differ, whereas proposed shares by men and women with a high social status do. 
Variable β S.E.
a
 t P>|t| 
Intercept 0.503 0.021 23.41 .000 
Scarcity -0.065 0.016 -3.96 .000 
Social Status -0.061 0.021 -2.90 .005 
ScarcXSocStat 0.049 0.015 3.21 .002 
Female 0.079 0.04 1.97 .052 
ScarcXFemale -0.026 0.041 -.63 .528 
SocStatXFemale 0.083 0.038 2.17 .033 
ScarcXSocStatXFemale -0.041 0.033 -1.22 .227 
R² .064    
Root MSE .210    
F(7,75) 5.46    
Prob>F .000    
N 
Strata 
Units  
1140 
1 
76 
   
Dependent variable=Proposed share 
a
 Corrected for clustering within individuals  
Table 5: Linear Regression Estimating Proposed Shares while Interacting Gender with Social Status and with 
the Scarcity Treatment  
We know that upstream users with higher social status propose lower shares when water is abundant 
in the experiment (-0.061). When water is scarce, however, all reduce their proposed share (-0.065) 
but upstream users with higher social status reduce it less (positive significant coefficient of the 
interaction effect of scarcity and social status =0.049).  
 When it concerns female upstream users, the negative effect of a higher social status on proposed 
shares in water abundance is cancelled out. Female upstream users reduce their proposed share as 
much as male upstream users when water is scarce (insignificant coefficient of the interaction effect 
of being female and scarcity). To the same extent as among male upstream users, a higher social 
status makes female upstream users reduce their proposed share less (insignificant coefficient of the 
interaction effect of being female, scarcity and social status).   
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Compares Proposed Share With Proposed Share F(1,75)= Prob>F= 
By low status male in abundance By high status male in abundance  8.39 0.0050 
By low status male in abundance By low status female in abundance 0.01 0.9265 
By low status male in abundance Equal split 4.94 0.0293 
By low status female in abundance By high status female in abundance 0.48 0.4914 
By low status female in abundance Equal split 3.10 0.0825 
By high status male in abundance By high status female in abundance 6.37 0.0137 
By high status male in abundance Equal split 3.39 0.0696 
By high status female in abundance Equal split 3.47 0.0663 
By low status male in scarcity By high status male in scarcity  0.33 0.5686 
By low status male in scarcity By low status female in scarcity 0.04 0.8422 
By low status male in scarcity Equal split 2.47 0.1201 
By low status female in scarcity By high status female in scarcity 9.92 0.0023 
By low status female in scarcity Equal split 0.89 0.3477 
By high status male in scarcity By high status female in scarcity 3.67 0.0592 
By high status male in scarcity Equal split 10.08 0.0022 
By high status female in scarcity Equal split 0.26 0.6122 
By low status male in abundance By low status male in scarcity 19.31 0.0000 
By high status male in abundance By high status male in scarcity 0.70 0.4040 
By low status female in abundance By low status female in scarcity 4.06 0.0476 
By high status female in abundance By high status female in scarcity 3.23 0.0763 
Table 6: Wald F Test for Significant Differences between Estimated Proposed Shares 
The combination of these effects results in the following differences in proposed shares (Table 6). In 
water scarcity, the proposed shares by men with low social status, by women with a low social status 
and by men with a high social status do not significantly differ (respectively 0.503-0.065+0.061-
0.049=0.450; 0.503-0.065+0.061-0.049+0.079-0.026-0.083+0.041=0.461; 0.503-0.065-
0.061+0.049=0.426). The proposed share by men with a high social status is significantly smaller than 
an equal share. The proposed shares by low status men and women are smaller than an equal share but 
the difference is insignificant. 
The proposed share by women with a high social status in water scarcity remains larger than an equal 
share, albeit insignificantly (0.503-0.065-0.061+0.049+0.079-0.026+0.083-0.041=0.521). It is 
significantly larger than the proposed share by low status women (and men) and by high status men.    
All upstream users, except men with a high social status, significantly reduced their proposed share in 
water scarcity as compared to water abundance. High social status women reduced their share, yet it 
remained an altruist split. Low social status men and women reduced their share from an altruist split 
to a (less than) equal split. High social status men propose less than an equal split throughout the 
experiment. 
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Discussion  
In this section we first compare our findings with the experimental and CPR literature. Then, we 
assess the extent to which real-life gender- and status-specific characteristics like resource valuation, 
subsistence needs and beliefs in fairness, trust and helpfulness can explain the distribution behaviour 
observed in the experiment. We continue by evaluating the external validity of our findings and, 
finally, we reflect on policy implications.  
The distribution behaviour by male and female participants as observed under conditions of water 
abundance in our framed experiment confirms that women are more generous than men (Andreoni & 
Vesterlund, 2001; Catherine Eckel & Grossman, 2008). They care less about disadvantageous 
inequality in water distribution even while this is relatively costly in terms of payoffs. Possibly, 
women have different social preferences than men and are more other-regarding (Greig & Bohnet, 
2009). It may also be that women are more reluctant than men to break the irrigation system‟s rules 
that prescribe a fair resource distribution, as Agarwal (2007) and Cleaver (1998) suggested.  
When water is abundant, men and women with a low social status and women with a high social 
status distribute water in an altruistic way. Men with a high social status are less generous than others. 
They disrespect the irrigation schemes‟ fairness norms and behave selfishly. Their behaviour confirms 
social psychology findings that higher status and more powerful people are less other-regarding, more 
selfish and transgress norms more often (Ball & Eckel, 1998; Keltner et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, our results show that both men and women react to water scarcity by lowering the share 
they propose. As a result, women, who distributed in an altruistic way in water abundance, distribute 
in a fair way in water scarcity. Men, who distributed in a fair way in abundance, distribute in a selfish 
way in water scarcity. In our experiment, women are more generous than men, whether water is 
relatively cheap to give (in abundance) or expensive (in scarcity). Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), 
however, state that women are more generous when it is expensive to give, while men are more 
generous when it is cheap to give.  
When water is scarce, especially women with a high social status remain generous. They propose 
more than an equal share irrespective of water being abundant or scarce. High status women appear to 
be more other-regarding or more willing to live by the rules. Possibly, they can afford to be generous. 
As shown in Table 7 A&B, they are economically better off since they are less likely to have 
experienced food insecurity, they more likely have off-farm income opportunities and they own more 
valuable livestock. Or it may be that they take up a leadership role as guardians of fairness norms, 
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since they strongly believe in fairness (Table 7 C&D)
25
 (P.  Bardhan & Dayton-Johnson, 2002). Status 
seeking behaviour or „noblesse oblige‟ could be other explanations (Liebe & Tutic, 2010).  
Low status women, however, are generous and propose more than equal shares when water is 
abundant but this fades when water is scarce. Water scarcity possibly made proposing (more than) 
equal shares prohibitively expensive in our experiment as it results in a negligible payoff. Possibly, 
under scarcity, being other-regarding or living up to fairness norms is prohibitively disadvantageous 
for low status women given their more deplorable economic status, their higher levels of subsistence 
distress and their higher dependence on irrigation water for food production (Hong & Bohnet, 2007). 
The same may apply to men with a low social status; they react in a similar way to water scarcity as 
low social status women.  
In fact, in the irrigation communities, irrigators with a lower social status, and especially women with 
a lower social status, are more likely to have experienced food insecurity than irrigators with a higher 
social status (Table 7 A&B). They rely more on irrigated agriculture for subsistence as they allocate 
larger percentages of their irrigated plots to food crops, they have less income opportunities outside 
agriculture and they own less livestock (Table 7 A&B). In addition, low status women are more likely 
to belong to minority tribes, possibly because they married into the community (Table 7 B&C). This 
could make it easier for them to disregard rules to fairly distribute water despite their strong beliefs in 
fairness.  
Even while men with a high social status propose larger shares in water scarcity than in water 
abundance, they disregard fairness throughout and propose less than equal shares. When water is 
scarce they decrease their proposed share less than others. Possibly, considerations of being other-
regarding, taking leadership or „noblesse oblige‟ only come into play under scarcity when they realise 
their counterpart is seriously deprived if they take the lion share. Still men with a high status remain 
selfish and deprive their counterpart of gaining any substantial payoff.  
In fact, in the irrigation communities, irrigators with a higher social status allocate larger percentages 
of their irrigated plots to cash crops (Table 7 A&B). Irrigation water, thus, has a high (market) value 
for them, both when water is abundant and when it is scarce. This could explain why higher social 
status irrigators take large shares of water in the experiment. Yet, we observe such behaviour among 
high status men but not among high status women even while they grow similar percentages of cash 
crops. One of the factors explaining the different distribution behaviour of high status men and high 
status women may be that men less strongly believe in fairness than women (Table 7 C&D).  
                                                     
25
 Women generally have stronger beliefs in fairness than men. Yet beliefs of high status women are somewhat 
weaker than low status women‟s.  
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Group By  Food 
Insecurity 
%  
Food 
Crops 
% 
Drought 
Crops  
%  
Cash 
Crops 
Live 
Stock 
Value 
No Off-
Farm 
Income 
Belief in 
Fairness 
Belief 
in 
Trust 
Belief 
Helpful 
ness 
% Same 
Tribe  
A. Sample: Upstream users in experiment 
Men 
(n=52) 
Social 
status 
-.210 .199 -.043 .019 0.277° -.179 -.027 -.133 -.088 -.048 
Women 
(n=24) 
Social 
status 
-.230 -.264 -.176 .232 .333 -0.342° -.482
*
 -.040 -.129 .312 
All 
(n=76) 
Social 
status 
-0.221° .058 -.069 .087 .307
**
 -.251
*
 -0.194° -.107 -.129 .092 
B. Sample: Irrigation communities 
Men 
(n=140) 
Social 
status 
-.126 -.092 -.057 .122 0.170° -.186
*
 -.068 -.055 -.009 -.074 
Women 
(n=78) 
Social 
status 
-.266
*
 -.155 -.166 .162 .249
*
 -0.221° -.015 -.061 .080 0.198° 
All 
(n=218) 
Social 
status 
-.189
**
 -0.123° -0.114° .156
*
 .223
**
 -.231
**
 -.105 -.069 .028 .058 
C. Sample: Upstream users in experiment 
Low 
status
a
 
(n=30) 
Male 
(n=18) 
-.082 -.100 -.307° .191 .183 -.085 -.703
**
 .092 -0.291 .394
*
 
High 
status
b
 
(n=31) 
Male 
(n=26) 
.115 .196 
/
 .069 -.204 .175 -.244 .010 -.026 -.047 
All 
(n=78) 
Male 
(n=53) 
-.042 -.037 .001 .159 .151 -.141 -.320
**
 .001 -.136 .241
*
 
D. Sample: Irrigation communities 
Low 
status
a
 
(n=87) 
Male 
(n=44) 
-.152 -.061 -.137 .095 .176 -.075 -.266
*
 -.013 .016 .300
**
 
High 
status
b
 
(n=89) 
Male 
(n=73) 
.018 .016 .063 .031 -.013 .071 -.219* -.032 -.065 -.062 
All 
(n=227) 
Male 
(n=142) 
-.081 -.040 -.060 .106 .168
*
 -.144
*
 -.165
*
 -.056 .026 .184
**
 
Significance levels two-sided: ° = 10%, * = 5%, ** = 1%. 
a
 Low social status if centred standardised social status <=-0.47 
b
 High social status if centred standardised social status >=0.25 
Table 7: Correlations between Social Status, among Men and Women, and Indicators of Resource Valuation, 
Subsistence Needs or Adherence to Norms
26
 
A direct evaluation of the external validity of our findings can be made on the basis of the post-
experiment question: “Did you recognise many, some, few or no elements from real life in the 
exercise?” Most upstream users in the experiment recognised many elements from real life in the 
experiment (59.2%; N=78). A minority did not recognise any element (13.2%). Fewer women with a 
low social status recognised many elements (26.7%) but still many some elements (53.3%). This 
could suggest low status women are confronted with slightly different dilemmas in water 
appropriation in real life. 
                                                     
26
 Food insecurity indicates that the respondent‟s household has experienced food insecurity in two years 
preceding the survey. Percentage of food/drought/cash crops is the percentage of the irrigated plot allocated to 
food crops, which include maize and beans, to drought resistance crops, which include yams, cassava and sweet 
potatoes, and to cash crops, which include tomatoes, carrots, cabbage and African eggplant. Livestock value is 
the total value of big and small livestock owned by the respondent‟s household calculated using market values at 
the time of the survey (www.lmistz.net and market prices recorded in Mufindi district, July 2008). No off-farm 
income indicates the respondent lacks income opportunities outside agriculture and livestock. Belief in 
fairness/trust/helpfulness was expressed by referring to a scale going from low over moderate to high levels. The 
last indicator is the percentage in the community of the same tribe as the respondent. 
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The external validity of our findings can be evaluated in an indirect way by looking at real life 
behaviour in the irrigation schemes. More particularly, we can look at the type of crops grown on 
irrigated plots. Growing drought resistant crops is a typical low-risk, low-return strategy to deal ex-
ante with the risk of insufficient (irrigation) water (Dercon, 1996). We observe that high status men 
allocate smaller percentages of their irrigated plot to drought resistant crops (0.4%) than others in the 
irrigation communities and larger percentages to cash crops (14.7%) (N=228)
27
. They may do so 
because they are more confident in an adequate water flow. Or, they may be less risk averse or more 
market-oriented. Low status men and women, regardless of their status, grow more drought resistance 
crops (resp. 1.0% and 2.0%). Either, women and low status men anticipate on an inadequate supply of 
irrigation water as they are less assertive in claiming a share; or they are generally more risk averse.  
Indirectly, the experimental results are backed by the findings of a related study on resource conflicts 
in the same irrigation schemes (Lecoutere, 2011). In that study, we found that offenders had a low 
social status in less than one quarter of the twenty five studied cases of resource conflicts. Offenders 
had a relatively high social status in more than half of the cases. Women were the offenders only in 
three cases. These observations correspond with the experimental findings that high status men 
respect a fair distribution of resources less than women and lower status men. Yet, low status women 
disregard fairness when water is scarce in the experiment but hardly any of such cases was reported. 
Either, in real life this rarely happens, or people turn a blind eye to it to allow women to foresee in 
their minimum needs (Cleaver, 1998).  
Our findings imply that policy that naively builds on self-governance and expects this will guarantee 
equitable water use may be disappointing. There are four possible approaches for policy to advance 
equity in the distribution of resources. First, if feasible, the efficiency of water use or the water flow 
could be increased. But, this may be a stopgap measure as this could attract more users while the 
dilemma and inherent inequalities remain the same. Secondly, selfish water appropriation by men 
high on the social ladder may be warded off by more enforceable appropriation rules and by 
supporting women and users of low social status in negotiation processes over access to water. 
Appropriation rules could be more enforceable if they are recorded at the irrigation scheme or village 
level. Support in negotiation processes could be organised in the form of easily accessible „legal‟ aid. 
Thirdly, users with lower social status could more easily afford to maintain a fair resource distribution 
if their dependence on (irrigated) agriculture for subsistence would be reduced through other income 
opportunities or micro-insurance. Finally, high status women should be actively involved in water 
governance as they are the true guardians of fairness in the distribution of resources.  
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 Differences however are insignificant as percentages are low and standard deviations are high. 
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Conclusion  
Equity in the distribution of CPR is not evident. Embedded social differentiation linked to gender and 
social status plays a significant role for the willingness and ability to fairly distribute water in rural 
African irrigation systems. Water scarcity further intensifies differences in distribution behaviour. As 
men with a high social status often fulfil a leadership role in patriarchal and status-based societies and 
they are economically better-off, one would expect them to comply with fairness norms and distribute 
resources evenly. But they do not. They seem less other-regarding but more efficiency-minded. Low 
status women and low status men, however, appear unable to stick to a fair distribution when water is 
scarce. The economic loss that comes with fairness is insurmountable given their more deplorable 
economic situation and their dependence on irrigation water for subsistence. Only women with a high 
social status adhere and are able to adhere to fairness. Even if there are different reasons for it, the 
unfair distribution behaviour of high status men and people with a low social status could undermine 
trust, reciprocity, mutual commitment and CPR provision and render the system for self-governance 
of irrigation schemes unsustainable. Moreover, the way water is distributed results in differential 
access to irrigation water that mirrors structural inequalities and may reinforce economic inequalities 
linked to gender and social status. Such drawbacks are exacerbated when water is scarce. Policy that 
builds on self-governance but remains blind for structural impediments to fair distribution of water 
may fail to attain sustainable and equitable water governance, especially if climate change increases 
water scarcity.  
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Institutions under Construction: Resolving Resource Conflicts in 
Tanzanian Irrigation Schemes
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
Water governance in Tanzania’s small-scale irrigation schemes has become ever more challenging 
because of increasing market penetration, declining predictability of water availability and widening 
institutional pluralism. Despite these trends, resource conflicts at the local level have generally been 
avoided. Instead, one observes processes in which actors involved in conflicts make and remake 
institutions. This renders these irrigation schemes interesting for studying water governance 
institutions under construction. By documenting how conflicts over water are solved in small-scale 
irrigation schemes in rural Tanzania, we show that resource conflicts do not necessarily lead to 
violence, but motivate actors to pragmatically search for solutions. Institutional pluralism is turned 
into an asset because it increases the potential for creativity. As such, pragmatic conflict resolution 
and institutional pluralism contribute to the development of more sophisticated and locally adapted 
resource governance institutions. However, despite its potential, actor-driven development of 
resource governance institutions can also reproduce deeply entrenched power imbalances and gender 
roles. As such, it can hinder inclusion of less powerful resource users because the latter do not always 
have the capability to engage in creative conflict resolution.  
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Introduction 
The last decennia have been marked by neo-Malthusian predictions of water wars and ever increasing 
incidences of conflicts over scarcer water supplies (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Starr, 1991). While rising 
competition for natural resources can be a potential trigger for violence in concurrence with broader 
tensions, there is little evidence that substantiates a direct causal relation between water scarcity and 
violent conflict (Le Billon, 2001). If appropriate resource governance institutions are in place, 
competition for scarce resources does not necessarily lead to violence (Ostrom, 1990). What is more, 
competition may well be a driver for institutional evolution (Bogale & Korf, 2007; Singleton, 2007). 
In Tanzania, different trends have boosted competition for water in small-scale irrigation schemes. 
More semi-subsistence farmers now supplement traditional rain-fed food production with irrigated 
agriculture (Kaswamila & Masuruli, 2004). Irrigated production of crops for local and regional 
markets, like tomatoes and onions, has become increasingly important over the last decade (Shao, 
Nyomora, Mlay, & Kasunga, 2002). In addition, climate change and inter-annual climate variability 
such as El Niño effects have made rainfall less predictable, rendering rain-fed agriculture more risky 
(Dixon et al., 2003; Sokoni & Shechambo, 2005). To date, there have been few incidences of violent 
conflicts over water for irrigation in Tanzania that are unrelated to other tensions. It appears that the 
increased competition has mainly generated a growing need for more sophisticated water governance. 
Concurrently, the decentralisation process has added to legal and institutional pluralism with regard to 
water governance in Tanzania. Formerly, water had been principally governed by user communities 
relying on “traditional” institutions at the local level, but recent policy changes have made 
institutional pluralism more tangible (Maganga, 2002). The renewed national water policy 
(NAWAPO) has introduced a new institutional framework for water governance with more 
implications for the local level (United Republic of Tanzania, 2002, 2005). Additionally, the local 
government reform program (LGRP) has devolved more power, responsibilities and resources to local 
government authorities (Chaligha et al., 2007). 
These recent developments have emphasised the dynamics of making and remaking institutions for 
governing water in small-scale irrigation schemes. We believe it is important to uncover these local 
dynamics to counter neo-Malthusian predictions of water wars, to counterbalance the idea that the 
sole challenge lies in “getting the institutions right” and to downscale romanticised views about 
harmonious and inclusive local self-governance of natural resources. A more unprejudiced view on 
local resource governance is essential to inform policy. 
In this article, we address three persistent fallacies about local resource governance institutions and 
their evolution by making use of data on how resource conflicts are solved in Tanzanian small-scale 
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irrigation schemes
28
. First, conflicts that arise over natural resources like water or land are not 
necessarily disruptive. In fact, conflicts may prompt processes of pragmatic problem solving through 
which local resource governance institutions are reproduced. Secondly, institutional pluralism is not 
systematically exploited in opportunistic ways. Actually, institutional pluralism can be an asset for the 
making and remaking of local resource governance institutions because it can be used in a creative 
way to resolve resource conflicts. As such, it can contribute to the development of more sophisticated 
resource governance institutions. Thirdly, pragmatic and creative conflict-solving in institutional 
pluralist contexts is not an impartial process. Actors‟ positions in the local power structure play a 
decisive role in this process, which risks further entrenching existing power imbalances. 
In the following sections we will first present a conceptual framework based on the post-
institutionalist literature, which describes processes that shape institutional evolution in contexts of 
institutional pluralism and increased decentralisation. Secondly, we will discuss our empirical 
approach to study processes of institutional evolution prompted by resource conflicts. Thirdly, we will 
describe the spatial layout, livelihoods and water governance in Tanzanian smallholder irrigation 
schemes. Fourthly, we will present an empirical account of the way resource conflicts are solved 
while assessing the implications of the power status of all actors involved. This will enable us to 
uncover the dynamics of local resource governance institutions in this setting. 
Institutions under Construction: A Conceptual Framework 
Competition and conflicts over scarce resources like water do not necessarily bring about violence. 
They can be potential drivers of the further evolution of water governance institutions. To appreciate 
such evolution, a conceptualisation of institutions is required that allows understanding how events 
such as disputes, shocks or the introduction of new policies can ignite processes of institutional 
evolution. Therefore, the idea of institutional crafting has to be relaxed. It is more appropriate to 
approach institutions as regularised patterns of behaviour that are constantly made and remade 
through people‟s practices but emerge from underlying structures and sets of “rules in use” (Cleaver, 
2002; Leach et al., 1999). In fact, when it comes to solving issues like disputes over water, the actors 
involved search for solutions, and preferably non-violent ones. Solutions arise in a pragmatic and 
creative way and may involve elements of formal policy, traditional law and common practice. This 
search for solutions leads to organically evolving resource governance institutions. 
The diverse historical and geographical diversity of institutions for natural resource governance 
suggests that institutional evolution has not been unidirectional, but rather is a result of ad-hoc 
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 Recourse conflicts are defined here as conflicts between individuals or between groups resulting from 
competing claims on resources and disputes over access to and management of resources. These conflicts may 
imply violent encounters, but they are not instances of violent mass conflicts, defined as systematic breakdowns 
of the social contract which involve mass violence instigated through collective action (Justino, 2009). 
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processes. Moreover, it appears that contexts characterised by legal and institutional pluralism have 
created greater opportunity for divergence in institutional evolution. Such contexts have also given 
ample scope for human agency while concretising claims to resources and resolving emerging 
problems (Maganga, 2002; Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan, 2002). 
The (post-)institutionalist literature provides insight into various practices and processes that shape 
institutional evolution in contexts of legal and institutional pluralism and increased decentralisation. 
We discuss processes of institutional bricolage and institutional syncretism. We also deal with forum 
shopping and legitimising practices which are part and parcel of such processes. 
First, processes of “institutional bricolage” are defined as those in which socially embedded actors 
respond in an ad-hoc, creative, yet structurally constrained way to issues that arise regarding natural 
resource governance. In these processes, actors borrow or construct mechanisms for resource 
governance from existing institutions, styles of thinking and sanctioned social relationships (Cleaver, 
2002, p. 16). Actors can blend elements of diverse institutions without paying attention to 
classifications like traditional and modern or formal and informal. Along the way, elements of more 
bureaucratic institutions like water policies can become more “socially embedded” as they are used as 
a reference, even when problems are solved outside the bureaucratic system. Conversely, a 
bureaucratisation of elements of socially embedded institutions can take place when these become 
integrated in more formal rules and regulations. 
Institutional bricolage is a process that involves contestation and negotiation between actors 
embedded in a social structure. Therefore, actors‟ position in their community‟s power structure, their 
social relations, their interests and their capabilities will influence the outcome of such negotiations. 
Consequently, institutions evolving through bricolage may perpetuate and reinforce social divisions 
(Cleaver, 2002, p. 20). Yet, the social embeddedness of the actors involved may also imply that 
objectives like maintaining social consensus, solidarity, reciprocity, conflict avoidance and 
reconciliation are as important as maximising the economic utility of resources (Cleaver, 2002;  
Maganga, 2002). 
Institutional syncretism can be seen as a subset of institutional bricolage. Whereas institutional 
bricolage encompasses all processes of creative blending, institutional syncretism only considers 
those that result in innovative institutions. The innovative construction that becomes the “commonly” 
accepted institution is supposed to be a more viable, durable and legitimate institution in the long run 
than an un-moulded, imposed institution (Galvan, 2007; Galvan & Sil, 2007). 
More opportunistic processes can be at work when actors pragmatically blend and interpret 
components of different sets of institutions in response to emerging issues. First, forum shopping, a 
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phenomenon that is inherent in situations of legal or institutional pluralism, is a process whereby 
actors base their claims on the legal framework that suits them best. Or take their claim or dispute to 
the institution which they deem most likely to produce a satisfactory outcome (Lund, 2006, p. 676; 
von Benda-Beckmann, 1981). It is a negotiation process in which power relations matter a great deal. 
According to Aldashev et al. (2010), the mere threat of relying on a more suitable legal framework or 
institution may well be enough to enforce a claim. They infer that groups marginalised by the 
“traditional” legal framework may profit from legal pluralism, because they can threaten to refer to 
the formal law when it offers better protection.  
Secondly, legitimising practices are processes whereby organisations representing certain institutions 
seek resource claims to authorise and disputes to solve in order to gain and sustain legitimacy in the 
eyes of their constituency and to turn their power into authority (Sikor & Lund, 2009). Legitimising 
practices occur in circumstances with a multiplicity of institutions and different legitimacies that 
compete for authority
29
.  
The notion of legitimising practices is especially interesting in light of recent endeavours in 
democratic decentralisation and decentralisation of natural resource management (NRM) in Tanzania 
and the rest of sub-Sahara Africa. Democratic decentralisation aims to devolve more discretionary 
powers to locally representative authorities so they can respond more effectively and efficiently to 
local priorities (Fjeldstad, Braathen, & Chaligha, 2006). Yet, in many cases, democratic 
decentralisation is not yet established (Ribot et al., 2010). There are several reasons for this. Firstly, 
local authorities are hardly responsive or accountable to local populations (Ribot et al., 2010). 
Secondly, their space for discretion remains narrow because they are still bound by priorities and 
budgets set at higher levels of government (Fjeldstad et al., 2006). Thirdly, the performance of village 
and district governments is problematic in many cases because of misuse and misallocation of funds, 
a lack of transparency, corruption and (violent) coercion (Afrobarometer, 2008; Brockington, 2008)
30
. 
The decentralisation of natural resource management is expected to improve sustainable management 
of natural resources and ameliorate the livelihoods of local beneficiaries. Yet the expected benefits are 
rarely realised because of the problems related to democratic decentralisation (Brockington, 2008; 
Ribot et al., 2010). Moreover, development agencies and government bodies dealing with NRM prefer 
community-based NRM approaches instead of engaging local authorities. In Tanzania, few forest 
management committees are vested in village government. If they are, there is little space for 
discretion for village government or responsibilities remain ambiguous (Persha & Blomley, 2009; 
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 Legitimising practices are closely related to „„shopping forums‟‟ (von Benda-Beckmann, 1981) 
30
 Brockington based his conclusion on data gathered before the LGRP. The Afrobarometer survey, conducted 
in Tanzania in 2008, however, does not give the impression that the LGRP led to a drastic improvement of local 
government‟s performance or their reputation. 
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Ribot et al., 2010). As we will discuss further, with regard to water management in Tanzania, the 
recently adopted institutional framework hardly offers a role for local authorities. 
These opportunities and weaknesses that accompany decentralisation open a space for legitimising 
practices. Village governments and other politico-legal organisations try to gain legitimacy and 
authority and try to widen their space of discretion by (re)claiming their role in natural resource 
management(Ribot, 2009; Sikor & Lund, 2009). In Senegal, for instance, there is competition for 
authority between the elected rural council, which was recently granted the power to manage the 
forest, and the Forest Service, which formerly controlled the forests. The rural council pursues 
legitimacy in the eyes of the local population by being able to authorise their access to the forest. The 
Forest Service tries to authorise access to the forest to urban-based merchants. It coerces and bribes 
the president of the rural council to accomplish this (Ribot, 2009). Wardell and Lund (2006) describe 
how illegal efforts to access land in a forest reserve in Ghana inspired legitimising practices over 
rights of access and authority. When the local chief tried to accommodate (and extract fees from) new 
tobacco farmers, he challenged the traditional earth priest‟s authority to allocate land. When a serious 
dispute arose, the District Chief Executive intervened and negotiations followed. Eventually, the earth 
priest kept the authority to allocate land, but found space for the local chief‟s new tobacco farmers. 
The District Chief Executive was perceived as a wise and constructive man of office. 
Yet the way that local institutions for natural resource governance are shaped through contestation 
and negotiation by actors embedded in a social structure holds the potential to entrench existing social 
divisions and power imbalances. On the one hand, past injustices and inequalities can undermine the 
participation of certain groups in actor-driven processes of institutional evolution (Vihemäki, 2005). 
Ribot et al. (2010) refer to different case studies which show that decentralised NRM can sustain 
existing gender inequalities, social hierarchies or ethnic division. While analysing the management of 
forests in the East Usambara Mountains in Tanzania, Vihemäki (2005) observed that village members 
with a higher social position are generally better informed about forest control rules than women and 
poorer village members. This encumbers the latter‟s participation in forest management. In Uchira, 
Tanzania, the water user association responsible for domestic water management is mainly composed 
of elites. The water user association demands considerable amounts of communal labour on top of 
financial contributions which are especially demanding for poorer community members (Cleaver & 
Toner, 2006). In India, agencies involved in water governance generally talk to highly placed men 
who are more influential than women and poorer community members. As a result, the needs of the 
latter are forgotten(Mehta, 1997). 
On the other hand, actor-driven processes of institutional evolution can shift or maintain the ways that 
local elites benefit from resources and exercise power over them. Ribot et al. (2010) cite case studies 
in which better-positioned actors with extensive social relations were able to maintain access through 
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the manipulation of authorities or reciprocal relations and payments. In the East Usambara Mountains, 
efforts to increase participation through joint forest management led to the exclusion of village 
members who were not connected to village government from development initiatives like bee-
keeping (Vihemäki, 2005). In Uchira, Tanzania, community-based water management resulted in the 
installation of more private water taps, which mainly benefits wealthier people and makes poorer 
people increasingly dependent on them for their water supply (Cleaver & Toner, 2006). 
Methods to Study Institutions under Construction 
Actor-driven processes that reproduce institutions are often empirically substantiated through ex-post 
observation of institutions and the interpretations of stakeholders
31
 . However, processes that shape 
institutions through resource conflict management can be disentangled if resource conflicts are taken 
as the unit of analysis and the way they are settled is investigated. A similar approach is used by Ribot 
(2009) to examine legitimising practices, by Galvan (2007) to examine syncretism and by Juma and 
Maganga (2005) to examine bricolage. 
For data on resource conflicts in smallholder irrigation schemes in Tanzania, we could not rely on 
evidence from court cases because these only represent a fraction of the conflict management that 
occurs in this institutional pluralist context  ( Maganga, 2002). Moreover, the court is avoided by most 
smallholder irrigators since they lack legal water rights. Therefore, we collected original data on 
recent resource conflicts and how they were solved in five small-scale irrigation schemes. 
The data were collected in five small-scale irrigation schemes situated in the semi-arid lowland areas 
of Mufindi district in Tanzania, which are part of the Rufiji river basin (Figure 14). They were 
selected in consultation with local experts on irrigated agriculture. Mufindi district was chosen 
because of the importance of irrigated agriculture for food and cash crops and because of the seasonal 
scarcity of water (Mkavidanda & Kaswamila, 2001). The average annual rainfall in these areas ranges 
between 600 and 700 mm. Rainfall is concentrated in one rainy season that lasts from December until 
April (United Republic of Tanzania, 2006b).  
Initially, in a first round of data collection from June until August 2008, focus group discussions were 
organised to get a sense of the types of institutions for irrigation water appropriation and conflict 
management. Participatory mapping exercises, conducted in each of the irrigation schemes, resulted in 
detailed maps that localise the plots of each irrigator. In total, 351 irrigators are identified on five 
maps. The maps also indicate water flows and other features. Some include information on resource 
conflicts. Subsequently, all available irrigators identified on the maps answered a structured 
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 Examples of institutional bricolage include Cleaver (2002) and Sehring (2009). Examples of legitimising 
practices include Nuijten and Lorenzo (2009) and Roth (2009). 
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individual survey, which included questions on socio-economic characteristics, on irrigated 
production and on involvement in resource conflicts. A total of 228 respondents took part in the 
survey. Both the maps and survey data enabled the identification of irrigators who had been involved 
in resource conflicts in the recent past. Most conflicts occurred less than five years prior to data 
collection.  
In a second round of data collection in May 2009, individual semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with irrigators involved in resource conflicts and with village chairmen (VC), village 
executive officers (VEO) and, if present, irrigation scheme leaders. In total, 10 men and six women 
reported on 25 different cases. The interviews included questions on the subject and severity of the 
conflict, on irrigators involved and the location of their irrigated plot, on timing and recurrence of the 
conflict, on who mediated the conflict or who enforced rules and on sanctions. Respondents generally 
did not hesitate to talk about the cases because the interviews were conducted in private, anonymity 
was assured and respondents were familiar with the research team. 
Furthermore, institutions and their reproduction are approached as actor-driven negotiation processes 
in this study. Gender and gender roles are important in such negotiation processes because there are 
socially determined ideas and practices associated with being female and being male (Reeves & 
Baden, 2000). The actors‟ position in the local power structure is another important variable in such 
negotiation processes because it influences their ability to control their environment and others‟ 
behaviour (Eyben et al., 2006; Leach et al., 1999)
32
. Empirically, this called for an assessment of the 
implications of gender and for an unambiguous measurement of actors‟ position in the local power 
hierarchy. 
We organised a participatory ranking exercise to measure irrigators‟ relative power status in the 
irrigation community‟s power hierarchy based on the perception of the community members (Laws et 
al., 2003). As such, we avoided making assumptions about relations between power status and social 
positions or socio-economic characteristics that cannot be easily validated (Cleaver, 2002). During the 
exercise, social status was used as a proxy of power status because it is a more commonly understood 
and unambiguous concept that was positively correlated
33
. 
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 The focus here is on the enabling nature of power, which relates to Sen‟s concept of capabilities, or Lukes‟ 
(2005) concept of „„power to‟‟ (Stewart & Deneulin, 2002). 
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 Social status is a collective judgment of the relative position of an individual in society based on her traits and 
assets and is an important source of power (Weiss & Fershtman, 1998). Social status was translated in Swahili 
as „„hadhi ya jamii,‟‟ which literally means „„status in society,‟‟ and as „„uwezo,‟‟ which implies economic 
ability but also the ability to attain your goals, to influence others and to be respected. The notion of power is 
present in the term „„uwezo.‟‟ 
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Figure 14: Mufindi District in the Rufiji River Basin (Bernacset (1981)) 
Mufindi District Rufiji River basin 
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The participatory ranking exercises were conducted in each of the five irrigation schemes during the 
first round of data collection. They followed after the participatory mapping exercises. Four randomly 
composed subgroups of the 20 irrigators who did the mapping ranked all irrigators identified on the 
maps by social status. They did so by putting cards with the irrigators‟ names on a ladder with four 
rungs
34
. High (low) rungs represented high (low) social status (Singh-Manoux et al., 2005). This 
resulted in up to four rankings for each irrigator. Each ranking was transformed into a score, equal to 
the value assigned to the rung divided by the total number of rungs on the ladder. The mean of 
subgroup scores makes up our measure of irrigator‟s social status relative to other irrigators of the 
same scheme. This forms our indicator for irrigators‟ relative power status. The indicator ranges from 
0.24 to 1 and the average is 0.59 (0.20). Higher values represent higher relative power status. On 
average, women were ranked lower than men. In group discussions that were held after the 
participatory ranking exercises, a high power status was related to more decision power whereas a low 
power status was linked to marginalisation, defencelessness and voicelessness.  
Context: Livelihoods, Spatial Layout and Water Governance 
Rural households living in the semi-arid lowlands of Mufindi district mainly depend on semi-
subsistence smallholder farming to provide for their livelihood. Most households keep small livestock 
to supplement their diet or for trade. Some keep small herds of cattle as savings, for milk or for trade. 
Other activities to supplement the household‟s income include crop trade, petty trade, brick or 
charcoal production, seasonal labour and beer brewing. 
Agricultural production historically has been based on rain-fed cultivation with the use of rudimentary 
technology and minimal inputs. Irrigated agriculture permits production of food crops outside of the 
season for rain-fed agriculture. An extra harvest of food crops in irrigated fields can prevent seasonal 
food insecurity. Selling surplus food crops from irrigated agriculture - often at a better price in the 
lean season - can provide an income (Mkavidanda & Kaswamila, 2001). Irrigation is also used for the 
production of vegetables and cash crops for local and regional markets. Such crops supplement the 
households‟ diet and income. Of the 228 irrigators surveyed in this case study, almost all grow food 
crops for own consumption on their irrigated plots. These include maize, sweet potato and beans. 
About half of them grow food crops which they partly sell, such as Irish potato, peas and spinach. 
About 40% grow crops for local and regional markets like tomatoes, onions and cabbage.  
The smallholder irrigation schemes dealt with here consist of networks of locally dug river diversions 
and canals. Occasionally, locally made wooden gates, earthen dams or sandbags are used to manage 
the water flow. In exceptional cases, concrete intakes or technically more advanced gates are used. 
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 Participants were not expected to rank themselves nor users they were not well acquainted with. Rungs could 
be removed (added) if participants distinguished less (more) than four categories. 
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Flooding and capillary absorption make the soil of the plots in the irrigation schemes moist enough to 
farm. Alternatively, the proximity of water permits bucket irrigation. The irrigation schemes comprise 
a patchwork of plots most of which are relatively small (on average, one acre) and cultivated by one 
farmer and her household. Less than one-third of the farmers use two or more plots and only a few 
farmers own large plots (of up to 13 acres). 
More particularly, irrigation scheme Mutua (Mt) is composed of two main canals diverted from a 
river, with plots along secondary and tertiary canals, and is used by about 40 farmers
35
. It was 
developed by local residents about 40 years ago. Irrigation scheme Kitungulu (KitU), consists of a 
primary irrigation canal which is sourced by a river higher uphill. The primary canal was constructed 
by colonial farmers and was renovated about 10 to 20 years ago. Secondary canals diverted from the 
primary canal irrigate the sloped farming plots of approximately 50 farmers. Irrigation schemes Isanu 
(Is) and Ika (Ik) can be described as locally improved riverbed irrigation schemes. They consist of a 
network of diversions from the main river at the bottom of the river valley. At the slopes of the valley, 
they comprise diversions from tributaries of the main river and one or more recently dug canals. 
These irrigation schemes have been used as long as people can remember. They continue up and 
downstream, but we limited our analysis to a strip of a maximum of 100 adjacent plots used by 
farmers from the same village. Irrigation scheme Kitangzi is located in a broad valley and is sourced 
by four rivers. It consists of diversions from the rivers and some recently dug canals and is used by 
approximately 70 people from the same village.  
Water governance and management of resource conflicts in the studied irrigation schemes happen in a 
context of institutional pluralism. Broadly, the “bureaucratic” set of water governance institutions 
includes NAWAPO, based on integrated water resources management (IWRM) principles, and the 
National Water Sector Development Strategy, which sets out the formal rules and an institutional 
framework (United Republic of Tanzania, 2002, 2005). NAWAPO has not been fully incorporated 
into legislation yet. Older legal acts stipulate that all water abstraction requires possession of a water 
right (Juma & Maganga, 2005). The organisational structure that comes with NAWAPO is largely in 
place. On the basin level, Basin Water Boards and the executive Basin Water Offices coordinate 
IWRM, issue and enforce water rights and resolve conflicts. Our case study sites fall under the Rufiji 
Basin Water Office (RBWO). In principle, irrigation water users should be organised in water user 
associations (WUAs), the lowest level of water resource management. WUAs should hold a legal 
water right. Their responsibilities include mediation in local water conflicts. In reality, few 
smallholder irrigators are organised in WUAs or have a legal water right. 
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The renewed institutional framework on water governance does not explicitly assign a role for 
government on a district, ward or village level apart from representation in Basin Water Boards. Still, 
district agricultural and livestock officers deal with irrigated agriculture and extension services. 
Stipulations issued by the district planning office - for instance, on land use in riverbeds - can have 
repercussions for irrigation schemes. But generally, water appropriation within irrigation schemes or 
local water conflicts are not dealt with at the district level
36
. Whether the village government level is 
involved in water governance depends on whether bylaws have been adopted. The VC, VEO and 
village council sometimes make decisions that deal with water provision and appropriation. They are 
regularly called to intervene in conflicts over water or land.  
Concurrently, the LGRP intended devolution of power, responsibilities and resources to local 
government. Although the objectives of democratic decentralisation by devolution have not been fully 
realised, the village government‟s space for discretion has widened somewhat (Fjeldstad et al., 2006). 
As a result, the LGRP indirectly increased the potential for village government to intervene in water 
and land management. Nonetheless, NAWAPO seems to take over local government‟s role in local 
water management. These developments increased dubiousness towards discretionary powers over 
natural resource management. 
Water governance institutions in the studied irrigation schemes are in flux and have a high degree of 
local specificity. It is nevertheless possible to identify some common principles of “informal” water 
governance institutions
37
. Canals and river diversions are dug collectively or on the initiative of a few 
individuals. Usually, irrigators are expected to contribute to canal maintenance. Fixed rules regarding 
water appropriation are largely absent. Often, irrigators individually decide on water appropriation. 
Sometimes, they informally agree on water sharing or make up a rotation scheme. Generally, 
competition and distributive conflicts are avoided in order to maintain harmony. Irrigators also 
strongly believe that everybody has a right to water. With regard to conflict management, there is a 
clear preference for reconciliation over confrontation. Other than that, conflict management, rather 
than being based on well-defined institutions, relies on pragmatic problem solving when disputes 
arise. 
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 Interview with Mufindi District Agriculture Extension Officer, Mr. Nko, Mafinga, June 20, 2008. 
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 Based on information gathered through group discussions in 2008. 
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An Empirical Account: Solving Resource Conflicts 
Recently, in Isanu, an additional irrigation canal was dug on the initiative of a young, ambitious, 
market-oriented and powerful farmer with a large plot in the irrigation scheme. Since it was dug, 
competition for water between river irrigators and canal irrigators has caused grave disputes. A first 
incident was called “a dangerous situation because a war could have started”38. In fact, the canal 
initiator blocked the river intake to make water flow to the canal, thereby depriving river irrigators of 
water. Three of the most affected river irrigators complained to the canal initiator. The dispute almost 
turned violent. Other river irrigators observing the commotion reported to the VC. The VC stated that 
he suspected the canal initiator “think[s] the water is his and others have no right to use it”39. To settle 
the dispute, the VC used the NAWAPO guideline saying that: “Every citizen has an equal right to 
access and use the nation‟s natural water resources for his benefit” (United Republic of Tanzania, 
2002, p. 17). He reprimanded the canal initiator and forbade him to close the river intake. 
Additionally, mediation by the VC and VEO resulted in an agreement on rotating water use, 
allocating water to the canal initiator on Sundays and to other irrigators on weekdays. 
Later, another dispute arose as one of the river irrigators obstructed the canal intake
40
. The canal 
initiator declared: “We could have fought and killed each other”41. Eventually, the village extension 
officer mediated between the river irrigator and the canal initiator. He decided the river irrigator did 
not comply with the rotation agreement nor with the prohibition to close water intakes. The river 
irrigator had to pay a substantial fine. In addition, the village extension officer instructed irrigators to 
stick to the rotation agreement. The sanctioned river irrigator was also made “canal guard”, a newly 
created function with the responsibility to make sure the rotation scheme is respected. 
The conflict was still lingering at the time of research, and the water intake of the river and the canal 
are routinely obstructed. The canal initiator admitted that he did not report the latest incident to the 
village government
42
. Instead, he reported it to the RBWO while being aware that water appropriation 
by both river and canal irrigators is illegal as they lack legal water rights. According to the canal 
initiator, the RBWO told him to apply for a water right and promised to improve the canal intake. 
Indirectly, the RBWO granted permission to canal irrigators to appropriate water, which is also how 
the canal initiator interpreted it. It is probable that the canal initiator secretly attempted to circumvent 
some levels of regulation as another strategy to end his problems with river irrigators. 
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Clearly, the series of disputes described here could have turned out badly and could have instigated 
violence but they did not. In fact, this series of disputes form an excellent example of how disputes 
over water between competing users have motivated the actors involved to search for non-violent 
solutions. It also shows how institutions for governing water in this irrigation scheme have become 
more sophisticated along the way. 
Solving the disputes between the river and canal irrigators in non-violent ways demanded creativity 
and pragmatism. When instruments of traditional water governance like informal talks failed, the 
village government was called in. Nonetheless, the village government‟s toolbox needed the backing 
of rules made at higher levels of bureaucracy like NAWAPO. As a result, elements of these 
bureaucratic institutions became more socially embedded. Along the way, a rotation agreement and a 
canal guard were introduced as innovative water governance institutions. Later, the rotation 
agreement became more formal and more “bureaucratised” when the village extension officer 
instructed irrigators to comply with it. The canal guard function may have been created to ensure the 
river irrigator‟s cooperation by co-opting him, or may have been a form of a compensation for his 
fine. As such, resentments may have been avoided in a reconciliatory form of conflict resolution. 
Finally, one of the actors decided to skip some levels of regulation and bring his claim directly to 
RBWO in the hope that forum shopping would benefit him. Evidently, actors involved in these 
disputes engaged extensively in processes of institutional bricolage, institutional syncretism and 
forum shopping. Solving the emerging problems in this way contributed to the development of more 
refined resource governance institutions. Ultimately, institutional pluralism definitely was not an 
obstacle here; it was quite useful. 
a. Solving Resource Conflicts with the Aid of Institutional Pluralism 
The above example is not unique. To the contrary, in each of the studied irrigation schemes, many 
disputes over water or land have instigated processes that contribute to institutional evolution. In the 
following cases, actors respectively engage in institutional bricolage, forum shopping and legitimising 
practices. Throughout the descriptions of the cases, we consistently refer to the relative power status 
of the actors involved because this is expected to play a significant role in such processes. At a later 
stage, this role will be analysed. 
In irrigation scheme Kitangzi, a conflict arose between a downstream and an upstream irrigator 
because the latter neglected to unblock the canal after irrigating. The affected downstream user, who 
claimed to be the initiator of that canal, solved the problem through an informal talk. To make his 
case, he invoked the common practice of unblocking canals after irrigating. In addition, he referred to 
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the NAWAPO guideline stipulating that everyone has an equal right to water
43
. It seemed that the 
affected user had attended an RBWO training and readily applied his knowledge. He might also have 
needed the backing of more “bureaucratic” rules in his dispute with the upstream user, who had a 
slightly higher power status (respectively equal to 0.69 and 0.73). 
In irrigation system Ika, a dispute arose because somebody with a relatively high power status (equal 
to 0.81) dug a new canal in order to drain water from his plot, which was too moist to farm
44
. A group 
of downstream users, both irrigators and domestic water users, feared this would cause water 
shortages and soil erosion. The group complained to the VEO. A written request from the VEO to 
stop digging the canal had little effect. Subsequently, as the village had no appropriate by-laws, the 
village council referred to the RBWO prohibition on digging additional canals in the river valley. The 
village council summoned the farmer to fill the canal and imposed a fine. The above example of 
institutional bricolage on the part of the village government is reminiscent of the dispute over the 
closure of the river intake in Isanu
45
. In that case, the village government referred to a NAWAPO 
guideline to overrule the relatively powerful canal initiator (power status equal to 1). 
Again, the emerging resource problems described above have not caused grave or violent disputes, 
but have instead brought about processes of institutional bricolage. The emerging problems made 
actors blend elements of diverse institutions in their search for ad-hoc solutions. As such, NAWAPO 
policy guidelines or district regulations became more “socially embedded” when irrigators referred to 
them to make their claims. Village governments also contributed to “social embedding” of rules 
established at hierarchically higher levels of bureaucracy when they absorbed them in their set of 
working rules. It is notable here that the offenders had a high power status, which suggests that 
relying on rules established at higher levels may have served to gain leverage. 
Oppositely, the “bureaucratisation” of “informal” and “socially embedded” elements can also result 
from pragmatic solving of resource conflicts. In Mutua, for instance, an irrigator used a woman‟s 
failure to participate in canal cleaning as an argument to deprive her of water despite a rotation 
agreement
46
. One of the sources reporting on this case, an IUC member, agreed with this argument. 
This could have been an (not necessarily deliberate) attempt to “formalise” canal cleaning as a 
condition for water access. Likewise, the disputes in Isanu discussed before prompted the 
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development of a rotation scheme that was later invoked by the village extension officer and made 
official along the way
47
. 
While institutional pluralism can be used in a creative and constructive way, it can also be employed 
in somewhat opportunistic ways. In the following case, institutional pluralism offered the opportunity 
of forum shopping. This case occurred in irrigation scheme Kitungulu. An irrigator sold a plot of land 
he used but did not legally own to a semi-commercial farmer from a neighbouring town
48
. After the 
former legal owner died, an inheritor contested the sale and the land ownership of the semi-
commercial farmer. The inheritor argued with the one who sold the plot and complained to the VC. 
The village council decided that the plot belonged to the inheritor. The semi-commercial farmer, 
however, appealed to the ward tribunal. The tribunal stated that the property right, including the 
alienation right, to land goes to the person using the land if this had been fallow for more than 12 
years. Thus, the tribunal decided the sale was legal and the semi-commercial farmer rightfully 
acquired landownership. Strikingly, the inheritor was instructed to pay compensation to the semi-
commercial farmer. 
Forum shopping is said to be mainly a strategy of the more powerful, which is indeed the case here. 
The semi-commercial farmer was ranked relatively high in power status (power status equal to 0.75). 
Since he did not belong to the community, he also may have been more immune to social pressure to 
opt for less confrontational ways to resolve the land conflict (Hayami, 2009). Indeed, there is still a 
general feeling in the community that the land was not acquired in a rightful way. The case clearly 
stuck in people‟s minds as three different sources reported on it. This suggests that the semi-
commercial farmer‟s strategy was exceptional or was socially unacceptable. Similarly, the canal 
initiator in Isanu, who was forum shopping to get permission for water abstraction, was secretive 
about his strategy
49
. He likely suspected his strategy would face social disapproval, but it is possible 
that his high power status rendered him more inconsiderate. 
Nevertheless, actual forum shopping apparently is not always necessary; threatening to do so may be 
an effective deterrent as well. For instance, in irrigation site Ika, an elderly woman and another 
irrigator quarrelled because the latter opened the irrigation canal for too long and caused the woman‟s 
plot to flood. This destroyed the beans in her field
50
. A (female) neighbour, who was called to mediate 
emphasised that the rotation scheme should be respected, also threatened to report the incident to the 
sub-village chairman (sub-VC). Eventually, the offender agreed to close the canal. The fact that the 
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affected elderly woman‟s power status is slightly higher than the offender‟s may have contributed to 
winning her case (respectively equal to 0.54 and 0.43). 
In irrigation scheme Kitangzi, a potentially violent conflict arose when two men competed for a 
vacant plot of land
51
. Elders were called to mediate. Later, the village government was asked to 
intervene, but it decided that the conflicting parties should settle the issue themselves. According to 
our source, one claimant finally renounced his claim to the plot because the other claimant‟s 
reputation made him fear an escalation. Our source called the other claimant “a „characterman‟, 
meaning he is intractable, is known to like conflicts, does not fear fighting and does not hesitate to go 
to court or call in the police”52. It appears that the fear of violence and of bureaucratic measures 
discouraged the one claimant from pursuing his case despite his relatively higher power status.  
Furthermore, socio-political organisations like the village government also take advantage of conflicts 
in a context characterised by institutional pluralism and dubiousness about discretionary powers over 
natural resources. For instance, resolving a conflict over a new canal in irrigation scheme Ika boosted 
the village government‟s authority in water governance53. The VEO praised the village government‟s 
success in water governance: “people now come to ask how to manage water and which rules to 
follow. The affected users thanked the village government for intervening”54. 
In irrigation site Kitungulu, there were recurrent disputes between a semi-commercial farmer and the 
irrigation user committee (IUC)
55
. First, the semi-commercial farmer did not participate in canal 
cleaning and broke an IUC regulation that makes water access conditional on canal cleaning. The IUC 
chairman and secretary talked to the farmer to solve the problem. Despite his apologies, the farmer 
still did not clean canals. The second dispute arose when the semi-commercial farmer refused to pay 
contributions to the IUC for the water right, for which they applied to the RBWO. The IUC chairman 
reported this to the RBWO, but the RBWO advised him to go to the village government first. The 
village government, however, did not want to intervene as long as the farmer was not officially 
included in the list of irrigators as submitted to the RBWO. In addition, they demanded that the IUC 
“formalises” its rules on canal management and water use and present these to the village 
government. The village government also refused to endorse the IUC water right application. 
According to the VEO, the village government feared the IUC would “monopolise” the irrigation 
canal while the village government legally owns it.  
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Another interpretation of these actions would be that the village government‟s refusal to endorse the 
water right application and their precondition of “formalising” rules before they intervene in conflicts 
constitute an attempt to “reclaim” authority in governing resources. Governing resources in the village 
seems to have passed to the IUC and RWBO. With the means at their disposal, the village government 
may have tried to (re)position themselves as legitimate decision makers and as legitimate judges over 
claims regarding natural resources. Such strategies fit into what Sikor and Lund call legitimising 
practices(Sikor & Lund, 2009). The feeling of being sidelined with regard to natural resource 
governance and the (aspirations for) larger space for discretion in the wake of the LGRP may have 
nourished the village government‟s motivation for legitimising practices. 
It is noteworthy that none of the irrigation schemes in our case study operates with a legal water right, 
which implies all water appropriation is illegal according to national water laws. Still the village 
government intervenes in governance of “illegally” appropriated water.  
Yet not all opportunities for legitimising practices are necessarily seized. For instance, when called 
upon to intervene because an irrigator refused to contribute to water right fees, the RBWO advised the 
complainant to go to the village government first, rather than taking the issue on board
56
. In another 
case, the RBWO removed sandbags that obstructed a river intake during a routine visit but did not 
take any other measure
57
. It is possible that the recently established RBWO does not feel the same 
need for legitimising practices as village governments. 
b. Solving Resource Conflicts the “Traditional” Way 
Although various disputes over resources in the studied irrigation sites have instigated processes of 
institutional bricolage, institutional syncretism, forum shopping and legitimising practices, other 
disputes have not. They have been solved according to “traditional” rules of the game which include 
“informal” talks, settlements between families and the intervention of mediators. 
In irrigation scheme Mutua, for instance, a dispute started because one user did not respect the 
rotation scheme which had been informally agreed upon. As a result, another user - his sister - was 
deprived of water
58
. She complained to her brother in person and they settled the dispute within the 
family. In the same irrigation scheme, another quarrel started because a woman with a relatively low 
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power status (equal to 0.25) did not participate in canal cleaning, which caused a reduced water flow 
for others
59
. She was not sanctioned but was “instructed” to participate in the future. 
Two other incidents in irrigation scheme Mutua were apparently solved by the users themselves. The 
incidents cropped up because upstream users did not comply with the rotation scheme
60
. Both issues 
were resolved after one of the affected downstream users personally complained to upstream users. 
Although this downstream user claimed he “informally” talked to the upstream users as a fellow 
irrigator; he is also the VC, irrigation site leader and canal initiator and has a high power status (equal 
to 0.83). Regardless of the role in which he approached the upstream users, his multiple functions 
most probably granted him authority: “As I am the chairman and the canal initiator, the man listened. 
If I would have been someone else, he might not have listened”61. 
Sometimes mediators were called to settle conflicts. In irrigation scheme Isanu, a woman - the wife of 
a man with a high power status - obstructed the water flow in a canal
62
. She put downstream 
irrigators‟ tomatoes and other crops at risk. A mediator was called. The woman promised not to close 
the canal again but did not keep her promise. 
At the time of digging the canal in irrigation site Isanu, which caused the recurrent disputes between 
canal and river irrigators previously discussed, a conflict cropped up between the canal initiator and a 
farmer whose plot the canal was supposed to pass through
63
. Two fellow irrigators, one of whom is 
the sub-VC, were called upon to mediate. After informal talks, the canal initiator and the farmer 
agreed that the canal could pass through the farmer‟s plot if he could use the water as well. Later, the 
same parties had another dispute. When the canal initiator asked all irrigators to clean the canal, the 
farmer refused and blocked the water flow
64
. Another irrigator mediated between the conflicting 
parties. The issue was settled with a handshake and the mediator decided rules on canal cleaning 
would be necessary.  
In irrigation site Ika, a dispute arose between river users and two irrigators who closed the river intake 
with sandbags to divert water to their irrigation canal. Although there were no fixed rules on water 
distribution at the time of the conflict, blocking each other‟s water intake was considered 
unacceptable. One of our sources - a respected elder - recounted how he was called upon by the 
affected users to mediate. He said he convinced the offenders that others also needed water, after 
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which they removed the obstruction
65
. The mediator claimed this was the only intervention, but 
according to the VC, the affected users reported the issue to the village government. The VC declared 
that a village government delegation removed the sandbags and forbade the offenders to block the 
river intake
66
. The “true” story about who solved the problem could not be uncovered. But regardless 
of who intervened in the dispute, it seems that affected users called someone with considerable 
authority to deal with the offenders, who had relatively high power statuses (equal to 0.6 and 0.71). 
A woman was called upon to mediate a dispute in only two cases. In one case, an elderly woman was 
called upon to mediate when a fight broke out between two male irrigators after one of them 
encroached upon the other‟s land to dig an additional irrigation canal67. This woman concluded that: 
“Women cannot mediate between men”68. Hence, she referred them to the sub-VC. In another case, 
which has been described above, a female neighbour was asked to mediate in a dispute about a 
flooded plot
69
. The issue was resolved after the female neighbour threatened to call the sub-VC. 
From the above cases, it appears that mediators generally stick to “informal talks”. Another 
commonality is that nearly all mediators are powerful men (their power statuses range from 0.63 to 
0.94). They often have multiple identities; they are fellow irrigators but also sub-VC. Apparently, 
women cannot mediate between men, and in an exceptional case in which a woman was called to 
mediate, she threatened to call upon bureaucratic measures. In two of the three cases mediated by 
men, the offenders had a high power status and the mediators‟ “weight” was probably necessary to 
deal with them. 
Yet the “traditional” way of solving disputes through an intervention of a mediator does not seem to 
be very effective. Offenders did not change their behaviour, the conflicting parties were involved in 
other disputes later or the village government ultimately also had to intervene. This may suggest that 
the “traditional” way to resolve disputes using a mediator has reached its limits.  
c. The Role of Power in Solving Resource Conflicts 
Whereas all previously described conflicts were solved in one way or another and with more or less 
lasting success, in four cases conflicts were not solved. In the first case, the crops of a group of 
downstream irrigators were imperilled when two upstream irrigators disrespected water sharing 
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agreements and excessively extracted water from the canal
70
. As one of those upstream irrigators was 
also the VC, irrigation leader and canal initiator and considered powerful - his power status equals 
0.83 - the downstream users “kept quiet whether their harvest is high or low”71.  
Secondly, in irrigation site Kitangzi, there was a dispute because an upstream user neglected to reopen 
the canal after irrigating her plot. There was no settlement but the two affected downstream users 
stopped farming. One of the affected users formulated her reason for inaction like this: “She is the 
wife of the extension officer; so that is why I left it like that”72. Another dispute involved a male 
relative who encroached on a woman‟s plot of land in irrigation site Mutua73. The man had a high 
power status, equal to one, whereas the woman had a low power status, equal to 0.33. Our source said 
the affected woman “decided to keep quiet and stop the argument because the offender was a man and 
because they are relatives”74. In the end, she just abandoned her plot. 
A different, quite vigorous and potentially violent conflict cropped up in irrigation site Mutua. A male 
farmer denied a female farmer access to irrigation water despite an “informal” agreement to take 
water in turns
75
. According to a male IUC member, their families reconciled and reached an 
agreement on water sharing. Commenting on the same dispute, another female source explained that 
the female farmer did not complain to the offender nor did she call a mediator because: “Nobody 
would have been able to stop him from irrigating his field because he has the power of being a 
man”76. The female farmer is said to have stopped farming despite the need to provide for her family. 
In this case as well, the affected farmer, a woman with a low power status, faced a problem with a 
man considered among the most powerful on the irrigation site (power statuses respectively equal to 
0.25 and 1).  
The disputes described here were not really solved, but they ended because the affected parties simply 
rested their case. There is one particular commonality in all four disputes: The affected ones are the 
least powerful of the conflicting parties and many of them are women. Apparently, creative problem 
solving is out of their reach.  
Browsing through the cases described above, we analyse the role of the actors‟ relative power status 
in the occurrence of conflicts, in the resolution of conflicts and in the processes through which the 
                                                     
70
 Case Mt4. 
71
 Interview with irrigation user committee member, Mutua, May 8, 2009. 
72
 Interview with female irrigator, Kitangzi, May 11, 2009. See case KitZ10. 
73
 Case Mt1. 
74
 Interview with female irrigator, Mutua, May 8, 2009. 
75
 Case Mt3. 
76
 Interview with female irrigator, Mutua, May 8, 2009. 
110 
 
“rules of the game” are reproduced. A first observation is that actors‟ power status plays a role in 
compliance with rules and agreements about water and land use. In less than one-quarter of the cases 
the offender has a low power status, whereas in more than half of the cases the offender has a 
relatively high power status. There are also two “serial offenders” who both have a high power status. 
One of them is the semi-commercial farmer who resides in a neighbouring town and who is involved 
in disputes over land and water in Kitungulu. The other is a young, ambitious, market-oriented farmer 
who initiated irrigation via a canal in Isanu. They could be flagrant offenders not deterred by social 
sanctions - or, they could be obvious scapegoats because they generate jealousy and because they are 
not fully integrated in the community. 
Another observation is that actors‟ power status is also an important determinant for processes that are 
prompted by resource conflicts. First, irrigators with a high power status are more inclined to engage 
in forum shopping and to threaten to do so. Secondly, “traditional” or purely socially embedded 
instruments to enforce rules or resolve conflicts are mainly used when the conflict involves offenders 
with a low power status, many of whom are female. If the conflict involves powerful offenders, many 
of whom are male, there is a higher likelihood of relying on more authoritative and often more 
bureaucratic forms of conflict management. These seem to be needed as leverage to deal with 
powerful offenders. Mediators are also more likely to be deployed in cases with powerful offenders. 
These mediators are generally powerful men, often with an administrative function underpinning their 
authority. Again, this suggests the need for leverage in these instances.  
Conclusion 
Examining how conflicts over water and land are solved in small-scale irrigation schemes in rural 
Tanzania provided several insights into local resource governance institutions and their dynamics. A 
first insight is that conflicts over scarce resources can arise when competition is increasing, but that 
these conflicts are not necessarily disruptive or violent. Actually, the resource conflicts that crop up 
challenge existing local resource governance institutions, especially in a context of intensified 
institutional pluralism. They instigate processes in which the actors involved in resource conflicts 
search for solutions, and preferably non-violent ones. Such actor-driven processes can contribute to 
the further evolution of local resource governance institutions. 
A second insight is that institutional pluralism is an asset for pragmatic problem solving and for the 
processes through which resource governance institutions are reproduced because it provides 
opportunities for creativity and human agency. As such, institutional pluralism can contribute to the 
gradual development of more sophisticated resource governance institutions. Through this process, 
these institutions may be more adapted and meaningful at the local level because their development is 
shaped by the particular social and ecological context (Cleaver, 2002; Galvan, 2007). 
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A third insight is that pragmatic problem solving and the processes of institutional evolution are not 
necessarily impartial, fair nor universally accessible. Problem solving and the processes of 
institutional evolution happen in a socially embedded way. This means that responses to emerging 
conflicts depend on who is involved, on who is intervening, on actors‟ gender and on actors‟ 
involvement in other incidents. The type of response also highly depends on the relative power status 
of the actors involved in the conflict. Stronger, more authoritative and often more bureaucratic 
instruments for conflict management are used to deal with powerful offenders. But the most striking 
observation is that women and actors with a low power status do not always have the capability (or 
forsake their capability) to engage in creative conflict resolution and uphold their interests. It shows 
that inherent power imbalances seriously limit the scope of creative and pragmatic problem solving 
for the least powerful in the community. As a result, there is a risk of existing power imbalances 
becoming further entrenched in local resource governance institutions.  
Our case study shows that building on the pragmatic and socially embedded processes through which 
institutions evolve at the local level can enrich a policy aiming for meaningful, useful and locally 
adapted resource governance institutions. To realise this potential, however, the dynamics of 
innovation, creative problem solving, flexible interpretation of policy principles and legitimation 
should be appreciated by policy makers (Galvan, 2007; Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan, 2002; Roth, 2009). 
In addition, policies should reflect that the outcome of institutional design cannot be predicted since 
institutions are products of ongoing social processes in which numerous actors play their roles in 
environments characterised by uncertainties. Therefore, any (formal) institutional design that aims for 
social equity should assess how it concurs or collides with informal institutions, how elites could find 
ways to enhance their power over resources and what the potential pitfalls or opportunities might be 
for women and marginalised groups (Leach et al., 1999). This requires an acknowledgement of the 
heterogeneity of communities and existing social differences and power imbalances (Mehta, 1997).  
Policy should also actively address deep-rooted power imbalances which hamper the capability of 
women and the least powerful members of society to engage in constructive problem solving. Less 
articulate members of communities should be consulted and actively engaged in natural resource 
governance. Women and the less powerful should be supported in the negotiation processes that arise 
over claims to natural resources through easily accessible legal aid. Additionally, their claim-making 
capacity should be enhanced through targeted information on natural resource policies, adult literacy 
programs or leadership training. 
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Who Would Engage in Water Scarcity Conflicts? A Field Experiment with 
Irrigators in Semi-Arid Africa 
 
 
 
Abstract  
Does water scarcity induce conflict? And who would engage in water scarcity conflicts? In this paper 
we look for evidence of the relation between water scarcity and conflictive behaviour. A framed field 
experiment, conducted with smallholder irrigators from semi-arid Tanzania, replicates appropriation 
from an occasionally scarce common water flow. Water scarcity is observed to induce selfishness 
despite the strong non-competition norms that regulate water appropriation in these irrigator 
communities and despite the fact that this is considered conflictive behaviour. But not all react to 
water scarcity in the same way. By combining experimental evidence and survey data we found out 
that mainly the poor the ones with little extensive social networks and the ones for whom irrigation 
water is critical for agricultural production - are more inclined to react in a conflictive way to 
scarcity by being selfish. Viewed from a wider perspective we conclude that circumstances in 
Tanzania could be conducive to resource scarcity conflicts. The ones who are more likely to react in a 
conflictive way to water scarcity in the experiment suffer from real economic and political 
inequalities which could form a basis for mobilisation for more violent ways of competing for scarce 
resources. At the same time, water governance institutions entail exclusionary elements that are likely 
to disfavour the same people. These factors concur with climate change and other socio-economic 
developments that increase competition for increasingly scarce water. 
116 
 
Introduction 
Conflicts over water have been the centre of attention for some time. Not only has a future of 
interstate water wars been forecasted, also the internal, civil conflicts that mark the last decennia have 
been linked to an increasing scarcity of natural resources like water or cropland (Homer-Dixon, 1994; 
Kaplan, 1994; Le Billon, 2001; Starr, 1991; United Nations Development Programme, 2006; Welsch, 
2008). Besides, climate change threatens to exacerbate water scarcity which puts the concern about 
resource scarcity conflicts high on the development and security agenda (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2006).  
While the literature provides bits and pieces of the answer on how resource scarcity and conflict 
relate, there is no evidence of the relation between resource scarcity and the individual predisposition 
towards conflictive behaviour. This study will provide such evidence by making use of a framed field 
experiment, conducted with irrigators from semi-arid Tanzania, which replicates water appropriation 
dilemmas in common water flows under circumstances of water abundance and water scarcity.  
Combining experimental evidence of water appropriation behaviour with data on socio-economic 
characteristics of the irrigators participating in the experiment will enable to determine which type of 
irrigators is more to react in a conflictive way to water scarcity. An experiment enables to elicit a 
reaction to different circumstances by the same people. Observational data cannot provide the same 
information as people may not be able or not be willing to answer to (hypothetical) questions about 
their behaviour in water-abundant and water-scarce circumstances.   
It is particularly relevant to look for experimental evidence of who reacts in a conflictive way to water 
scarcity because these may be the types of water users who are more likely to break social norms and 
exhibit conflictive behaviour when water is scarce in reality. Evaluating these findings in a broader 
perspective by assessing the presence of other drivers of resource conflicts in Tanzania will allow 
hypothesising about the potential of water scarcity conflicts in this setting.  
The article is structured as follows: In the first section we review the literature on the relation between 
resource scarcity and conflict. In the second section we describe the methods for data collection. In 
the third section we present the experimental results. In the last section we discuss the potential of 
water scarcity conflicts in the Tanzanian context.  
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Literature on the Relation between Resource Scarcity and Conflict  
The relation between resource scarcity and conflict has been amply debated in the literature. We give 
an overview. The environmental security literature states that there is a causal relation between 
scarcity of natural resources and violent conflict and predicts that resource scarcity conflicts are on the 
rise
77
. Increasing scarcity of resources is expected not only to provoke internal or interstate conflicts, 
but also to induce large population movements that will feed group identity conflicts. It may deepen 
economic deprivation and disrupt social institutions and contribute to deprivation conflicts (Homer-
Dixon, 1994). Besides, resource scarcity is more likely to lead to violent conflict if an inability to 
solve complex problems aggravates grievances and erodes the moral and coercive authority of 
government (Homer-Dixon, 1999). The environmental security literature has been criticised, however, 
for being too deterministic and a-political and for generalising too much. Another critique is that it is 
founded on anecdotal evidence that suffers from a selection bias as it is mainly based on cases where 
resource scarcity and conflicts coincided (Gleditsch, 2001; Le Billon, 2001). 
The common pool resource (CPR) literature also deals with the relation between resource scarcity and 
conflict. Actually, it has proven that institutions hold the potential to overcome overuse and 
distributive conflicts (Ostrom, 1990). The CPR literature, however, is criticised for oversimplification 
as it sees scarcity as a likely cause of competitive struggles if unconstrained by proper institutions. 
But it does not suffer from selection bias because of its focus on cooperation (Turner, 2004). For 
instance, in the politically instable Somali Region in Ethiopia where drought causes environmental 
scarcity, many elements conducive to resource scarcity conflicts are present. Yet farmers and 
pastoralists have a non-violent relationship because they have adopted different institutions for 
sharing scarce resources (Bogale & Korf, 2007). Another example involves the sharing of 
increasingly scarce salmon stocks in the Coastal Salish Fisheries in the US. This happens in a 
relatively peaceful way with the aid of an adapted and flexible set of institutions for governing fish 
appropriation (Singleton, 2007).  
Apart from case studies on cooperation and conflict in circumstances where CPR are scarce, this 
literature also includes analyses of CPR users‟ behaviour based on laboratory or field experiments 
(e.g. Cardenas, 2003; Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008). Some experimental studies look at the effect of 
resource scarcity on resource appropriation behaviour. Examples include Rutte et al. (1987) who 
conducted an experiment with students using a one shot game simulating sequential CPR 
appropriation. They found that subjects harvested less from the resource in scarcity than in abundance 
conditions, especially when scarcity was nature-induced. Osés-Eraso and Viladrich-Grau (2007) use 
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 Natural resources like water, cropland, forests and fish are diffuse, not lootable and renewable resources with 
a low marginal value but a high total value because they are essential for humans and the biosphere. Scarcity 
makes such resources valuable and raises competition (Le Billon, 2001). 
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an experiment with students in which subjects first choose between extracting or not from a CPR 
stock after which the remaining resource units are shared. Resource scarcity is replicated by reducing 
the initial resource stock. They show that appropriation levels diminish with increasing CPR scarcity 
that they attribute to subjects‟ concern for resource scarcity.  
Political ecology scholars argue that causes of resource conflicts may be much more complex than 
competitive struggles over scarce resources
78
. While physical scarcity is often seen as the main cause 
of such conflicts, this is only one aspect (Turner, 2004). They state that resource-related conflicts 
develop as social phenomena. The relative scarcity of resources is partly socially constructed since it 
depends on livelihoods, markets and commodity chains (Le Billon, 2001). While at first sight 
conflicts may seem to relate to resource scarcity, a closer look may reveal that they are rooted in 
history, in broader social tensions or in disagreements over ethical issues like proper resource use (Le 
Billon, 2001; Peluso & Watts, 2001; Turner, 2004). Such conflicts can sometimes be traced to 
attempts to protect of moral issues, to different views on resource commoditisation or to longer-term 
strategic motives (Turner, 2004). Resource-related conflicts can have roots in feelings of 
marginalisation and frustration about corruption and injustice as well (Benjaminsen et al., 2009). The 
Kilosa killings in Tanzania, for instance, cannot be solely explained by a competitive struggle over 
scarce resources between farmers and pastoralists. Underlying is an historical and ongoing spatial and 
political marginalisation of pastoralists in favour of farmers. Additionally, a culture of clientelism and 
corruption have eroded trust in the local government and have reduced the willingness of local 
judiciary and police to prevent conflicts (Benjaminsen et al., 2009). The political ecology literature 
urges to take other factors into account when studying the relation between resource scarcity and 
violent conflict. 
The literature on civil conflict theorises on the contextual factors, group effects and individual 
incentives that potentially contribute to (violent) conflict. A first line of thinking in this literature 
maintains that marginalisation contributes to a higher incidence of civil conflict and a higher 
likelihood that individuals or groups will participate in violence (Stewart, 2000). Groups may be 
mobilised to join in violence on grounds of real or constructed group inequalities. This is most 
effective if differences in economic opportunities or political marginalisation coincide with cultural, 
ethnic or religious differences. If groups suffer from exclusion from access and control over natural 
resources, this can contribute to resource-related conflicts (Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Turner, 2004). 
A second line of thinking asserts that people decide to join in conflict or not based on cost-benefit 
considerations. While participating in acts of violence or supporting armed groups may imply high 
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 Resource conflicts or resource related conflicts are social conflicts (violent or non-violent) associated with 
both struggles to gain access to natural resources and struggles resulting from the use of natural resources 
(Turner, 2004, p. 864). 
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individual costs (death, injury, imprisonment and so on), people may still choose to participate 
because of the potential gains such as improved socio-economic opportunities, access to valuable 
assets or loot (P. Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Keen, 1998). The gains may consist of protection or the 
fulfilment of basic economic needs. High levels of poverty may drive individuals into conflict 
especially when productive activities are scarce, unemployment is high and returns from agriculture 
work are low (Justino, 2009). The ones with poorer economic opportunities – the poor, the 
uneducated, the jobless, the landless, the dissocialised, the youth – are more likely to join criminal 
groups or rebel activity because they have nothing to lose but all to gain (P. Collier & Hoeffler, 1998). 
Gaining access to resources of which they are otherwise (relatively) deprived may provide a strong 
incentive. Besides, for people who live at the margin of society the (social) cost of breaking social 
norms may be relatively low (Hayami, 2009). Not participating in conflict may also be particularly 
costly because it raises suspicion or because it excludes one from protection by armed groups and 
access to resources they control. Such costs may render it impossible to stay out (Kalyvas & Kocher, 
2007). Furthermore, participating in conflict is generally thought to be restricted to men. Women are 
assumed to be more peaceful and less violent than men. Women, however, are observed to actively 
participate in conflicts but often they have more supporting roles and not combat roles (Bouta, Frerks, 
& Bannon, 2004). 
A political economy approach to analyse conflict forms a third line of thinking (Collinson, 2003). 
This approach highlights that power determines the distribution of access to key resources and the 
potential to safeguard basic political, economic and social rights. Vulnerability and powerlessness 
often result from a political and economic process of neglect, exclusion or exploitation (Le Billon, 
Macrae, Leader, & East, 2000). Hence, resource-related conflicts and their underlying causes often 
relate to power relations and power struggles. Therefore, these should receive the necessary attention 
when studying such conflicts.  
While the literature tries to explain how incidences of conflict relate to resource scarcity, there is little 
evidence of the relation between the individual predisposition towards conflictive behaviour and 
resource scarcity. Yet at a fundamental level, conflict originates from individuals‟ behaviour and their 
interactions with their immediate surroundings (Verwimp et al., 2009). Individuals‟ decisions to 
behave in a conflictive way are likely to be influenced not only by material incentives but also by 
non-material incentives, such as norms or grievances. Economic experiments are a way forward to 
better understand individual decisions to behave in conflictive ways and the role of both types of 
incentives (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). 
This study will provide evidence on the relation between resource scarcity and the individual 
predisposition towards conflictive behaviour by making use of a framed field experiment. The 
experiment replicates water appropriation dilemmas in common water flows under circumstances of 
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water abundance and water scarcity. It is conducted with smallholder irrigators from semi-arid 
Tanzania of whom we have data on their socio-economic characteristics. Three subsequent questions 
will guide our analysis of the experimental findings. First, we want to make out whether water 
scarcity induces a reduction of extraction as the CPR thesis predicts; or whether it introduces 
competition as the resource scarcity conflict thesis predicts. Secondly, we want to find out what types 
of users of the common water flow are more inclined to react in a conflictive way to water scarcity. 
Thirdly, by putting our findings in a broader perspective, we want to evaluate to what extent real life 
circumstances are such that resource scarcity could engender conflict in Tanzania.  
Research design  
Data was collected in five irrigation schemes that are located in the Rufiji river basin in the semi-arid 
lowland areas of Mufindi district, Iringa region, Tanzania. Mufindi district was selected because 
irrigated agriculture is relatively important for food and cash crops (Majule & Mwalyosi, 2005; 
Mkavidanda & Kaswamila, 2001). The study was conducted in the lowlands of Mufindi district 
because these are characterised by a semi-arid climate and a single rainy season (Chang‟a et al., 2010; 
United Republic of Tanzania, 1999, 2006b). Hence, people are confronted with a recurrent seasonal 
scarcity of water. The five irrigation schemes were selected with the help of local experts on 
smallholder irrigation and the district authorities. The irrigation schemes are similar to other irrigation 
schemes in the semi-arid lowlands of Mufindi district and in the wider region.  
Participatory mapping exercises were conducted in each of the five irrigation schemes with mixed 
groups of 20 people who cultivate in the specific irrigation scheme. Via the participatory mapping 
exercises, inventories of all irrigators cultivating a plot in each of the irrigation schemes were 
obtained
79
. Random samples of irrigators were drawn from these inventories to participate in the 
framed field experiment and the survey.  
Focus group discussions were conducted in each of the irrigation schemes with the same groups 
involved in participatory mapping. We inquired about the prevailing norms and rules for water 
extraction and water distribution. Additionally, we probed what people thought was a violation of 
these norms and what they considered to be conflictive behaviour.  
A framed field experiment was used to study irrigators‟ water appropriation behaviour and their 
reaction to water scarcity. The framed field experiment was designed to replicate real life dilemmas 
irrigators face when they appropriate water from a common water flow in circumstances of water 
abundance and scarcity. These dilemmas imply two particularities. Appropriation from a common 
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 An irrigator is defined as the person in the household mainly responsible for cultivating the plot in the 
irrigation scheme and for making decisions regarding irrigated agriculture regardless of whether this person 
personally owns/rents the plot or not. 
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water flow is sequential and entails vertical downstream externalities (Cardenas et al., 2008). 
Consequently, appropriation does not necessarily affect the resource stock but mainly affects the 
remaining resource units for subsequent user(s). Furthermore, scarcity is not just a reduction of 
resource units per head but essentially entails there is an insufficient supply of resource units to fulfil 
the users‟ needs (United Nations Development Programme, 2006, p. 133). Our design takes these 
particularities into account. Therefore, it differs from experiments that replicate CPR dilemmas where 
appropriation is not sequential. It also differs from experiments in which resource provision is the 
underlying concern and in which resource scarcity reduces resource stocks but does not make them 
insufficiently large to satisfy the CPR users‟ needs (e.g. Oses-Eraso & Viladrich-Grau, 2007).  
When spatially fixed irrigators appropriate water from common irrigation water flows, irrigators 
located upstream can repeatedly determine how many of the available units of water they will extract. 
Their water extraction will affect the remaining units for the subsequent irrigator(s). This can be 
mimicked in a framed field experiment by a repeated distribution game in which a participant, who is 
randomly assigned to be an upstream user, can propose a split of an available twelve hours to extract 
irrigation water
80
. The number of hours corresponds to a certain payoff, representing the harvest from 
irrigated agricultural production, payable at the end of the experiment. Another participant, randomly 
assigned a downstream user and permanently paired to the upstream user, receives the remainder of 
the hours available for water extraction. In practise, the upstream user indicated his decision on a card 
that was passed to the downstream user. The downstream user, however, is not a passive receiver in 
reality. Therefore, in each round of the game, she could react to her received share by opting to 
remain silent, to communicate appreciation or dissatisfaction to the upstream user or to punish the 
upstream user. The latter implied a minor cost for the downstream user and a small fine for the 
upstream user, deductible from the final payoff. In practise, the downstream user indicated her 
reaction on the same card that went back to the upstream user. Thereafter, the subsequent round 
started. The upstream user decided on water extraction another time and a new card went to the 
downstream user for reaction, and so on. Participants were not informed about the number of rounds. 
To assess the effect of water scarcity on appropriation behaviour, the experiment included five rounds 
in which water is abundant and ten rounds in which water is scarce. Under water abundance, total 
water availability was sufficient for both upstream and downstream user to reach a threshold – set at 
four hours – that represents a critical water input required for irrigated agricultural production. Above 
the threshold payoffs rose with hours of water extracted; below the threshold payoffs were minimal. 
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 Whether participants were assigned to be upstream or downstream users in the experiment was independent of 
their actual position in the irrigation scheme.  It referred to the type of decision they had to take in the 
experiment, respectively a decision about the distribution of water units or about the reaction to a received share 
of water units. It was assumed that, in reality, each participant has a neighbour located upstream and 
downstream in the irrigation scheme and is confronted with both types of decisions. 
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Water scarcity was mimicked by fixing the threshold at seven hours, which rendered it impossible for 
both upstream and downstream users to reach above threshold payoffs. In addition, payoffs per hour 
of water extraction were lower and increased only half as fast per extra hour. The payoff structure for 
water abundance presented in Table 8 was available to upstream and downstream users in the five 
rounds with abundance; that for water scarcity in the ten scarcity rounds 
81
. 
 Water Abundance Water Scarcity 
Hours 
Upstream 
User 
Upstream 
User 
Downstream 
User 
Upstream 
User 
Downstream 
User 
0 50 500 50 350 
1 50 500 50 325 
2 50 475 50 300 
3 50 450 50 250 
4 175 425 50 200 
5 250 375 50 125 
6 325 325 50 50 
7 375 250 125 50 
8 425 175 200 50 
9 450 50 250 50 
10 475 50 300 50 
11 500 50 325 50 
12 500 50 350 50 
Table 8: Payoff per Hour of Water Extraction 
In total, 13 sessions were conducted with 156 irrigators, of which 52 are female. A maximum of four 
sessions of the experiment were conducted in each of the irrigation schemes. Each session included 
maximum fourteen irrigators from the same irrigation scheme randomly selected from those identified 
via the participatory maps. At the end of the experiment, each participant received the sum of payoffs 
minus fines or punishment costs if any. On average participants received 2,460 TSH.  
An individual survey was conducted with all irrigators identified during participatory mapping who 
were available at the time of the survey, including all who participated in the experiment. In total 228 
irrigators were interviewed. The survey included questions on socio-economic characteristics, on 
networks, on irrigated agricultural production and on conflicts over irrigation water.  
A participatory ranking exercise was organised to get a measure of irrigators‟ relative social status in 
the irrigation community based on the community members‟ perception (Laws et al., 2003). Social 
status was used as a proxy for power status because it is a strong positive correlate and it is a more 
commonly understood and unambiguous concept
82
. In each of the five irrigation schemes, four 
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 Payoffs are measured in Tanzanian Shilling (TSH), with 1 US$ = 1,200 TSH. The table and every other tool 
used both figures and symbols to ensure understanding by lowly educated people. Tools and instructions are 
available in 
Appendix I and Appendix II. 
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 Social status is a collective judgment of the relative position of an individual in society based on her traits and 
assets and is an important source of power (Weiss & Fershtman, 1998).  
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randomly composed mixed subgroups of the groups involved in mapping ranked the irrigators who 
were identified on the participatory maps. They did so by putting irrigators‟ name cards on a ladder 
with four rungs
83
. High (low) rungs represented high (low) social status (Singh-Manoux et al., 2005). 
Each of the four rankings per irrigator was transformed into a score, equal to the value assigned to the 
rung – one to the lowest rung, four to the highest – divided by the number of rungs on the ladder. The 
mean of scores makes up a measure of irrigator‟s relative social status relative to other irrigators of 
the same scheme. This measure was standardised per irrigation scheme by subtracting the mean for 
the irrigation scheme from each individual‟s social status and by dividing this by standard deviation 
for the irrigation scheme. The standardised indicator of relative social status ranges from -1.91 to 
1.98. Positive (negative) values represent a relative social status that is higher (lower) than the 
irrigation community‟s mean.   
Finally, we reflect on our findings and the specific Tanzanian context to hypothesise on the potential 
of resource conflicts. We discuss trends that drive up competition for water in Tanzania and potential 
exclusionary features of water governance institutions on the basis of secondary sources. 
Additionally, we assess inequalities in wealth, income opportunities, power, water and land access at 
the irrigation scheme level with our own survey data; and at the regional level by using National 
Sample Census of Agriculture 2002/2003 data (National Bureau of Statistics, 2006).  
Results 
In this section we will first examine appropriation behaviour of upstream users in the framed field 
experiment when water is abundant and the change in appropriation behaviour when water becomes 
scarce. This will permit to answer the first research question whether water scarcity induces a 
reduction of resource extraction (the CPR thesis) or whether it introduces competition (the resource 
scarcity conflict thesis). Thereafter, we will sketch a profile of those who react in a conflictive way to 
water scarcity by linking different responses to water scarcity to individual characteristics of the 
irrigators who participated as upstream users in the experiment. This will provide an answer to the 
second research question. 
During the focus group discussions conducted in each of the irrigation schemes, we learned that 
strong non-competition and reciprocity norms form essential tools for regulating the distribution of 
the common water flows. Irrigators sometimes defy these norms and enter into appropriative 
competition with others, even though violent encounters remain exceptional (Lecoutere, 2011). 
                                                                                                                                                                     
„Hadhi ya jamii‟ (status in society) and „uwezo‟ (ability: economic ability but also ability to attain one‟s goals, 
to influence others) were used as Swahili translations for social status (Kamusi Project).   
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 Participants were not expected to rank themselves nor users whom they were not well acquainted with. Rungs 
could be removed (added) if participants distinguished less (more) than four categories. 
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Nonetheless, competition for water is badly looked upon in these irrigator communities. Disregarding 
the needs of others and extracting water in a selfish way is considered to be conflictive behaviour.  
In principle, the only pure strategy equilibrium of the game played in the framed field experiment 
would consist of the upstream user appropriating all of the available hours for water extraction, if 
(common knowledge of) narrow material self-interest is assumed. This would maximise her payoff. 
Empirically, such equilibria are seldom observed in distribution, dictator or ultimatum games. In 
dictator games, the average proposed shares range between 0.31 and 0.5 and are generally larger in 
small-scale communities where strong egalitarian norms prevail (Colin F.  Camerer, 2003; Joseph  
Henrich et al., 2004). A one-to-one comparison between dictator games and the distribution game 
played here however, is impossible since we used framing and experiment participants face dilemmas 
they know from real life. Hence, selfish behaviour is expected to be countered by social proximity and 
social norms, both of which are known to prevent excessive extraction in CPR settings (Velez et al., 
2009). The repeated nature of the game and the opportunity for the downstream users to react to their 
share may also ease selfishness (Frey & Bohnet, 1995; Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994). 
In fact, we observe that the 78 upstream users in our experiment appropriate on average less than half 
of the available hours for water extraction over the five rounds in which water is abundant. More 
specifically, they appropriate 5.73 hours (SD 2.01), which corresponds to an average proposed share 
of 0.52. Their „more than fair‟ appropriation behaviour probably is partly motivated by the strong 
norms of non-competition that regulate water distribution in the irrigation schemes.  
Introducing water scarcity could induce competition. That is what the thesis of resource scarcity 
conflicts predicts. In contrast, the CPR thesis states that communities can overcome distributive 
conflicts over scarce resources with a suitable set of institutions. According to this thesis, resource 
scarcity may well induce a reduction in resource extraction. In line with this thesis, Osés-Eraso and 
Viladrich-Grau (2007) and Rutte et al. (1987) observed experiment participants to reduce their 
resource extraction in response to increasing resource scarcity.  
In our experiment, however, upstream users do not reduce their water extraction in response to water 
scarcity. Over the ten rounds of water scarcity, upstream users appropriate on average more than half 
of the available hours, i.e. 6.57 hours (SD 1.87). This is significantly more than under water 
abundance. It corresponds to an average proposed share of 0.45. Our experiment shows that water 
scarcity induces selfish appropriation behaviour despite the strong non-competition norms regulating 
CPR use in the participants‟ communities. Given the irrigation schemes non-competition norms, we 
take that upstream users behave in a conflictive way in the framed field experiment if they appropriate 
water in a selfish way and claim more than an equal share of the available twelve hours for water 
extraction. Our findings thus confirm the resource scarcity conflict thesis. 
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But, not all upstream users react to water scarcity in the same way. We distinguish four ways in which 
upstream users can react to scarcity. First, upstream users can react in a conflictive way to water 
scarcity if they move from non-selfish water extraction in water abundance to selfish water extraction 
in water scarcity. Secondly, upstream users can react in a persistently conflictive way if they selfishly 
extract water in abundance and keep extracting selfishly in scarcity. Thirdly, upstream users can react 
by reducing the hours of water extraction if they change from being selfish in abundance to being 
non-selfish in scarcity. Fourthly, upstream users can react in a persistently non-competitive way if 
they are non-selfish when appropriating water in abundance and remain non-selfish in scarcity.  
We now evaluate to what extent upstream users opted for any of the four reactions to water scarcity in 
the experiment. To do so we compare each upstream user‟s average number of hours of water 
extraction over the five rounds that mimic water abundance with the average number of hours of 
water extraction over the ten rounds that mimic water scarcity (AVG in Table 9). Alternatively, we 
compare each upstream user‟s number of hours of water extraction in the last abundance round (round 
5) with that in the first scarcity round (round 6) (R5R6 in Table 9). As such, we appraise the shock 
effect of water scarcity. Table 9 presents the percentages of upstream users in the experiment who 
react in a conflictive, persistently conflictive, reducing or persistently non-competitive way to water 
scarcity. 
Out of the 78 upstream users, 28.21% react in a conflictive way to water scarcity if average water 
extraction under water abundance and water scarcity are compared (Table 9: AVG). If water 
extraction in the last abundance round (round 5) and the first scarcity round are compared (round 6), 
we find that 37.18% react in a conflictive way to water scarcity (Table 9: R5R6). Quite high 
percentages of upstream users appropriate water in a persistently conflictive way (AVG: 33.33%; 
R5R6: 17.95%). Only limited percentages of upstream users react to water scarcity with a reduction of 
water appropriation (AVG: 3.85%; R5R6: 7.69%). Relatively high percentages of upstream users 
appropriate in a persistently non-competitive – non-selfish – way throughout abundance and scarcity 
(AVG: 34.62%; R5R6: 37.18%).  
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Reaction to Water Scarcity: Conflictive Persistently 
Conflictive 
Reducing Persistently     
Non-competitive 
AVG: Comparing averages 28.21% 33.33% 3.85% 34.62% 
R5R6: Comparing last abundance round 
(R5) with first scarcity round (R6) 
37.18% 17.95% 7.69% 37.18% 
Table 9: Comparing Hours Appropriated in Water Abundance and Water Scarcity: Percentage of Upstream 
Users per Type of Reaction to Water Scarcity (N=78) 
These findings show that water scarcity induces different reactions among upstream users in the 
experiment. Since our second research objective is to discern who would engage in water scarcity 
conflicts, we want to find out what is the profile of those who react to water scarcity in a conflictive 
way.  
To find this out, we relate upstream users‟ individual characteristics to the likelihood of reacting to 
water scarcity in each of the four possible ways (conflictive reaction, persistence in conflictive 
appropriation, reduction of appropriation and persistence in non-competitive appropriation). To do so, 
we need to look at appropriation behaviour in water abundance and the change appropriation 
behaviour when water becomes scarce in the experiment. That is why we estimate the (log) odds of 
making selfish appropriation decisions when water is abundant and when it is scarce in the experiment 
using a binary logistic regression in function of the upstream users‟ characteristics.  
A dummy variable „Scarcity‟ is included as an explanatory variable to assess the effect of water 
scarcity on the likelihood of selfish appropriation decisions. It takes the value one in the ten rounds in 
the experiment that mimic water scarcity. Interaction effects of the variable „Scarcity‟ and each of the 
explanatory variables are included to evaluate the effect of water scarcity on upstream users with 
different characteristics
84
.  
The (log) odds of making selfish appropriation decisions are estimated with individual (and 
household) characteristics of the upstream users as the explanatory variables. Descriptive statistics of 
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 One could argue that this model is likely to suffer from omitted variable bias. The nature of our experiment is 
such that the current reaction is a function of the downstream user‟s reaction in the previous round. But 
including this as an explanatory variable is not straightforward. The downstream user‟s sanctioning behaviour is 
a direct function of the upstream user‟s appropriation behaviour. Hence, including the downstream user‟s 
reaction would make our model a dynamic panel data model. It is well known that in such a model, the 
appropriation behaviour is likely to be correlated within individuals over time, which renders the downstream 
user‟s reaction in the previous period endogenous. The standard solution to estimate the model in first 
differences and use suitably lagged levels of the endogenous variable as instruments is uninteresting for us, as 
this deletes all time-invariant variables from the model, which are key in this study. However, to get a sense of 
the magnitude of this omitted variable problem, we ran an additional set of regressions. The reasoning of this 
analysis as well as the results, are presented in the Appendix IV. Overall, we find that excluding the downstream 
user‟s reaction in the previous round has little effect on the other variables. 
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these variables are presented in Error! Reference source not found.. Hereafter we will explain why 
these characteristics are expected to influence the likelihood of conflictive appropriation behaviour in 
response to water scarcity.  
First, gender is expected to influence the reaction to water scarcity because water values and 
community mechanisms to induce non-competitive appropriation behaviour are different for men and 
women ((Agarwal, 2007); see Part II). Moreover, men are assumed to more likely than women to 
engage in conflictive behaviour (Bouta et al., 2004). Therefore, we included the dummy variable 
„Female‟.  
Variable Proportion  N 
Female 32.1%  78 
Foodinsec  (HH) 41.0%  78 
Thatchroof (HH) 47.4%  78 
Ironroof (HH) 52.6%  78 
No_edu 19.7%  76 
Cows (HH) 15.8%  76 
Bicycle (HH) 66.2%  77 
Watershort 26.9%  78 
Farmincome 23.4%  77 
Min_reli 30.8%  78 
Min_tribe 24.4%  78 
Immigrant 24.7%  77 
Young 29.5%  78 
Villgvt  42.3%  78 
 Mean SD N 
Livestock (HH) 0 1 74 
     “ “ unstandardised (TSH) 522672 968421 74 
PctCash (HH) (%) 9.64% 18.27% 78 
Irriland (HH) (acres) 1.37 1.05 77 
SocStat 0 1 76 
     “ “ unstandardised 0.0299 1 76 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables in the Sample of Upstream Users in the Experiment 
Secondly, the literature suggests the poor and uneducated are more likely to exhibit conflictive 
behaviour (P. Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Justino, 2009). As an indicator of (acute) poverty we included 
the dummy variable „Foodinsec‟, which indicates that the participant‟s household has experienced 
food insecurity in the two years preceding the survey. Another indicator of poverty which is often 
used in the development literature relates to housing quality (Van Campenhout, 2007). The dummy 
variable „Thatchroof‟ indicates the participant is relatively poor as her household lives in a house with 
a thatch roof (as opposed to an iron or tile roof). A lack of education is represented by the dummy 
variable „No_edu‟ 85.  
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 Lack of education and poverty concur in this society. A lack of education is positively correlated with food 
insecurity and thatch roofing in the complete survey sample and in the subsample of upstream users in the 
experiment. It is negatively correlated with wealth indicators like livestock value, cow ownership, bicycle 
ownership and iron/tile roofing. 
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Thirdly, wealth is expected to have a negative influence on conflictive behaviour. Assets owned by 
the participants‟ household are an indication of wealth. In a rural Tanzanian setting, livestock often 
makes up a household‟s savings (Dercon, 1996; Lazaro, 2003). The value of the livestock owned by 
the participant‟s household is used as a wealth indicator („Livestock‟)86. Alternatively, the dummy 
variable „Cows‟ can be used. This variable takes the value one if the participant‟s household own 
cows. The dummy variable „Ironroof‟ indicates the participant‟s household lives in a house with an 
iron or tile roof, which is associated to higher wealth. The dummy variable „Bicycle‟ is another wealth 
indicator since mainly the wealthier own a bicycle in a rural Tanzanian setting (Van Campenhout, 
2007).  
Fourthly, water scarcity is expected to be more likely to induce conflictive behaviour if water is 
highly valued. In that case, the benefits of behaving in a conflictive way may be higher than the 
(social) costs. The (relative) importance and value of irrigation water is presumed to be higher to 
participants who experienced irrigation water shortage in any one of the two dry seasons preceding 
the survey. This is measured by the dummy variable „Watershort‟. Irrigation water is likely to be 
higher valued if agriculture is the only source of income. The dummy variable „Farmincome‟ 
indicates the participant only gains an income out of agriculture and does not own (big) livestock 
either. A higher percentage of the irrigated plots allocated to cash crops, such as tomatoes, carrots, 
cabbage and African eggplant, is assumed to raise the value of irrigation water as well. This is 
measured by „PctCash‟. The size of the irrigated land of the participant‟s household („Irriland‟) is 
used here as another indication of the participants‟ valuation of water87. We expect that the marginal 
value of water will be higher for irrigators with smaller plots, especially when water becomes scarce.  
Fifthly, people who are marginalised, who have less extensive social networks or who immigrated 
into the community may be more likely to behave in a conflictive manner because (non-competition) 
norms and social pressure may not have evenly strong deterrence effects on these people (Hayami, 
2009). As an indicator of being immigrated, the dummy variable „Immigrant‟ that takes the value one 
if the participant is not a lifetime resident in the community. Not only ethnicity, but also religion is a 
basis of social (and economic) networks in Africa, even more so since the proliferation of new 
religious movements that has started in the late 70s (Meagher, 2009). As indicators of less extensive 
social network in the community, we constructed dummy variables that take the value one if the 
upstream user is a member of a religious group or a tribe that includes less than one third of the 
                                                     
86
 Livestock value is the total value of big and small livestock (in TSH) calculated using market values at the 
time of the survey (www.lmistz.net and market prices recorded in Mufindi district, July 2008). The variable has 
been standardised to facilitate interpretation by subtracting the mean for the sample of upstream users in the 
experiment (=522672) and by dividing by the standard deviation (= 968421) 
87
 The size of the irrigated land is not a good indicator of wealth as land is generally not acquired via market 
transactions but rather via inheritance or via allocation by the village or traditional leaders (Dercon, 1996).   
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population living in the same community as the upstream user („Min_reli‟; „Min_tribe‟). Besides, if 
religious, ethnic or cultural differences concur with exclusion from economic or political 
opportunities, this may frustrate people and may create incentives for conflictive behaviour (Stewart, 
2000).   
Sixthly, on the one hand, youngsters are assumed to be more inclined to conflictive behaviour (P. 
Collier & Hoeffler, 1998). On the other hand, young people may be more compliant with norms and 
more susceptible to social pressure in rural African societies where the elite, mainly composed of 
elders, provide an authority structure to which younger people and other lower status people have to 
obey (Platteau & Abraham, 2002). The dummy variable „Young‟ indicates the participant is (more 
than) seven years younger than the mean in her irrigation scheme
88
.   
Lastly, a political ecology perspective on resource conflicts requires taking into account patterns of 
power and dependency that may influence irrigators‟ appropriation behaviour (Le Billon, 2001; 
Turner, 2004). The literature suggests that the more powerful members of society may take advantage 
of their position, defy non-competition norms and compete for scarce resources (Keltner et al., 2003; 
Potkansky & Adams, 1998). The less powerful may be more careful in breaching norms and in 
competing with others. If powerlessness coincides with poverty or results from processes of 
exclusion, however, it may increase the likelihood of conflictive appropriation over scarce but vital 
resources such as water (Ruttan, 2008). We use a direct measure of decision-making power in the 
irrigation community and include a dummy variable that takes the value one if the participant is 
member of the village government or village council („Villgvt‟). Another indicator of the relative 
power status of the participant is based on the standardised indicator of social status („SocStat‟), 
which was measured via participatory ranking
89
.  
As a first step, we will evaluate the effect of upstream user‟s individual or household characteristics 
on the likelihood to make selfish appropriation decisions on the basis of the results of the binary 
                                                     
88
 Note that being young correlates with the indicator of decision-making power and with most of the poverty 
and wealth indicators. Therefore, it was included in a separate model to avoid multicollinearity. 
89
 The standardised social status indicator has been centred on the mean for the sample of upstream users in the 
experiment (=.0299) to facilitate interpretation of the results. As social status correlates with other independent 
variables, it has included in a separate model to avoid multicollinearity. 
Comparison of one‟s social status with that of the participant one was paired to in the experiment was 
impossible. This information was not provided to avoid a bias, to ensure understanding and to safeguard 
anonymity. Behaviour in the experiment and possible social distance effects are dependent on internalised 
awareness and internalised behavioural implications of one‟s relative social status in the irrigator community 
(Cardenas, 2003; Cardenas & Ostrom, 2004).  
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logistic regressions presented in Table 11
90
. This will be done for water-abundant conditions in the 
experiment and for water-scarce conditions. 
As a second step, we will calculate the probability to react to water scarcity in a conflictive way, in a 
persistently conflictive way, in a persistently non-competitive way or by reducing appropriation based 
on the regression estimates. The probability to react to water scarcity in a conflictive way is calculated 
by multiplying the probability of non-selfish appropriation in water abundance with the probability of 
selfish behaviour in water scarcity, or (1-pAB)xpSC
91
. The probability to react in a persistently 
conflictive way is calculated by multiplying the probability of selfish water extraction in abundance 
with the probability of selfish water extraction in scarcity, or pABxpSC. To obtain the probability to 
react in a persistently non-competitive way we multiply the probability of non-selfish appropriation in 
abundance with the probability of non-selfish appropriation in scarcity, or (1-pAB)x(1-pSC). The 
probability to react to water scarcity with a reduction of appropriation is obtained by multiplying the 
probability of selfish appropriation in abundance with the probability of non-selfish appropriation in 
scarcity, or pABx(1-pSC). 
The probabilities of each of the four reactions are calculated for a „reference upstream user‟ on the 
basis of the regression estimates presented in the first column of Table 11. With a χ²-test we verified 
that the probabilities of each of the four reactions to water scarcity by the reference upstream user are 
significantly different from each other. As a „reference upstream user‟ we use a participant who is 
male, who does not belong to a minority tribe, who is not a member of the village government or 
village council and whose household did not experience food insecurity. The value of the livestock of 
this participant‟s household is equal to the mean of the sample of upstream users in the experiment. 
The percentage of this participant‟s irrigated plot allocated to cash crops is also equal to the mean.  
To assess the effect of a particular individual (or household) characteristic on the probabilities of each 
of the four reactions to water scarcity, these probabilities are then calculated for upstream users who 
differ from the „reference upstream user‟ with regard to that particular characteristic92. With a χ²-test 
we verified that the probabilities of each of the four reactions to water scarcity significantly differ 
from those for the reference upstream user. The probabilities of each of the four reactions for different 
types of irrigators and the χ²-tests are presented in Table 12. 
                                                     
90
 We estimated five different regressions, each of which includes different poverty and wealth indicators. These 
indicators are included separately to avoid multicollinearity. The five regressions also serve as a robustness 
check of the effect of poverty and wealth on the probability of selfish appropriation decisions. 
91
 With pAB=exp( (βiXi)/(1+exp( βiXi) and pSC=exp( (βiXi+γi(XixSc))/(1+exp( (βiXi+γi(XixSc)))). 
92
 We add (subtract) one time the standard deviation when calculating the effect of higher (lower) livestock 
value and percentage of cash crops. 
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Variable β t
a
 Sig β t
a
 Sig β t
a
 Sig β t
a
 Sig β t
a
 Sig 
Constant -1.83 -4.29 ** -1.68 -3.81 ** -1.42 -3.55 ** -1.80 -3.68 ** -0.87 -3.95 ** 
Scarcity 1.50 3.10 ** 1.49 2.91 ** 1.45 3.05 ** 1.46 2.77 ** 0.87 4.18 ** 
Irriland 0.29 2.04 * 0.25 1.94 ° 0.24 1.89 ° 0.33 2.15 *    
ScarcXIrriland -0.32 -1.88 ° -0.29 -1.73 ° -0.26 -1.58   -0.38 -2.29 *    
Min_reli 1.13 2.75 ** 1.09 2.69 ** 1.05 2.57 ** 1.03 2.28 *    
ScarcXMin_reli -0.64 -1.67 ° -0.59 -1.62   -0.48 -1.19   -0.49 -1.17      
Villgvt 0.71 1.75 ° 0.72 1.84 ° 0.76 1.96 * 0.56 1.39      
ScarcXVillgvt -0.72 -1.85 ° -0.79 -2.10  * -0.82 -2.09  * -0.48 -1.23      
Female -0.72 -1.51   -0.65 -1.45   -0.57 -1.32   -0.76 -1.57   -0.75 -1.60  
ScarcXFemale 0.60 1.24  0.50 1.08   0.36 0.81   0.65 1.34   0.39 0.79  
PctCash 0.01 1.67 ° 0.01 1.80 ° 0.02 2.74 ** 0.01 1.38      
ScarcXPctCash -0.01 -1.08   -0.01 -1.13   -0.01 -0.99   -0.01 -0.88      
Livestock -0.37 -2.18 *       -0.40 -2.26 *    
ScarcXLivestock 0.03 0.13         0.07 0.30      
Cows    -0.66 -1.81 °          
ScarcXCows    -0.21 -0.41            
Bicycle       -0.67 -1.57         
ScarcXBicycle       -0.05 -0.11         
Foodinsec -0.52 -1.25   -0.50 -1.25   -0.57 -1.49         
ScarcXFoodinsec 0.85 1.94 ° 0.89 2.09 * 1.03 2.44 *       
Thatchroof          -0.37 -0.77      
ScarcXThatchroof          0.62 1.39      
SocStat             0.21 1.13  
ScarcXSocStat             -0.41 -2.28 * 
% Correctly Predicted               
Obs/Pred=0 76.2%   75.1%   78.3%   75.2%   80.7%   
Obs/Pred=1 47.4%   47.0%   50.8%   42.4%   28.0%   
Pseudo R²                
Cox and Snell 0.112   0.107   0.11   0.109   0.062   
Nagelkerke 0.151   0.145   0.148   0.147   0.084   
McFadden 0.088   0.084   0.086   0.085   0.048   
Sample Design Information              
Total N 1170   1170   1170   1170   1170   
Missing 75   45   30   75   30   
Strata 1   1   1   1   1   
Units 73   75   76   73   76   
Dependent variable= log odds of selfish water appropriation by upstream participants 
Significance **99%;*95%;°90% 
a
 Corrected for clustering within individuals 
Table 11: Binary Logistic Regressions Estimating the Likelihood that Upstream Users Make Selfish 
Appropriation Decisions when Water Is Abundant and when It Is Scarce in a Framed Field Experiment 
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The results of the binary logistic regressions show that the variable „Scarcity‟ has a positive 
significant effect on the probability of making selfish appropriation decisions. This confirms that 
upstream users are more likely to make selfish appropriation decisions when water is scarce in the 
experiment (Table 11). For instance, the probability that the „reference upstream user‟ makes selfish 
appropriation decisions when water is abundant is calculated by pAB=exp( (βiXi)/(1+exp( βiXi) and 
is equal to 20.8%. When water is scarce, the probability that the „reference upstream user‟ makes 
selfish appropriation decisions is calculated by 
pSC=exp( (βiXi+γi(XixSc))/(1+exp( (βiXi+γi(XixSc)))) and is equal to 41.2% (based on regression 
results presented in the first column of Table 11)
93
.  
As a next step, we calculated the probabilities of each of the four reactions to water scarcity by the 
„reference upstream user‟ (Table 12). The reference upstream user is most likely to be persistently 
non-competitive (46.54%). The probability he reacts in a conflictive way to water scarcity is about 
one in three (32.64%). The chance that he reduces the hours of water extraction in response to water 
scarcity is relatively low (12.24%). He is least likely to appropriate water in a persistently conflictive 
way (8.58%).  
Although men are expected to be more likely to behave in a conflictive way, we do not observe 
differences between men and women in the experiment. The likelihood of selfish water extraction is 
not significantly different for women than for men either when water is abundant or when it is scarce. 
As a result, the probabilities that female upstream users react in any of the four possible ways to water 
scarcity are largely the same as the reference (male) upstream user‟s. However female upstream users 
are significantly less likely to react by reducing the hours of water extraction in response to scarcity. 
This is probably due to the fact that they are (insignificantly) less likely to start off with selfish water 
extraction in water abundance. 
                                                     
93
 pAB=exp((-1.83)+0.29x1.37+0.01x9.64+(-0.37)x0)/(1+exp((-1.83)+0.29x1.37+0.01x9.64+(-0.37)x0)) and 
pSC=exp((-1.83)+0.29x1.37+0.01x9.64+(-0.37)x0+1.50+(-0.32)x1.37+(-0.01)x9.64+0.03x0)/(1+exp((-
1.83)+0.29x1.37+0.01x9.64+(-0.37)x0+1.50+(-0.32)x1.37+(-0.01)x9.64+0.03x0)) 
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 Conflictive Persistently 
Conflictive 
Reducing Persistently 
Non-Competitive 
Reference
a
 32.64% 8.58% 12.24% 46.54% 
Female 34.01% 4.34% 6.97% 54.68% 
χ²-stat 1.86 1.58 5.17* 0.64 
Irriland: large (1.37+1.05) 29.81% 10.64% 15.67% 43.89% 
χ²-stat 10.89* 3.44° 5.96* 1.4 
Irriland: small (1.37-1.05) 35.18% 6.82% 9.42% 48.58% 
χ²-stat 5.98* 3.08° 5.47* 0.84 
Min_reli 29.41% 23.96% 20.93% 25.69% 
χ²-stat 13.05** 11.95** 3.13° 3.98* 
Villgvt 26.74% 14.35% 20.58% 38.33% 
χ²-stat 4.61* 2.3 4.51* 1.43 
PctCash: high (9.64+18.27) 31.80% 10.03% 13.94% 44.23% 
χ²-stat 3.36° 2.02 6.59* 0.97 
Livestock: high value (0+1) 28.20% 5.14% 10.28% 56.38% 
χ²-stat 3.30° 5.32* 7.01** 2.34 
Livestock: low value (0-1) 35.94% 13.64% 13.87% 36.55% 
χ²-stat 5.05* 7.25** 4.76** 3.27° 
Foodinsec 42.65% 6.67% 6.86% 43.82% 
χ²-stat 1.43 0.7 3.16° 0.03 
Reference: Conflictive      
χ²-stat / 70.73** 11.05** 44.93** 
Reference: Persistently conflictive     
χ²-stat 70.73** / 7.43** 187.52** 
Reference: Reducing     
χ²-stat 11.05** 7.43** / 7.43** 
Reference: Persistently non-competitive     
χ²-stat 44.93** 187.52** 7.43** / 
a: Reference: Female=0; Irriland=1.37; Min_reli=0; Villgvt=0; PctCash=9.64; Livestock=0; 
Foodinsec=0 
Significance **99%;*95%;°90% 
Table 12: Probabilities of Different Types of Users Reacting to Scarcity in a Conflictive, Persistently 
Conflictive, Reducing or Persistently Non-Competitive Way  
Wealth has an effect on the likelihood of selfish appropriation decisions, but only when water is 
abundant. In times of abundance the likelihood of extracting water in a selfish way decreases when 
the upstream user is wealthier because the value of his household‟s livestock is higher. When there is 
water scarcity, the likelihood of selfish water extracting increases independently of the upstream 
user‟s wealth. Possibly, as livestock is a form of productive capital, it makes people less dependent on 
(irrigated) agriculture. This could explain why people with higher values of livestock demand less 
water (in abundance). The same relation between wealth and the likelihood of selfish water extraction 
is observed when cow ownership is used as a wealth indicator. Similarly, when the upstream user‟s 
household owns a bicycle, he is less likely to make a selfish appropriation decision in water 
abundance. This effect, however, is only significant at 88% (P>|-1.57|=88%). Wealth measured by 
having an iron or tile roof does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of being selfish, either in 
abundance or scarcity. 
Consequently, relatively wealthy upstream users (measured by higher livestock values) are less likely 
to react to water scarcity in a conflictive way as compared to the reference upstream user. This 
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corresponds to what the literature suggested. They are less likely to appropriate in a persistently 
conflictive way as well. They are (insignificantly) more likely to be persistently non-competitive but 
also less likely to reduce water extraction when water becomes scarce.  
In contrast, if the value of the livestock is lower and the upstream user is relatively poor, the 
likelihood of extracting water in a selfish way in abundance is higher than for others. As a result, 
upstream users whose livestock has a lower value are more likely to react in a conflictive way and in 
permanently conflictive way to water scarcity than the reference upstream user. They are less likely to 
appropriate water in a persistently non-competitive way. These observations confirm the presumption 
that the poor are more likely to exhibit conflictive behaviour.  
Further proof for this presumption is the fact that upstream users who are poorer are more likely to 
make selfish appropriation decisions when water is scarce in the experiment, than others would. This 
relation is observed both when acute poverty is measured (food insecurity) and more chronic poverty 
is measured (thatched roof). The effect of chronic poverty however, is less outspoken. The effect is 
smaller and only significant at 83% (P>|1.39|=83%). But when water is abundant, poorer upstream 
users‟ are not more likely to extract water in a selfish way than others. Possibly, if resources are 
abundant the poor abide with non-competition norms because of their vulnerable and dependent 
position. But if vital resources such as water are scarce, their relative poverty may make them to defy 
such norms.  
Consequently, if the upstream user‟s household has experienced food insecurity, the upstream user is 
less likely to reduce water extraction and (insignificantly) more likely to behave in a conflictive way 
as a reaction to water scarcity than the reference upstream user. These observations form a (weak) 
confirmation of the presumption that the poor are more likely to exhibit conflictive behaviour.  
Being uneducated (No_edu) has been included in a model without other poverty indicators to avoid 
multicollinearity. Being uneducated, however, did not have any significant effect on the likelihood of 
selfish appropriation decisions in abundance, nor in scarcity.  
If upstream users allocate larger proportions of their irrigated fields to cash crops (PctCash), they are 
more likely to appropriate water in a selfish way when water is abundant in the experiment. When 
water is scarce, their likelihood to appropriate in a selfish way increases independently of the 
proportion allocated to cash crops. Probably, as they grow cash crops irrigators need sufficient water 
for their cash crops under all circumstances.  
Consequently, upstream users with higher proportions of their irrigated fields allocated to cash crops 
are more likely than the reference upstream user to reduce water extraction in response to water 
scarcity. This is because they are more likely to start off with selfish appropriation in times of water 
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abundance. They are also more likely to appropriate water in a persistently conflictive way. This 
difference however, is only significant at 85% (P>|2.02|=85%). This is a (weak) confirmation of the 
hypothesis that a higher valuation of irrigation water increases the likelihood of conflictive 
appropriation behaviour. But in this case, the higher demand and higher likelihood of competing for 
water does not necessarily come as a reaction to water scarcity.  
Upstream users with larger plots of irrigated land (Irriland) are more likely to appropriate water in a 
selfish way when water is abundant. When water is scarce, they are less likely than others to 
appropriate water in a selfish way. It may be that people with larger irrigated plots take large shares of 
water when there is enough water. If water is scarce, however, they may be able to reduce their 
demand as they can more easily afford to give up some of their (more diversified) produce. Or, if 
water is scarce they may refrain from extracting as much water as they would need for their bigger 
plot because (they feel) they could offend others. In contrast, if people have small irrigated plots it 
may not be so important to take large shares of water when it is abundant. But when water is scarce, it 
may be all or nothing. If they do not get a sufficient share of water, their sole irrigated produce may 
perish. Therefore, when water becomes scarce the marginal value of irrigation water may increase 
much more for irrigators with relatively small irrigated plots than for others.   
Consequently, upstream users with larger plots of irrigated land are more likely than the reference 
upstream user to appropriate water in a persistently conflictive way. They are also more likely to 
reduce water extraction in response to scarcity. Upstream users with smaller plots of irrigated land, 
however, are more likely to react in a conflictive way than the reference upstream user and they are 
less likely to reduce their water extraction. As they probably allot a higher marginal value to irrigation 
water, it was to be expected that they would be more likely to react in a conflictive way to water 
scarcity. 
The other indicators for a higher valuation of irrigation water, „Watershort‟ and „Farmincome‟, have 
not been included in the final model because these variables did not have any significant effect on the 
likelihood of making selfish appropriation decision in times of abundance nor in scarcity. Somewhat 
unexpectedly, upstream users‟ experience with water shortages did not affect their behaviour in the 
experiment. Possibly their experience has not raised the value they allot to water or they have 
„learned‟ not to react with more selfish appropriation behaviour.  
Upstream users who belong to minority religious groups are more likely to make selfish appropriation 
decisions when water is abundant. When water is scarce their likelihood of making selfish 
appropriation decisions increases less than for others. The latter however, may not be a very robust 
relation as it is not confirmed in the regressions where alternative indicators for poverty and wealth 
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are included. Belonging to a minority tribe or having immigrated into the village, however, did not 
have any significant effects
94
. 
As there is an (unconfirmed) lower increase in the likelihood of selfishness in water scarcity for 
members of minority religious groups, they are more likely to reduce water extraction in response to 
scarcity than the reference upstream user. As upstream users who belong to minority religious groups 
behave more selfishly than others in water abundance, they are more likely to appropriate water in a 
persistently conflictive way than the reference upstream user. The latter is in line with expectations 
that people who are marginalised or have little extensive social networks adhere less to (non-
competition) norms and appropriate water in a more conflictive manner. Yet, it may be that they 
refrain from breaking norms to some extent when there is water scarcity.  
Being relatively young („Young‟) has not been retained in any model as it had no significant effect on 
the probability of selfish appropriation decisions in abundance or in scarcity. Probably, young people 
in these rural Tanzanian communities are quite susceptible to social pressure and therefore avoid 
competition.  
Upstream users who are a member of the village government or village council are more likely than 
others to extract water in a selfish way when it is abundant, but less likely than others to do so when 
water is scarce. People with decision-making power may take advantage of their position and behave 
more selfishly if water is abundant. But when water is scarce, they transgress norms less than others. 
Possibly they realise that selfish behaviour deprives others and hence they correct their behaviour to 
some extent. They may do so because they take up a leadership role or want to set the example.  
As a result, we observe that upstream users who are a member of the village government or village 
council are more likely to reduce water extraction as a reaction to scarcity than the reference upstream 
user. They are also slightly but insignificantly more likely to appropriate in a persistently conflictive 
way. Hence, there is no confirmation of higher probabilities of conflictive behaviour of irrigators with 
more (decision-making) power. 
The relative social status of the upstream user, used as a proxy for their power, does not affect the 
likelihood of selfish water extraction in abundance. In scarcity, the likelihood of selfish water 
extraction of upstream users with a higher social status increases less than for others. Either, upstream 
users with a higher social status transgress non-competition norms less as they want to set an example. 
Or, as social status negatively correlates with poverty, people with a lower social status may be 
poorer. Therefore, they may be more likely than others to extract water in a selfish way when there is 
                                                     
94
 Possibly being a member of a minority tribe makes less of a difference because at present religion in rural 
Tanzania seems to bind people more than tribe (Toner, 2008).  
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scarcity of vital resources such as water. We observed such a relation with food insecurity as a 
poverty indicator.  
The answer to our second research question is that the ones who are relatively poor, who have less 
extensive social networks and the ones for whom access to irrigation water makes a critical difference 
for their agricultural production are more likely than others to react in a conflictive way to water 
scarcity in the experiment. This is largely in line with the literature‟s presumptions that the poor, the 
marginalised and dissocialised and the ones who value resources highly are more likely to come into 
conflict over scarce resources. Our findings did not support presumptions that men, youth and 
uneducated people would be more inclined to struggle for scarce resources.  
Discussion  
In the previous section, we presented experimental evidence that some types of irrigators are more 
likely than others to enter into appropriative competition when water is scarce despite the existence of 
non-competition norms and despite the fact that such behaviour is considered conflictive in their 
communities. When water is scarce in reality, they may also be the ones who are more likely to break 
social norms and to react in conflictive ways to scarcity. There is a chance that these types of 
irrigators would also more easily engage in more violent ways of competing for scarce resources.  
The relation between resource scarcity and conflict, however, is complex and multi-layered. Resource 
scarcity can bring about (violent) conflict but this is most often as a result of a concurrence of 
circumstances (Turner, 2004). Via the framed field experiment we observed that some people have a 
higher predisposition towards conflictive behaviour in response to resource scarcity. We will now 
evaluate if this coincides with the presence of horizontal inequalities, with marginalisation or with 
exclusionary features in policy. We will also assess to what extent other factors that could be 
conducive to resource scarcity conflicts, such as rising competition for water, are present in Tanzania. 
Looking at our findings from this wider perspective will enable to hypothesise to what extent 
circumstances in Tanzania are such that resource scarcity could engender conflict.  
First, horizontal inequalities, marginalisation of certain groups and their exclusion from access to 
resources are factors that are known to be conducive to resource scarcity conflicts (Benjaminsen et al., 
2009; Stewart, 2000). Inequalities in wealth, power and resource access could aid mobilisation for 
(resource scarcity) conflicts, especially when a higher predisposition for conflictive reactions to water 
scarcity concurs with such inequalities. We checked whether the types of people that were more 
inclined to react in a conflictive way to water scarcity in the experiment are confronted with real 
inequalities in each of the five irrigation schemes by using the complete survey sample. We checked 
this for the wider region as well by using data on Iringa region gathered in the National Sample 
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Census of Agriculture 2002/2003 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2006) (See Table 17 in the Appendix 
V). 
The experiment showed that relatively wealthy irrigators are less likely than others to react in a 
conflictive way to water scarcity, while relatively poor irrigators are more likely to do so. We 
investigated whether these differences concur with inequalities in water and land access and 
(decision-making) power. We found that there is a positive (negative) correlation between wealth 
(poverty) and the size of (irrigated) agricultural land in each of the irrigation schemes and in the wider 
region. Wealth is also positively correlated with social status in every irrigation scheme and positively 
correlated with membership of village government or village council in some irrigation schemes
95
. At 
the regional level, there is a negative (positive) correlation between water shortage problems and 
wealth (poverty). Similar relations are observed in two of the irrigation schemes. These observations 
show that in reality, the poor are marginalised with regard to water and land access and (decision-
making) power. 
Next, the experiment gave indications that members of minority religious groups are less inclined to 
adhere to non-competition norms and more inclined to extract water in a persistently conflictive way 
than others. According to the literature, mobilisation to join in (resource scarcity) conflicts is most 
effective if inequalities in economic opportunities, resource access or political participation coincide 
with cultural, ethnic or religious differences (Stewart, 2000). We checked whether such inequalities 
are present in the studied irrigation schemes
96
. In fact, in three out of five irrigation schemes, 
members of minority religious group are more likely to be relatively poor or to possess less land. In 
the other two irrigation schemes, they are more likely to be relatively wealthy. In one irrigation 
scheme, members of minority religious group report more water shortage problems. 
While we did not observe differences in reactions to water scarcity in the experiment between youth 
and older irrigators, inequalities in wealth, water and land access and (decision-making) power exist 
along these lines. In each of the irrigation schemes, the ones who are relatively young have less 
(irrigated) agricultural land at their disposal, they are less likely to be involved in the village 
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 Note that the indicators of wealth (poverty), irrigated land size, village government membership and social 
status did not significantly correlate with each other in the subsample of upstream participants in the experiment 
that was used in the binary logistic regression estimation.  
Some variables are defined in a different way in our survey and in the National Sample Census of Agriculture. 
The exact definitions are included in the Appendix V together with Table 17. Correlations with membership of 
village government and with social status could not be checked at the regional level since this data is not 
available in the National Sample Census of Agriculture. 
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 This could not be checked at the regional level as data on religion is not available in the National Sample 
Census of Agriculture. 
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government or council and their social status is lower
97
. In the wider region, relatively young people 
have less land and fewer cattle and they report more water shortage problems. 
Lifetime residents and the ones who immigrated to the village did not react differently to water 
scarcity in the experiment. Furthermore we did not observe any consistent inequalities in the irrigation 
schemes with regard to water and land access and (decision-)making power between these groups. In 
contrast to what is often assumed lifetime residents are not privileged in this setting. 
Secondly, water governance institutions in Tanzania include potentially marginalising and 
exclusionary features that could contribute to conflicts over (increasingly) scarce resources. Despite 
the National Water Policy‟s good intentions, its arguments to use water in the most efficient and 
sustainable way and the principle of treating water as an economic good can endanger the entitlement 
to water of small scale users (United Republic of Tanzania, 2002)
98
. Participation of small-scale users 
at basin level water resource management should ensure their interests are defended. But it remains 
questionable that they can effectively influence resource management through their participation – if 
it takes place (Ribot et al., 2010). Moreover, representatives of small-scale users are often elite and do 
not always represent the interests of the different types of small-scale users (Cleaver, 2002). Besides, 
small-scale users are likely to pull the shortest string if competition for water arises since mostly they 
do not hold an official water right.  
Processes of marginalisation and exclusion are at work at the level of the smallholder irrigation 
schemes as well. At this level, water use is largely regulated by a mix of informal and formal 
institutions. The flexible and pragmatic nature of these (blends of) institutions allows accommodating 
for different challenges posed by water appropriation. But, less powerful irrigators and female 
irrigators do not always have the capability to pragmatically search for a suitable solution. Sometimes 
they forsake their capability to do so. Often they cannot or do not uphold their interests, which 
consolidates deep-rooted inequalities (Lecoutere, 2011). 
Thirdly, rainfall is becoming more erratic and less predictable due to climate change and increasing 
climate variability. This may well exacerbate competition for water resources (Chang‟a et al., 2010; 
Paavola, 2008). Economic development and population pressure increase demand for water. Hence, 
conflicting pressures between different users of Tanzania‟s water resources such as domestic users, 
farmers, livestock keepers, industry and hydropower plants, are present and on the rise (Maganga, 
Butterworth, & Moriarty, 2002). Also within the small-scale irrigation sector competition for water is 
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 Probably a persistent cultural fact that reserves leadership for men of certain age deprives the young (and 
women) of the capability to participate in decision making. Plot division at heritage is probably one of the 
causes of problematic land access for youth involved in agriculture.  
98
 NAWAPO serves as the reference even while it has not been fully incorporated into legislation yet.  
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ever increasing. Irrigated agriculture has become more attractive because rain-fed agriculture has 
become riskier due to climate change, and it has gained importance for production of locally 
marketable crops, like tomatoes and onions (Kaswamila & Masuruli, 2004; Sokoni & Shechambo, 
2005).  
Conclusion 
Conclusively we can confirm that resource scarcity induces conflictive behaviour even if strong non-
competition norms are present. Some people, however, are more inclined than others to respond to 
water scarcity in a conflictive way. Via the framed field experiment we observed that water users who 
are relatively poor, who have less extensive social networks and for whom irrigation water makes a 
critical difference for their agricultural production, are more likely to enter into appropriative 
competition when water is scarce, despite the existence of non-competition norms and despite the fact 
that such behaviour is considered conflictive in their communities. There is a chance that these types 
of water users would more easily break social norms, react in conflictive ways or even engage in more 
violent ways of competing for resources if water is scarce in reality, especially if circumstances are 
conducive to resource scarcity conflicts.  
In fact, circumstances in Tanzania are such that they could be conducive to resource scarcity conflicts. 
The ones who showed a higher predisposition to react in a conflictive way to water scarcity suffer 
from real economic and political inequalities. Besides, (formal and informal) water governance 
institutions hold exclusionary elements that possibly affect the same people. Inequalities and 
exclusion could form a basis for mobilisation for more violent ways of competing for scarce 
resources, especially in combination with rising values of water. The value of water can be reasonably 
expected to further increase as rainfall is becoming more unpredictable and erratic and water scarcity 
is increasing due to climate change. At the same time, economic developments, such as the growing 
commercialisation of irrigated agriculture, are raising the value of water.  
Still, we do not want to raise suspicion that the poor and the marginalised will soon engage in 
resource scarcity conflicts in Tanzania. To date there have been few incidences of disruptive or 
violent resource scarcity conflicts in Tanzania. While water governance institutions suffer from 
limitations, they still function relatively well and are based on good intentions. Additionally, the 
strong egalitarian norms and the central national value of peacefulness reduce the threat of resource 
scarcity conflicts in Tanzania (Kessler, 2006). Our message is rather that care should be taken and 
policy should take measure to ease these factors that are conducive to water scarcity conflicts.  
Measures should be taken to reduce the poor‟s dependency on natural resources, for instance through 
the creation of other income opportunities or safety-nets. At the same time, the concurrence of poverty 
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and unequal access to resources should be adjusted. Culturally, ethnically or religiously skewed 
resource access should be further prevented. What could be helpful are easily accessible initiatives 
that support poorer, less powerful and less networked people in land claims and disputes over water 
access. In addition, locally-specific (informal) resource appropriation rules could be made more 
enforceable and less ambiguous if they are recorded at the local level. The interests of small-scale 
users and less powerful users may be better protected in basin level water resource management when 
democratisation of resource management is further established. To achieve this, responsiveness to 
local needs and downward accountability to all users should be ensured. More decentralisation of 
discretionary powers and inclusion of mechanisms of accountability, like sanctions and elections, may 
be necessary (Ribot et al., 2010). While increasing commercialisation of agriculture is not a bad 
economic evolution, equal participation in this evolution should not be hindered. For instance, water 
may rise in value but pricing it could exclude less wealthy water users, which should be avoided. 
Countering the effect of climate change may prove difficult but the detrimental effect of increased 
rainfall variability could be partly absorbed by weather insurances (Skees, Varangis, & Larson, 2004) 
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General Conclusion 
Projections of a global water crisis, of rampant violent conflicts over increasingly scarce water 
resources and of a widening gap in entitlements to water between the powerless poor and others have 
inspired this research. Such projections find their roots in expected supply-demand problems, which 
will primarily hit development countries. Such problems may be caused by population growth and 
economic developments which increase the demand for water and by climate change which will make 
water increasingly scarce. These evolutions are expected to drive up competition, possibly to the 
extent that violence will be used to secure access and control over a scarce but essential natural 
resource. It is expected that equity in entitlement to resources will be harder to maintain under these 
conditions. When competition for resources is more intense, negotiations over access and control over 
resources are likely to be played higher. Power relations are likely to play a more decisive role. 
Hence, the poor and the least powerful may miss out on water entitlements.  
Both from a security and a development perspective, an informed understanding of water governance 
and of the impediments to equity in the distribution of water are essential to counterbalance the 
gloomy projections of the current discourse on water. In fact, evolutions like climate change, 
population growth and economic development could contribute to violent competition for increasingly 
scarce resources, especially in combination with disparities in access to resources. Hence, from a 
security point of view, it is important to comprehend the origin of inequalities with regard to resource 
access, to know to what extent decentralised water governance can counter resource conflicts and to 
understand individuals‟ motives to react in conflictive ways to resource scarcity. Insights into the 
distribution of essential common resources like water are also important from a development 
perspective. The livelihoods of semi-subsistence farmers are particularly vulnerable to inadequate and 
insecure water access. Uncertainty about adequate water supplies also forms an additional risk in their 
production process. Often such risks are avoided through opting for less water dependent agricultural 
production at the expense of larger returns.  
The literature presents diverging views on the relation between resource scarcity and conflict. The 
environmental security literature purports there is a causal relation between resource scarcity and 
violent conflict. The political ecology literature however claims that resource scarcity is neither a 
sufficient nor a necessary factor explaining conflict. It asserts that conflicts which seem related to 
resources are generally socially, culturally and historically embedded. The common pool resource 
literature states that distributive conflicts over common resources like water can be overcome with a 
suitable set of institutions.  
Different strands of literature deal with decentralised governance of natural resources and the 
distribution of resources. The common pool resource literature inspired the introduction of more 
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decentralised natural resource governance which is expected to contribute to efficient, sustainable and 
equitable use of resources. The common pool literature, however, spent little attention to equity even 
if this is essential to ensure resource provision and maintain trust and reciprocity, which are key 
elements for self-governance. Hence, the extent to which decentralised governance of common 
resources assures equity in the distribution of resources is uncertain. The post-institutionalist literature 
concentrates on equity. It highlights that local institutions for governing natural resources are socially 
embedded and embedded in the prevailing power structures. As a result, entitlements to resources and 
the distribution thereof are likely to be shaped by social inequities and power imbalances. 
The aim of this research is to provide a realistic account of local water governance and how common 
water flows are shared in semi-arid areas in sub-Sahara Africa. It addresses different gaps in the 
knowledge about how common water flows are locally governed and how water is shared in a setting 
where water is regularly in scarce supply. This setting is further characterised by increased 
competition for water due to climate change, population growth and economic developments and by 
widened institutional pluralism due to decentralisation and new water governance policies. 
A first contribution of this research consists of striking a balance between romanticised views of 
harmonious, inclusive local governance of natural resources producing efficient sustainable and 
equitable resource use and gloomy, neo-Malthusian ideas of resource users fiercely and violently 
competing for scarce resources. It presents a more unprejudiced view on local resource governance 
while uncovering structural causes of inequality.  
A second contribution is its rigorous analysis of the socially embedded nature of institutions and 
resource entitlements. In this research, resource governance institutions are not approached as fixed 
structures with an observable set of „rules of the game‟. Instead, institutions are viewed as sets of rules 
in use that are moulded by the resource users‟ practices. Such a view permits recognising and 
studying the socially embedded nature of institutions by uncovering how agency by socially and 
economically heterogeneous actors shapes institutions.  
Thirdly, in contrast to much of the literature on common pool resources this research specifically 
addresses fairness of resource entitlements. While doing so it acknowledges that issues of fairness and 
equitable resource distribution are strongly connected to broader socio-political structures that 
underlie inequalities in the communities. It implies that the norms, rules and reputation mechanisms, 
which are inherent parts of local resource governance institutions, may have different effects on 
socially and economically heterogeneous common pool resource users confronted with water 
abundance and water scarcity.  More specifically, this research analyses to what extent social factors 
like gender and social status influence resource distribution because institutions and resource values 
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may provide gender and status specific incentives to comply with resource appropriation rules under 
water abundant and water scarce conditions. 
A fourth contribution of this research consists of providing rigorous empirical evidence of the role of 
power in engendering disparities in resource entitlements and in shaping institutions. The economic 
literature often avoids taking up such measures due to statistical problems, while the sociologically 
inspired literature does not always provide convincing evidence of the role of power. This research 
uses a measure of the resource users‟ relative power status in their community‟s power structure 
which is based on the perception of community members.  
Fifthly, this research provides additional insights into the relation between resource scarcity and 
conflict. It uses a framed field experiment which enables to elicit a reaction to water abundance and 
water scarcity by the same people, which is impossible with observational data. By combining 
experimental evidence of water appropriation behaviour with data on socio-economic characteristics 
of the irrigators participating in the experiment it produces evidence on the relation between the 
individual predisposition towards conflictive behaviour and resource scarcity.  
There are three main parts in this work which each address specific issues related to local water 
governance and competition for water from common water flows. Part II deals with resource 
distribution behaviour by socially heterogeneous irrigators under conditions of water abundance and 
water scarcity. It is based on an analysis of experimental data. Part II examines whether male and 
female irrigators share resources in a different way and whether they react differently to water 
scarcity. It determines whether irrigators‟ social status affects the way they share resources when 
water is abundant and when it is scarce and whether this effect is similar for male and female 
irrigators. Furthermore, it includes an assessment of the extent to which real life observations 
substantiate the experimental findings on irrigators‟ resource distribution behaviour.  
Part III investigates how conflicts over land and water are dealt with in smallholder irrigation 
communities in semi-arid Tanzania which largely self-govern their water flows. While analysing how 
conflicts are solved in these irrigation schemes it is observed that conflicts may prompt processes of 
pragmatic problem solving through which local resource governance institutions are reproduced. The 
role of institutional pluralism in such processes is assessed. Throughout the analysis of how conflicts 
are solved, the role of actors‟ positions in the local power structure and their gender is looked at and 
the effectiveness of their resource claims is assessed.  
Part IV provides experimental evidence of individual predisposition of conflictive behaviour in 
response water scarcity. It investigates whether water scarcity induces a reduction of extraction as the 
CPR thesis predicts; or whether it introduces competition as the resource scarcity conflict thesis 
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predicts. It determines what types of users of the common water flow are more inclined to react in a 
conflictive way to water scarcity. And by putting the findings in a broader perspective, it hypothesises 
about the extent to which real life circumstances are such that resource scarcity could engender 
conflict in Tanzania. 
This research is defined to studying access to and conflict over productive water that is derived from 
common water flows in semi-arid sub-Sahara Africa. More particularly, five smallholder irrigation 
schemes in the semi-arid lowlands of Mufindi district, Tanzania, are studied. Tanzania is a 
representative example of the changes that take place in sub-Sahara Africa, such as climate change, 
economic development, population growth and increasing decentralisation of natural resource 
management. The smallholder irrigation schemes dealt with in this research consist of networks of 
locally dug river diversions and canals and are similar to schemes in the wider region. Irrigation is an 
important contribution to agricultural livelihoods in these settings and governance of irrigation water 
can be allotted to a well-defined community. Irrigators in these areas are confronted with recurrent 
water scarcity in the yearly dry season.  
Since the research adopts a micro level of analysis of resource appropriation and resource conflicts, in 
principle, the level of inquiry has been the individual. The multidisciplinary nature of the research and 
the research questions called for an empirical strategy using a mixed method approach. Both 
qualitative and quantitative methods have been applied for data collection. Participatory data 
collection methods have been used for mapping the irrigation schemes and for identifying irrigators. 
Participatory methods have been used to obtain a ranking of irrigators according to their relative 
social status in their community which is based on the perception of community members. The 
measure of the relative social status served as a proxy for the relative power status of irrigators in their 
community. Other qualitative methods included focus group discussions and semi-structured 
interviews. Quantitative data collection methods included an individual survey which inquired about 
socio-economic characteristics of the irrigators and about accessing irrigation water. A framed field 
experiment is another quantitative method that was used. The experiment was conducted with users of 
the smallholder irrigation schemes. It was framed as water appropriation from the common irrigation 
schemes in water abundant and water scarce circumstances. It replicated the dilemmas that irrigators 
experience in real life.  
Combining these different types of data permitted an analysis of resource distribution behaviour while 
taking into account the effect of social factors like users‟ gender, power and social status in the 
community. It also allowed explaining the variation in individual behaviour in the experiment. By 
taking resource conflicts as the unit of analysis and by investigating the way they are settled, an 
analysis of actor-driven processes that reproduce institutions was possible. Relating this to an 
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unambiguous measurement of the actors‟ positions in the local power hierarchy enabled uncovering 
the socially embedded nature of such processes and the role of power imbalances in these.  
This research not only provided insights of how water is governed and shared in the irrigation 
schemes in semi-arid Tanzania. It also enabled drawing more general conclusions on local resource 
governance institutions, on agency by people embedded in a social structure, on access to scarce 
common resources and on decentralised natural resource management. 
First, local resource governance institutions are not fixed structures with a clear and unambiguous set 
of norms and rules. Actually, the „rules of the game‟ to govern irrigation water in the studied 
irrigation schemes are in flux and are socially embedded. They are a mix of elements borrowed from 
“formal” bureaucratic rules and more “informal”, “traditional” ways to deal with water governance. 
Nevertheless, local water governance institutions involve some basic, common standards even if they 
are in flux and are locally specific. Competition and distributive conflicts are avoided in order to 
maintain harmony in the community. Irrigators also strongly believe that everybody has a right to 
water and water should be distributed in a fair way. With regard to conflict management, there is a 
clear preference for reconciliation over confrontation. 
New challenges have brought about more disputes over water and land at the local level. But such 
disputes are not necessarily disruptive. They sometimes prompt further development of local water 
governance institutions. This happens in a pragmatic way when the people involved in disputes search 
for solutions, preferably non-violent, non-confrontational ones. While they do so, they engage in 
institutional bricolage and blend elements of formal and informal institutions. Sometimes they search 
somewhat opportunistically for the solution that best accommodates their needs. Besides, there are 
indications that the purely “traditional” ways to resolve disputes have reached their limits. 
Furthermore, while trying to solve disputes, the local government, which gained more discretionary 
power through efforts of democratic decentralisation, tries to establish its role in local resource 
governance and avoids being sidelined by newly introduced water governance policies.  
Local water governance institutions are also socially embedded rules in use. The underlying norms 
and the monitoring and reputation mechanisms do not mean the same for all irrigators. People with 
different social positions in the community may value resources differently but they also face specific 
behavioural norms and reputation mechanisms. The experiment showed that gender and status 
specific behavioural norms and reputation mechanisms shape people‟s incentive structure and their 
resource distribution behaviour. Behaviour that is influenced by such internalised constraints may also 
consolidate inequalities related to the social structure in the community. 
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Secondly, the processes through which institutions take shape are subject to agency by people 
embedded in a social structure. While unravelling the ad-hoc development and the reshaping of 
institutions for solving resource related disputes in the irrigation schemes, it was shown that the social 
structure and the power relations in the irrigator communities play a decisive role. Irrigators‟ social 
position and power position in the community determine the extent to which they comply with the 
rules and norms that regulate water access and distribution. They are also significant for the way 
disputes are solved and for the type of processes of institutional (re)shaping that are initiated. 
Powerful irrigators, for instance, are more inclined to opportunistically search for the institutional 
framework and the rule that best serve their cases. Or, if disputes involve powerful offenders, many of 
whom are male, often more authoritative and more bureaucratic forms of conflict management are 
called in. Possibly these are needed as leverage to deal with powerful offenders. If conflicts involve 
less powerful offenders, in many cases more informal instruments are used to enforce rules or to 
resolve conflicts. It is also observed that less powerful irrigators, many of whom are female, do not 
always have the capability or forsake their capability to engage in creative conflict resolution and to 
uphold their interests. It shows that inherent power imbalances seriously limit the scope of the least 
powerful in the community to engage in creative and pragmatic problem solving and to contribute to 
the (re)shaping of institutions.  
Thirdly, access to common pool resources under decentralised governance is not necessarily 
equitable. While some norms and rules are in place to ensure a fair distribution of water and to avoid 
competition in the studied irrigation schemes, not everybody complies with these norms to the same 
extent. Moreover, water scarcity makes it harder to comply with such norms. More specifically, one 
would expect that men with a high social status, who are often economically better-off and fulfil a 
leadership role in these patriarchal and status-based societies, would comply with norms prescribing a 
fair resource distribution. But they do not. Men and women with a low social status comply with 
norms of fairness, but only when water is abundant. When water is scarce they do not, possibly due to 
their dependence on irrigation water for subsistence and due to the economic loss that comes with 
fairly distributing resources. Only women with a high social status adhere and are able to adhere to 
fairness in water abundant and water scarce circumstances. Hence, the way water is distributed results 
in differential access to irrigation water that mirrors structural inequalities and may reinforce 
economic inequalities linked to gender and status.  
Furthermore, water scarcity induces some irrigators to break the strong non-competition norms that 
regulate the use of the common water flows. Such behaviour is regarded conflictive in these irrigator 
communities. When water is scarce, the social norm to avoid competition is more easily broken by the 
ones who are relatively poor, the ones who have less extensive social networks and the ones for who 
access to irrigation water makes a critical difference for agricultural production. When water is scarce 
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in reality, they may also be the ones who are more likely to break social norms or to react in 
conflictive ways. Besides, the people with higher predispositions to react in a conflictive way to water 
scarcity suffer from real economic and political inequalities and are likely to be affected by 
exclusionary elements of formal and informal water governance institutions. These sources of 
inequalities and exclusion could form a basis for mobilisation for more violent ways of competing for 
scarce resources, especially in combination with rising water values and in the absence of other 
effective means of contestation. 
Fourthly, policies aiming at increased democratic decentralisation and more decentralised natural 
resource management do not always produce the expected results. The analysis of local governance of 
common water flows in a setting where such policies have been introduced provides insights into 
what really happens. Even if efforts of democratic decentralisation indirectly increased the potential 
of the village government to intervene in water and land management, the renewed national 
framework for water management did not leave much room for village government to engage in local 
water governance. This inspired the village government to actively (re)claim their role in local 
resource governance. Interestingly, the village government intervened in issues of water appropriation 
that is illegal according to formal policy since it happens without official water rights. Hence, the 
ambiguity about whom governs natural resources at the local level and which rules apply remains. 
Nevertheless, as we discussed before, the actual users of the natural resources give their own 
interpretation to the whole set of formal and informal institutional frameworks, rules and norms. They 
creatively make use of the institutional pluralism to which natural resource governance is subject. As 
such, institutional pluralism forms an asset for the gradual development of more sophisticated 
resource governance institutions. 
Still, building on local water governance institutions can enrich a policy aiming for meaningful, useful 
and locally adapted resource governance. But to realise this potential, the dynamics of innovation, 
creative problem solving, flexible interpretation of policy principles and legitimation should be 
appreciated by policy makers. Policy makers should also be aware that the outcome of any 
institutional design cannot be predicted, since institutions are products of ongoing social processes in 
which numerous heterogeneous actors play a role in environments characterised by uncertainties. If 
policy aims to amend social inequities and to reduce the potential for resource conflicts, it should 
assess how institutional design concurs or collides with informal institutions, how elites could find 
ways to enhance their power over resources and what the potential pitfalls or opportunities might be 
for women and marginalised groups. It should address potential sources of marginalisation and 
exclusion. This requires an acknowledgement of the heterogeneity of resource users, of the existing 
social differences and power imbalances and of the contextual factors that could be conducive to 
resource conflicts.  
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Appendix I: A Framed Field Experiment on Irrigation - Instructions and 
Procedures 
Introduction 
[When people enter the meeting room, they are asked for their name. We have a list of invited 
candidates, a sample chosen from previously identified households by the irrigation mapping 
exercise. Their name is marked and they are given a sticker with an identity letter, which we ask 
them to stick on their shirt. It is explained that this identity letter is unique and allows us to identify 
them during the exercise while guaranteeing complete confidentiality. This is important, as they are 
able to earn real money in the exercise. They are asked to take a seat in the meeting room. Further 
instructions will be given once sufficient people have shown up.] 
“Good morning/after noon. First of all, thanks for your interest. We are from the universities of Gent 
and Antwerp (Belgium) and we are making a study on local economic development and poverty. This 
study is important as it might help policymakers who are interested in combating poverty and 
stimulate economic development. We have been here in this village before to do an irrigation 
mapping exercise and a survey, in which many of you probably participated”. 
[Swahili] “Habari za asubuhi/mchana. Kabla ya yote, asanteni kwa kufika. Sisi tumetokea 
Chuo Kikuu cha Gent na Antwerp (Belgium) na tunafanya utafiti wa maendeleo ya kiuchumi 
na umaskini.Utafiti huu ni muhimu kwani utasaidia watunga sera ambao wana nia ya 
kupunguza umaskini na kuhimiza maendeleo ya kiuchumi.Tulikuwepo katika kijiji hiki kabla 
na tulifanya zoezi la kutengeneza ramani ya umwagiliaji na utafiti, ambayo wengi wenu labda 
mlishiriki.” 
(Keep the introduction as short as possible and acceptable) 
“You are now invited to participate in a new exercise, which allows you to earn real money. How 
much you earn depends on the decisions you will be asked to make, as well as the decisions of other 
people in the village. Like in real life, the harvest you can get from irrigated farming depends on your 
decisions but also on decisions of other users of water. Participation is voluntary. Your decisions will 
be dealt with in a confidential way, i.e. nobody in the village will ever know your individual 
decisions, or the money you will have earned. The money you earn will be paid out to you privately 
and confidentially after the exercise. During the whole exercise, you are not allowed to communicate 
with the other participants.” 
[Swahili] “Kwa sasa mnakaribishwa kushiriki katika zoezi jipya, ambalo litakupatia fedha 
taslimu. Kiasi utakachopata kitatokana na maamuzi ambayo utaombwa kufanya, na pia na 
maamuzi ya watu wengine wa kijiji hiki. Katika maisha ya kawaida, mavuno unayoweza 
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kupata kutoka katika kilimo cha umwagiliaji kinategemeana na maamuzi yako na pia 
maamuzi ya watumiaji wengine wa maji. Kushiriki ni muhimu. Maamuzi yako yatafanyika 
kwa usiri mkubwa, kwamba hamna mtu katika kijiji hiki atafahamu maamuzi yako au fedha 
ulizopata. Fedha utakayopata utalipwa ukiwa peke yako na kwa usiri baada ya zoezi. Wakati 
wa zoezi zima, huruhusiwi kuwasiliana na washiriki wengine.” 
Part 1: Water Abundance (5 rounds) 
“In part 1 of the exercise, you are matched with one other person. Imagine that you and the other 
person are both connected to the same irrigation channel. One person is located immediately 
„upstream‟ of the other person. We call the first person the „upstream person‟, whereas we refer to the 
second person as the „downstream person‟. Later we will inform you whether you are an upstream or 
a downstream person. It is important that you realise that you will never get to know the identity of 
this other person you are matched with. Nor will the other person ever get to know your identity.” 
[Swahili] ”Katika sehemu ya kwanza ya zoezi, unaambatana na mtu mmoja, Fikiria kwamba 
wewe na huyo mtu mwingine mko pamoja katika mfereji wa umwagiliaji. Mtu mmoja yupo 
juu ya mtu mwingine. Tunamwita mtu wa kwanza „mtu wa juu‟ ambapo tunamwita pia mtu 
wa pili „mtu wa chini‟.Baadaye tutakutaarifu kama u mtu wa juu au wa chini. Ni muhimu 
utambue kwamba hutamtambua huyu mtu mwingine unayeambatana naye. Hata mtu huyo 
mwingine hatakutambua” 
“As the water flow passes first by the upstream person, this person has the possibility to distribute the 
water flow between him/herself and the downstream person. He/she does this in the following way. 
We assume there is a constant flow of water and the upstream person has to decide how many hours 
he/she will extract water from the irrigation channel, from a total of 12 hours per day for each day of 
the month. It is important to realise that the downstream user cannot make use of the irrigation 
channel while the upstream user makes us of it. This means that the downstream user can only make 
use of the irrigation channel during the hours the upstream user does not make use of it. For instance, 
if the upstream user decides to use the water channel during 10 hours every day of the month, the 
downstream user will only be able to make use of the water channel during the remaining 2 hours 
each day of the month.”  
[Swahili] “Maji yanapopita kwanza kwa mtu wa juu, huyu mtu anauwezekano wa kuyagawa 
maji kati yake na mtu wa chini. Mtu huyu anayagawa katika mpangilio huu. Tunadhania 
kwamba mtiririko wa maji uko kwa kiwango na mtu wa juu anatakiwa kuamua masaa 
mangapi atatoa maji katika mfereji, kutoka katika masaa 12 kwa siku kwa kila siku ya mwezi. 
Ni muhimu kutambua kwamba mtu wa chini hawezi kutumia mfereji wa maji wakati mtu wa 
juu anatumia. Hii inamaanisha kwamba mtu wa chini anaweza tu kutumia mfereji wa maji 
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kipindi ambacho wa mtu wa juu hatumii. Kwa mfano, kama mtu wa juu ataamua kutumia 
mfereji wa maji kwa masaa 10 kila siku ya mwezi, mtu wa chini atatumia tu kwa masaa 2 
yaliyobaki kila siku ya mwezi” 
(Distribute decision cards for first exercise together) (Stick flipchart with decision card on the wall)  
“To make decisions in the exercise you will make use of decision cards. On the decision card you 
received we will do a first exercise together. We pretend you all are an upstream user now. And you 
have to decide of how many hours you will use the water in the irrigation channel per day for a whole 
month. On the decision card, you observe 12 dots, representing the maximum number of hours one 
can make use of the irrigation channel. This means this user will use this amount of hours per day for 
a whole month. To make a decision he/she colors the number of dots equal to the number of hours 
he/she makes use of the irrigation channel.” 
[Swahili] “Ili kufanya maamuzi katika zoezi hili utatumia kadi ya maamuzi. Katika kadi ya 
maamuzi mlizopata tutafanya zoezi la kwanza pamoja. Tunajifanya sasa wote ni watumiaji 
wa juu. Na itatakiwa muamue masaa mtakayotumia maji katika mfereji kwa siku na kwa 
mwezi mzima. Katika kadi ya maamuzi, utaona doti 12, zinawakilisha kiwango cha juu mtu 
anachoweza kutumia katika mfereji wa maji. Hii inamaanisha mtumiaji huyu atatumia masaa 
haya kwa siku na kwa mwezi mzima. Kufanya maamuuzi anapaka rangi idadi za doti sawa na 
namba za masaa anazotumia mfereji wa maji.” 
(Participants keep decision card of first exercise – Now distribute production table abundance for 
second exercise together) (Stick flipchart with production table on the wall)  
“The hours of water and thus the amount of water one is able to extract from the irrigation channel to 
irrigate his/her plot determines his/her income. The more water one uses on his/her plot, the more s/he 
can harvest and earn. How much one can earn is indicated in the production table. You observe three 
columns. In the first column, you observe the entire range of decision options for the upstream user. 
He can choose between 0 and 12 (included) number of hours (number of black dots) making use of 
the irrigation channel. The second column indicates the harvest and profit of the upstream user for a 
chosen number of hours. E.g. if the upstream user decides to make use of the irrigation channel during 
8 hours, he will obtain an income of 425 TSH from the harvest of the irrigated field. This means the 
downstream user can only make use of it during the remaining 4 hours and will obtain an earning of 
175 TSH... Another example: if the upstream user takes water for 6 hours every day, the downstream 
user will remain with 6 hours per day in that month. The upstream user will then earn 325 TSH, the 
downstream user 325 TSH. It is important that you realise that you can earn real money. The total you 
earn will be paid out to you after the end of the exercise.” 
[Swahili] “Masaa ya maji na pia kiasi cha maji ambacho mtu anatakiwa kuchukua toka 
mfereji wa maji ili kumwagilia inaonyesha kiasi cha mapato yake. Jinsi mtu anavyotumia 
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maji mengi ndivyo anavyopata mavuno mengi na mapato mengi. Kiasi ambacho mtu anaweza 
kupata imeonyeshwa kwenye jedwali la uzalishaji. Utaona safu tatu. Katika safu ya kwanza, 
utaona chaguzi mbalimbali ya maamuzi ya mtu wa juu. Anaweza kuchagua kati ya 0 na 12 
(zikiwemo) idadi za masaa (idadi za doti nyeusi) atakayotumia katika mfereji wa maji. Katika 
safu ya pili inaonyesha mavuno na faida ya mtu wa juu katika masaa yaliyochaguliwa. Kwa 
mfano, kama mtu wa juu ataamua kutumia mfereji wa maji kwa masaa manane, atapata 
mapato ya 425 TSH kutoka kwenye mavuno ya shamba lililomwagiliwa. Hii inamaanisha 
kwamba mtumiaji wa chini anaweza kutumia katika masaa 4 yaliyobaki na atapata mapato ya 
175 TSH. Mfano mwingine, kama mtumiaji wa juu atatumia maji kwa masaa 6 kila siku, 
mtumiaji wa chini atabakiwa na masaa 6 kwa siku kwa mwezi huo.Mtumiaji wa juu atapa 
tena kiasi cha shilingi.325., na mtumiaji wa chini kiasi cha shilingi .325 Ni muhimu 
kutambua kwamba utapata fedha taslimu. Jumla ya ulichopata utalipwa baada ya mwisho wa 
zoezi.” 
“In the production table, you also observe that there is a minimum required amount of water, equal to 
a flow of 4 hours per day, below which harvest is extremely low. In other words, if any of both users 
uses less than the minimum required water quantity, his/her production will be very low; he will only 
get 50 tsh. Above this threshold, harvest drastically increases, and the more water one uses, the higher 
his income.” 
[Swahili] “Katika jedwali la uzalishaji utaona pia kuna kiwango cha chini cha maji 
kinachohitajika, sawa na mtiririko wa masaa manne kwa siku , chini ya hapo uzalishaji ni 
mdogo sana. Kwa maneno mengine, mtumiaji yoyote atatumia maji kidogo zaidi ya kiwango 
kinachohitajika, mavuno yake yatakuwa kidogo, mapato iko shilingi 50 tu. Zaidi ya kiwango 
hiki, uzalishaji unaongezeka, na mtu anavyotumia maji mengi ndivyo mapato yake 
yanavyokuwa makubwa.” 
(Participants now write on the decision card from the first exercise (on which they coloured dots to 
choose hours of water)) (They need production tables to find income of up and downstream user) 
“Now look at the decision card: chose a number of hours of water you want to use and colour the 
number of dots. Look on the production table how much the upstream user can earn if s/he gets that 
number of hours of water. And write this on the decision card.” 
[Swahili] “Sasa angalia katika kadi ya maamuzi: chagua idadi ya masaa ya maji unayoyahitaji 
kutumia na upake rangi idadi za doti. Angalia katika jedwali la uzalishaji kiasi anachoweza 
kupata mtumiaji wa juu kama akitumia idadi ya hiyo ya masaa ya maji. Na kisha andika 
katika kadi ya maamuzi.” 
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“Now look at the third column of the production table which indicates the harvest and profit the 
downstream user will obtain. Write down the earnings of the downstream user on the decision card 
now.” 
[Swahili] “Sasa angalia katika safu ya tatu ya jedwali la uzalishaji ambayo inaonyesha 
mavuno na faida mtu wa chini atakavyopata. Sasa andika mapato ya mtumiaji wa chini katika 
kadi ya maamuzi.” 
[Show the second part of the decision card on flip chart]. 
“After the upstream user made the decision on the hours of water he will use and wrote down his 
earnings and the earnings for the downstream user, the decision card will be given to the downstream 
user He will then know the decision made by the upstream user. The downstream user knows that 
next month the upstream user will distribute water again. So the downstream user may find it 
important to give his reaction regarding the decision made by the upstream user. The „downstream 
person‟ can take four different actions. 
- First, he/she may decide to communicate to the upstream water user that he is satisfied with the 
amount of water and with the harvest he can get,  
- Second, he/she may decide to do nothing.  
- Third, he may decide to communicate to the upstream water user that he is not happy, dissatisfied 
with the amount of water and with the harvest he can get  
- Fourth the downstream user may decide to go to a mediator who punishes the upstream water 
user. The mediator punishes the „upstream person‟ by giving him a fine, which reduces his/her 
earnings by 100 tsh. The downstream user, however, has to pay a cost for resorting to the 
mediator (such as transport costs, „judicial‟ cost, time…), of 30 tsh.” 
[Swahili] “Baada ya mtumiaji wa juu akishafanya maamuzi ya masaa ya maji atakayotumia 
na kuandika mapato yake na ya mtumiaji wa chini, kadi ya maamuzi itapelekwa kwa 
mtumiaji wa chini. Ambapo atajua maamuzi yaliyofanywa na mtumiaji wa juu. Mtumiaji wa 
chini anajua kwamba mwezi ujao mtumiaji wa juu atayagawa maji tena. Hivyo mtumiaji wa 
chini ataona umuhimu wa kutoa tamko lake kuhusiana na maamuzi yaliyofanywa na mtumiaji 
wa juu. Mtumiaji wa chini anaweza kufanya maamuzi manne tofauti: 
- Kwanza, anaweza kuamua kuwasiliana na mtumiaji wa juu kwamba  
karidhika na kiwango cha maji na mavuno atakayopata  
- Pili, anaweza kuamua asifanye lolote 
- Tatu, anaweza kuamua kuwasiliana na mtumiaji wa juu kwamba hajafurahi, 
hajaridhika na kiasi cha maji na mavuno atakayopata. 
160 
 
- Nne, anaweza kuamua kumtumia msuluhishaji ambaye atamwazibu mtumiaji 
wa juu. Msuluhishaji atamwazibu „mtu wa juu‟ kwa kumtoza faini ambayo 
itapunguza mapato yake kwa shilingi 100 Ingawa mtu wa chini atatakiwa 
kulipa gharama za kumwita msuluhishi (kama vile gharama za usafiri, 
mahakama, muda…..) ya shilingi 30.” 
“After the downstream user decides on his reaction to the upstream user: the decision card is returned 
to the upstream user. This person will look at it and then make a decision on the water distribution for 
the next month.” 
[Swahili] “Baada ya mtumiaji wa chini kuamua tamko lake kwa mtumiaji wa juu, 
kadi ya maamuzi inarudishwa kwa mtumiaji wa juu. Mtu huyu ataiangalia na kuamua 
kufanya maamuzi tena ya mgawanyo wa maji kwa mwezi unaofuata.” 
(Distribute example decision cards with 8 dots coloured)  
“Now look at the decision card you got for this exercise: imagine that you are a downstream user and, 
this month, the upstream user left a certain number of hours of water per day for you, the downstream 
user. You are also left with a certain income. You know that the upstream user will distribute water 
again next month. Now decide on your reaction to the distribution made by the upstream user. Mark 
an X under the action you want to take.” 
[Swahili] “Sasa angalia kadi ya maamuzi uliyopata katika zoezi hili: fikiria kwamba wewe ni 
mtumiaji wa chini na, mwezi huu, mtumiaji wa juu amekuachia wewe mtumiaji wa chini 
idadi kadhaa ya masaa ya maji kwa siku. Umeachiwa pia mapato kadhaa.Unajua kwamba 
mtumiaji wa juu atagawa maji tena mwezi ujao. Sasa amua kuhusu mgawanyo uliofanywa na 
mtumiaji wa juu. Weka alama ya X chini ya amuzi unalotaka kulifanya.” 
(Distribute example decision card with 12 dots for the upstream user and where a downstream 
decided to punish the upstream user via the mediator) 
“We now distributed an example of a decision card where an upstream user used 12 hours of water. 
The downstream user was not happy with this.. He called in a mediator for which he paid 30 tsh 
which he has to pay from his earnings. Calculate now how much remains for this downstream user.” 
“And the upstream user was given a fine of 100 tsh which will be deduced from his earnings. 
Calculate now how much remains for the upstream user.” 
[Swahili] “Sasa tunagawa mfano wa kadi ya maamuzi ambapo mtumiaji wa juu alitumia 
masaa 12 ya maji. Mtumiaji wa chini hakufurahia. Alimwita msuluhishaji ambapo alilipa 
kiasi ca shilingi 30 ambayo atalipa toka kwenye mapato yake. Sasa piga hesabu kiasi 
kilichobaki kwa mtumiaji huyu wa chini.” 
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“Na mtumiaji wa juu alipewa faini ya shilingi 100 ambayo itapunguzwa toka kwenye mapato 
yake. Sasa piga hesabu kiasi kilichobaki kwa mtumiaji wa juu.” 
[Before the start of the experiment: Distribute ID cards, which shows ID letter, 
upstream/downstream role] 
“It is important that you don‟t show to anyone what is written on your ID card. And it is important to 
keep it because you will need it to be paid in the end. On the ID card you received you see your ID 
letter, the same as on your sticker. And you see if you are an upstream or downstream user. Upstream 
user is a triangle, downstream user is a square.” 
[Swahili] “Ni muhimu usimuonyeshe mtu yoyote kilichoandikwa kwenye kitambulisho 
chako. Ni muhimu pia kukitunza kwasababu utakihitaji ili kulipwa mwishoni. Katika 
kitambulisho ulichopata utaona herufi ya kitambulisho, sawa na ya kwenye stika yako. Na 
utaona kama wewe ni mtumiaji wa juu au wa chini. Mtumiaji wa juu ni pembetatu, mtumiaji 
wa chini ni mraba.” 
“Before starting with the exercise, we emphasise once again that it is important that you realise that 
you will never get to know the identity of the other person you are matched with, nor during nor after 
the exercise. Nor will the other person ever get to know your identity. We also ask you to give each 
other sufficient privacy, when taking decisions. Make sure that other people do not see the decision 
you write on your decision card. Communication is not allowed during the exercise. If you have a 
question, please raise your hand, so that one of us can come to you to answer your question in 
private.” 
[Swahili] “Kabla ya kuanza zoezi, tunawakumbusha tena ni muhimu kutambua kwamba 
hutamtambua mtu huyo mwingine unayeambatana naye, hata pia wakati wa zoezi au baada ya 
zoezi. Hali kadhalika mtu huyo mwingine hatakutambua. Tunaomba mpeane nafasi ya 
kutosha mnapofanya maamuzi. Mawasiliano hayaruhusiwi wakati wa zoezi. Hakikisha 
kwamba watu wengine hawaoni maamuzi uliyoandika katika kadi yako ya maamuzi. 
Mawasiliano hayaruhusiwi wakati wa zoezi. Kama una swali, tafadhali nyoosha mkono wako, 
ili kwamba mmoja wetu aje kujibu swali lako kwa usiri.” 
“You will now do the same exercise as we did together: some of you are upstream users, others are 
downstream users. You will be so for the rest of the exercise. Each upstream user is matched with one 
downstream user. You will be matched with the same person during the rest of the exercise. The 
upstream users will decide several times on the number of hours they will use water from the 
irrigation channel. The upstream users will write down their earnings and the earnings for the 
downstream user. After that, the downstream users receive the decision card and will then decide on 
how to react to the decision made by the upstream user After that the decision card will go back to the 
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upstream user, so that they will get to know the reaction of the downstream user. Thereafter, the 
upstream user will decide again on water distribution for the next month. This exercise will be 
repeated several times.” 
[Swahili] “Sasa utafanya tena zoezi sawa na tulilofanya pamoja: baadhi yenu ni watumiaji wa 
juu, wengine ni watumiaji wa chini. Mtakuwa hivyo kwa zoezi lililobaki. Kila mtumiaji wa 
juu anaambatana na mtumiaji mmoja wa chini. Utaambatana na mtu yuleyule kwa zoezi 
lililobaki. Watumiaji wa juu wataamua mara kadhaa idadi ya masaa watakayotumia maji 
katika mfereji. Watumiaji wa juu wataandika mapato yao na mapato ya watumiaji wa chini. 
Baada ya hapo, watumiaji wa chini watapokea kadi ya maamuzi na wataamua jinsi ya kutoa 
tamko kutokana na maamuzi yaliyofanywa na watumiaji wa juu.Baada ya hapo kadi ya 
maamuzi itarudishwa tena kwa watumiaji wa juu, ili kwamba wafahamu tamko la watumiaji 
wa chini. Baada ta hapo, mtumiaji wa juu ataamua tena mgawanyo wa maji kwa mwezi ujao. 
Zoezi hili litarudiwa mara nyingi.” 
“The upstream persons (those with triangle on the ID card) are now asked to take a seat in the other 
room. After everyone is seated again we will give you further instructions.”  
[Swahili] “Watumiaji wa juu (wale wenye pembetatu katika kitambulisho) wanaombwa sasa 
kukaa katika chumba mwingine. Baada ya kila mtu kukaa, tutawapa tena maelekezo.” 
[Upstream and downstream users are seated in different rooms. We assure that there is sufficient 
space between each participant to guarantee privacy when taking decisions. Once everybody is 
seated again, further instructions are given] 
1. DECISION CARDS are prepared on the basis of the LIST: pair number, also round number 
2. DECISION CARDS to upstream users (match via LIST and ID CODES)  
3. Upstream users decide 
4. DECISION CARDS to downstream users (match via LIST and ID CODES)  
5. Downstream users react 
6. DECISION CARDS back to upstream users (match via LIST and ID CODES)  
7. Next round….. (5 rounds) 
8. After each round earnings of up and downstream user are written in the printed Excel table  
Part 2: Water Scarcity (10 rounds) 
[Distribute new production table with water scarcity and collect the old ones where there was 
abundance of water].  
“We now inform you that rainfall has dropped drastically, which results in water scarcity. This means 
that from now on the water flow has drastically decreased. Consequently, people will need more time 
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for the same amount of water to come through to their plot. And thus you need more hours per day to 
get a good harvest and high earnings. It also means that you need at least 7 hours to get good harvest 
and high earnings. All these differences when there is water scarcity are taken up in the new 
production table.”  
[Swahili] “Tunakutaarifu kwamba mvua zimepungua sana, iliyopelekea kuwepo na ukame wa 
maji. Hii inamaanisha kwamba kuanzia sasa mtiririko wa maji umepungua sana. Kwa 
matokeo hayo, watu watahitaji muda zaidi kwa kiwango kile kile cha maji katika maeneo yao. 
Na kwamba unahitaji masaa zaidi kwa siku  ili kupata mavuno mazuri na mapato mengi. 
Inamaanisha kwamba unahitaji angalau masaa 7 ili kupata mavuno mazuri na mapato mengi. 
Tofauti zote hizi ambapo kunakuwa na ukame wa maji zinachukuliwa katika jedwali jipya la 
uzalishaji.” 
(Play exercise again with new production table)(10 rounds) 
1. DECISION CARDS to upstream users (match via LIST and ID CODES)  
2. Upstream users decide 
3. DECISION CARDS to downstream users (match via LIST and ID CODES)  
4. Downstream users react 
5. DECISION CARDS back to upstream users (match via LIST and ID CODES)  
6. Next round….. (10 rounds) 
7. After each round earnings of up and downstream user are written in the printed Excel table  
(At the end: put everything in Excel table on computer: calculate final earnings) 
Part 3: Individual Post-Experiment Questions: (Confidential) 
“In general, where you satisfied with the decisions made by the other user you were matched with? 
Very satisfied- satisfied -not so satisfied- dissatisfied” 
[Swahili] “Kwa ujumla, je uliridhika na maamuzi wa mtu mwingine uliyeambatana naye? 
Niliridhika sana – niliridhika  - niliridhika/sikuridhika – sikuridhika” 
“In the exercise: did you recognise many, some, few, no elements from real life?” 
[Swahili] “Katika zoezi, je uligundua mambo mengi, mambo machache au hamna ambayo 
yanafanana na maisha ya kawaida?” 
Part 4: Post-Experiment Group Discussion:  
“What did you recognise from real life?”  
[Swahili] je, nini ulichogundua kutoka maisha ya kawaida? 
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Appendix III: Assessment of Omitted Variable Bias in Part II  
With reference to the footnote on page 75 in Part II: One could indeed argue that an important 
explanatory variable is missing from our models. The design of the experiment is such that the 
downstream user can influence the behaviour of the upstream user through communicating 
dissatisfaction or punishment. Table 13 presents the percentages of upstream users‟ decisions in round 
r to which downstream users reacted with communicating dissatisfaction or punishment in round r-1.  
 % of decisions punished in r-1  punished or dissatisfaction in r-1  N decisions 
abundance 12.5 30.9 312 
scarcity 16.0 41.8 780 
Table 13: Percentages of Upstream Users‟ Decisions to which Downstream Users Reacted with Dissatisfaction 
or Punishment in r-1 
The fact that appropriation decisions are correlated within individuals and that sanctioning behaviour 
of the downstream user is a direct function of appropriation behaviour of the upstream user could 
generate endogeneity problems similar to those encountered in dynamic panel data models. To see 
this, we start form the following model: 
riririri sXy ,,,,  
Where riy ,  is the number of hours of water appropriated by upstream user i in round r, X is a matrix 
of explanatory variables, possibly including a constant and effects that do not change over the rounds, 
ris ,  is a dummy indicating if individual i received a punishment and/or expression of dissatisfaction 
by the downstream user in the previous round. ri,  is a residual which is assumed to be uncorrelated 
between individuals and over the different rounds. Note that for ris , , we use r as a subscript and not r-
1, as the fact that the upstream user was sanctioned determines current appropriation behaviour. Since 
ris ,  is a reaction on the number of hours of water the downstream user received from the upstream 
user in the previous round, we can also write: 
 riririri yfXy ,1,,, )(  
The nature of our data, however, does not permit us to assume that ri ,  is uncorrelated over the 
different rounds. Indeed, since we observe the same individuals over time, it may be that, say 
individual a always gives more water than individual b. We could make this explicit by splitting the 
original error term ri ,  into two components, one that does not change over rounds for the individual, 
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and a remainder that is assumed to be uncorrelated between individuals (
i
) and over the different 
rounds ( ri, ): 
riiririri yfXy ,1,,, )(  
Clearly, here 1,riy  is positively correlated with the first part of our composed error term ( i ) and so 
estimation of the above equation by Ordinary Least Squares is inconsistent. We note here, for further 
consideration, that the OLS estimator is biased upward.  
As the problem is caused by the individual specific effect in the error term, we might want to get rid 
of it. This can be done by estimating the same regression but on a transformation of original variables. 
We could, for example, use a within transformation, that expresses the variables as deviations from 
individual means over the rounds. However, it is known that, at least in short panels, such a fixed 
effects model leads to another correlation problem between the transformed error term and the 
transformed endogenous variable. In particular, the transformed endogenous variable is 
))(...)(...)((
1
1
)( 1,,1,1, Ririiri yfyfyf
R
yf , while the transformed error term is 
)......(
1
1
,1,2,, Ririiri
R
. We can see that 
1
)( ,
R
yf ri
 is correlated with ri, , but also 
that )( 1,riyf  is correlated with 
1
1,
R
ri
 (Bond, 2002). Furthermore, for our case, such a solution 
would also remove all time invariant explanatory variables (such as gender and social status) from the 
regression. These variables are the ones we are most interested in. This within groups (or fixed 
effects) estimator can be shown to be biased downward (Nickell, 1981)
99
. 
To get an idea of the bias of omitting the downstream user‟s sanctioning behaviour, we can use the 
fact that the pooled OLS regression generates estimators that are biased upward and the fixed effects 
regression generates estimators that are biased downward. The true magnitude of the effect will be 
somewhere between these estimators‟. In addition, the correlation between the error term and the 
endogenous variable in the fixed effects regression disappears if the number of time observations 
increases. Since our panel is relatively long, we expect it to be close to the value obtained by the fixed 
effects regression.  
                                                     
99
 The proper way to handle this problem is to apply a first difference transformation to the data and then 
estimate the model using lagged levels of the endogenous variables as instruments, possibly in a GMM 
framework, as in Arellano and Bond (1991). However, just as the first difference transformation, this would 
eliminate the time invariant effects from our model, which are of interest to us.  
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Our estimation strategy is as follows. First, we perform a pooled OLS regression with inclusion of the 
sanctioning behaviour of the downstream user. This overestimates its effect. Next, we estimate a fixed 
effects regression with inclusion of the sanctioning behaviour of the downstream user. This 
underestimates the effect of the endogenous variable. Then we compare these results to the results of 
the OLS regression (corrected for clustering within individuals) without inclusion of the sanctioning 
behaviour of the downstream user. If the coefficients stay more or less the same as the coefficients 
from the fixed effects and pooled OLS regressions with inclusion of the sanctioning behaviour, we 
can be confident that there is no real problem of omitting sanctioning behaviour from our models. 
Table 14 presents the results of such an analysis. In the first column, we copy the results of the OLS 
regression corrected for clustering within individuals without inclusion of the sanctioning behaviour 
of the downstream user as presented in the body of the text. The second column presents the pooled 
OLS regression with inclusion of the endogenous variable, in this case having received a punishment 
by the downstream user in the previous round. This provides us with an estimate of the coefficient of 
the endogenous regressor, albeit an overestimation of its effect. In the third column we present the 
results of a fixed effects regression with inclusion of the endogenous variable. As can be seen, all time 
invariant variables are removed from the model due to the within transformation. The effect of our 
endogenous variable is likely to be understated. The fourth and fifth column present the results 
respectively of the pooled OLS regression and the fixed effects regression, both with inclusion of the 
endogenous variable, in this case having received a punishment or expression of dissatisfaction by the 
downstream user in the previous round. The parameter estimate of the endogenous regressor in the 
fourth column is over-estimation of the effect, the one in the fifth column an underestimation.  
However, we are not really interested in the effect of the endogenous regressor. It was only included 
to check if our reported estimates are robust to the inclusion of a variable that was expected to be 
important given the design of our experiment. We find that the regression coefficients of the 
exogenous variables are very stable over the different specifications. As such, we are confident that 
our results are not driven by specification error and the omitted variable bias remains limited.  
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 Corrected for 
clustering 
Pooled OLS Fixed effects Pooled OLS Fixed effects 
Variable Est. S.E.
a
 Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E. 
Intercept 0.503 0.021** 0.523 0.015** .525 .010** .533 .015** .528 .010** 
Scarcity -0.065 0.016** -.064 .018** -.067 .014** -.046 .018* -.067 .015** 
Social Status -0.061 0.021** -.052 .014**   -.055 .012**   
ScarcXSocStat 0.049 0.015** .040 .017* .045 .013** .048 .015** .048 .012** 
Female 0.079 0.04° .070 .026**   .064 .024**   
ScarcXFemale -0.026 0.041 -.019 .031 -.022 .025 -.028 .29 -.024 .024 
SocStatXFemale 0.083 0.038* .078 .028**   .077 .025**   
ScarcXSocStatXFemale -0.041 0.033 -.050 .033 -.051 .026° -.058 .030° -.042 .025° 
PunishR_1   -0.123 -0.036** -.025 .032     
ScarcXPunishR_1   -.001 .042 -.001 .034     
DissatorPunishR_1       -.107 .025** -.028 .022 
ScarcXDissatorPunishR_1       -.004 .029 .015 .025 
R²  .064  .100    .119   
Root MSE  .210  .205    .204   
Wald F F(7,75) 5.46 F(9,1051) 12.91 F(6,979) 9.20 F(9,1130) 16.95 F(6,1058) 10.82 
Prob>F  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000 
N 
Strata 
Units  
 1140 
1 
76 
 1061 
 
 1061  1140  1140 
Dependent variable=Proposed share 
Significance levels two-sided: ° = 10%, * = 5%, ** = 1%. 
a
 Corrected for clustering within individuals  
Table 14: Estimations using Different Models to Assess the Bias by Omitting Sanctioning Behaviour by the Downstream User
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Appendix IV: Assessment of Omitted Variable Bias in Part IV 
With reference to the footnote on page 126 in Part IV: One could indeed argue that an important 
explanatory variable is missing from our models. The design of the experiment is such that the 
downstream user can influence the behaviour of the upstream user through communicating 
dissatisfaction or punishment. Table 15 presents the percentages of upstream users‟ decisions in round 
r to which downstream users reacted with communicating dissatisfaction or punishment in round r-1.  
 % of decisions punished in r-1  punished or dissatisfaction in r-1  N decisions 
abundance 12.5 30.9 312 
scarcity 16.0 41.8 780 
Table 15: Percentages of Upstream Users‟ Decisions to which Downstream Users Reacted with Dissatisfaction 
or Punishment in r-1 
The fact that appropriation decisions are correlated within individuals and that sanctioning behaviour 
of the downstream user is a direct function of appropriation behaviour of the upstream user could 
generate endogeneity problems similar to those encountered in dynamic panel data models. To see 
this, we start form the following model:  
ririririri sXpp ,,,,, ))1/(ln(  
Where rip ,  is the probability that upstream user i is selfish when appropriating water in round r, X is 
a matrix of explanatory variables, possibly including a constant and effects that do not change over 
the rounds, ris ,  is a dummy indicating if individual i received a punishment and/or expression of 
dissatisfaction by the downstream user in the previous round. ri,  is a residual which is assumed to be 
uncorrelated between individuals and over the different rounds. Note that for ris , , we use r as a 
subscript and not r-1, as the fact that the upstream user was sanctioned determines current 
appropriation behaviour. Since ris ,  is a reaction by the downstream user on the appropriation by the 
upstream user in the previous round, we can also write: 
riririririri ppfXpp ,1,1,,,, )))1/((ln())1/(ln(  
 
The nature of our data, however, does not permit us to assume that ri,  is uncorrelated over the 
different rounds. Indeed, since we observe the same individuals over time, it may be that, say 
individual a always gives more water than individual b. We could make this explicit by splitting the 
original error term ri,  into two components, one that does not change over rounds for the individual, 
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and a remainder that is assumed to be uncorrelated between individuals ( i ) and over the different 
rounds ( ri, ): 
riiririririri ppfXpp ,1,1,,,, )))1/((ln())1/(ln(  
Clearly, here ))1/(ln( 1,1, riri pp  is positively correlated with the first part of our composed error 
term ( i ) and so estimation of the above equation by binary logistic regression is inconsistent. We 
note here, for further consideration, that the logistic regression estimator is biased upward.  
As the problem is caused by the individual specific effect in the error term, we might want to get rid 
of it. This can be done by estimating the same regression but on a transformation of original variables. 
We could, for example, use a within transformation, that expresses the variables as deviations from 
individual means over the rounds. However, it is known that, at least in short panels, such a fixed 
effects model leads to another correlation problem between the transformed error term and the 
transformed endogenous variable. In particular, the transformed endogenous variable is  
))))1/((ln(...)))1/((ln(...)))1/((ln((
1
1
)))1/((ln( 1,1,,,1,1,1,1, RiRiririiiriri ppfppfppf
R
ppf  
while the transformed error term is )......(
1
1
,1,2,, Ririiri
R
. We can see that 
1
)))1/((ln( ,,
R
ppf riri
 is correlated with ri, , but also that )))1/((ln( 1,1, riri ppf  is correlated 
with 
1
1,
R
ri
 (Bond, 2002). Furthermore, for our case, such a solution would also remove all time 
invariant explanatory variables (such as upstream users‟ individual characteristics) from the 
regression. These variables are the ones we are most interested in. This within groups (or fixed 
effects) estimator can be shown to be biased downward (Nickell, 1981)
100
. 
To get an idea of the bias of omitting the downstream user‟s sanctioning behaviour, we can use the 
fact that the binary logistic regression, which does not take into account clustering within individuals, 
generates estimators that are biased upward and the fixed effects regression generates estimators that 
are biased downward. The true magnitude of the effect will be somewhere between these estimators‟. 
In addition, the correlation between the error term and the endogenous variable in the fixed effects 
                                                     
100
 The proper way to handle this problem is to apply a first difference transformation to the data and then 
estimate the model using lagged levels of the endogenous variables as instruments, possibly in a GMM 
framework, as in Arellano and Bond (1991). However, just as the first difference transformation, this would 
eliminate the time invariant effects from our model, which are of interest to us.  
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regression disappears if the number of time observations increases. Since our panel is relatively long, 
we expect it to be close to the value obtained by the fixed effects regression.  
Our estimation strategy is as follows. First, we perform a binary logistic regression with inclusion of 
the sanctioning behaviour of the downstream user and without taking into account clustering within 
individuals. This overestimates its effect. Next, we estimate a fixed effects regression with inclusion 
of the sanctioning behaviour of the downstream user. This underestimates the effect of the 
endogenous variable. Then we compare these results to the results of the binary logistic regression 
corrected for clustering within individuals and without inclusion of the sanctioning behaviour of the 
downstream user. If the coefficients stay more or less the same as the coefficients from the fixed 
effects binary logistic regression and binary logistic regression without clustering with inclusion of 
the sanctioning behaviour, we can be confident that there is no real problem of omitting sanctioning 
behaviour from our models. 
Table 16 presents the results of such an analysis. In the first column, we copy the results of the binary 
logistic regression corrected for clustering within individuals without inclusion of the sanctioning 
behaviour of the downstream user as presented in the body of the text. The second column presents 
the binary logistic regression, which does not take clustering within individuals into account, with 
inclusion of the endogenous variable, in this case having received a punishment by the downstream 
user in the previous round. This provides us with an estimate of the coefficient of the endogenous 
regressor, albeit an overestimation of its effect. In the third column we present the results of a fixed 
effects regression with inclusion of the endogenous variable. As can be seen, all time invariant 
variables are removed from the model due to the within transformation. The effect of our endogenous 
variable is likely to be understated. The fourth and fifth column present the results respectively of the 
binary logistic regression without clustering and the fixed effects logistic regression, both with 
inclusion of the endogenous variable, in this case having received a punishment or expression of 
dissatisfaction by the downstream user in the previous round. The parameter estimate of the 
endogenous regressor in the fourth column is over-estimation of the effect, the one in the fifth column 
an underestimation.  
However, we are not really interested in the effect of the endogenous regressor. It was only included 
to check if our reported estimates are robust to the inclusion of a variable that was expected to be 
important given the design of our experiment. We find that the regression coefficients of the 
exogenous variables are very stable over the different specifications. As such, we are confident that 
our results are not driven by specification error and the omitted variable bias remains limited.  
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 Corrected for 
clustering 
Without Clustering Fixed effects Without Clustering Fixed effects 
Variable β t
a
 Sig β t Sig β t Sig β t Sig β t Sig 
Constant -1.83 -4.29 ** -2.17 -5.59 **    -2.00 -6.10 **    
Scarcity 1.50 3.10 ** 1.62 3.75 ** 2.01 4.09 ** 1.01 2.63 ** 1.89 4.12 ** 
Irriland 0.29 2.04 * 0.31 2.18 *    0.28 2.25 *    
ScarcXIrriland -0.32 -1.88 ° -0.32 -1.98 * -0.31 -1.54  -0.33 -2.24 * -
0.35 
-
1.95 
° 
Min_reli 1.13 2.75 ** 1.06 3.43 **    1.08 3.98 **    
ScarcXMin_reli -0.64 -1.67 ° -0.51 -1.43  -0.84 -1.82 ° -0.53 -1.62  -
1.08 
-
2.57 
** 
Villgvt 0.71 1.75 ° 0.56 1.83 °    0.65 2.42 *    
ScarcXVillgvt -0.72 -1.85 ° -0.72 -2.06 * -1.29 -2.85 ** -0.71 -2.24 * -
1.26 
-
3.15 
** 
Female -0.72 -1.51   -0.48 -1.39     -0.62 -2.01 *    
ScarcXFemale 0.60 1.24  0.35 0.91  1.31 2.31 * 0.57 1.60  1.44 2.82 ** 
PctCash 0.01 1.67 ° 0.01 1.58     0.01 1.33     
ScarcXPctCash -0.01 -1.08   -0.01 -0.94  -0.01 -1.02  -0.01 -1.31  -
0.01 
-
1.11 
 
Livestock -0.37 -2.18 * -0.54 -2.53 *    -0.34 -2.12 *    
ScarcXLivestock 0.03 0.13   0.21 0.92  0.10 0.38  0.06 0.31  -
0.06 
-
0.31 
 
Foodinsec -0.52 -1.25   -0.42 -1.30     -0.46 -1.62     
ScarcXFoodinsec 0.85 1.94 ° 0.79 2.19 * 1.49 3.04 ** 0.92 2.79 ** 1.33 3.09 ** 
PunishR_1    1.21 3.07 ** -0.16 -0.29        
ScarcXPunishR_1    0.09 0.19  0.12 0.20        
DissatorPunishR_1          0.67 2.36 * -
0.42 
-
1.16 
 
ScarcXDissatorPunishR_1          0.88 2.69 ** 0.38 0.92  
Pseudo R² 0.112   0.115      0.154      
N 1095   1020   741   1095   840   
Significance levels two-sided: ° = 10%, * = 5%, ** = 1%. 
a
 Corrected for clustering within individuals  
Table 16: Logistic Regression Estimations Using Different Models to Assess the Bias by Omitting Sanctioning Behaviour by the Downstream User 
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Appendix V: Real Inequalities in the Irrigation Schemes and the Wider Region 
 
Irrigation 
scheme
c
 
 Livestock Cows Bicycle Ironroof Foodinsec Min_reli Min_tribe Young Immigrant Watershort
b
 Totalland Irriland Villgvt SocStat 
Is Livestock 1 .884
**
 .223 .022 -.012 -.097 .152 -.020 0.231° .046 .354
**
 .528
**
 .057 .309
*
 
Ik Livestock 1 .868
**
 .172 .100 -.135 .018 .194 -.205 -.082 .001 0.200° .166 .028 -.031 
KitU Livestock 1 .826
**
 .233 .242 -.205 -.132 .141 -.171 -.027 .034 0.331° -.062 0.268° .496
**
 
KitZ Livestock 1 .850
**
 .107 .218 .160 .180 .162 .106 .033 .112 .029 .106 -.117 0.286° 
Mt Livestock 1 .857
**
 .154 0.277° -0.296° .025 -0.306° .054 -.109 -0.328° .163 .201 -.060 .452
*
 
Iringa 
region  
/               
Is Cows .884
**
 1 .246 .192 .000 -.135 .208 .084 .399
**
 .233 .418
**
 .314
*
 .301
*
 .311
*
 
Ik Cows .868
**
 1 .222 .097 -.093 .036 .311
**
 -.151 -.045 -.035 0.226° 0.199° .049 .094 
KitU Cows .826
**
 1 .238 .167 -.177 .000 .218 .138 -.224 .100 .207 -.039 .067 .599
**
 
KitZ Cows .850
**
 1 .109 0.334° .023 .107 .128 .080 .134 .102 .140 .053 .004 0.324° 
Mt Cows .857
**
 1 0.312° 0.353° -0.338° .000 -0.307° .000 .000 -0.330° .248 0.274° -.092 .451
*
 
Iringa 
region  
Cows   .246
**
 .188
**
 -.114
**
   -.132
**
  -.040
**
 .275
**
    
Is Bicycle .223 .246 1 .267
*
 .054 .181 -.072 .410
**
 .016 -.019 .202 .300
*
 .099 .484
**
 
Ik Bicycle .172 .222 1 .490
**
 -.302
**
 .389
**
 .092 .089 -.191 .016 .022 .053 .112 .496
**
 
KitU Bicycle .233 .238 1 .354 -.053 -.053 .256 .004 .165 -.158 .185 .245 .192 0.278° 
KitZ Bicycle .107 .109 1 .344
*
 -.008 .221 -.023 .015 .206 .105 0.306° .149 -.023 0.258° 
Mt Bicycle .154 0.312° 1 0.383° -.182 .120 .054 -.037 .054 .089 .272 0.333° .232 .462
*
 
Iringa 
region  
Bicycle  .246
**
  .314
**
 -.125
**
   .110
**
  -.041
**
 .154
**
    
Is Ironroof .022 .192 .267
*
 1 -.228 -.266
*
 -.090 -.013 .141 -.056 .072 -.079 .153 .410
**
 
Ik Ironroof .100 .097 .490
**
 1 -.238
*
 .444
**
 .153 .105 -.040 -0.245° .135 0.202° .183 .425
**
 
KitU Ironroof .242 .167 .354 1 -.226 0.313° -.092 -.158 .136 -.262 .223 .231 0.300° .334 
KitZ Ironroof .218 0.334° .344
*
 1 -.198 0.298° -.077 -.040 0.332° .105 .089 .114 .061 0.298° 
Mt Ironroof 0.277° 0.353° 0.383° 1 .239 .000 -0.290° -.204 -.158 .204 -.039 .205 .259 .506
*
 
Iringa 
region  
Ironroof
a
  .188
**
 .314
**
  -.172
**
   .028
**
  -.034
**
 .109
**
    
Is Foodinsec -.012 .000 .054 -.228 1 0.229° -.123 .129 -.185 -.021 .073 .176 .005 -.131 
Ik Foodinsec -.135 -.093 -.302
**
 -.238
*
 1 -.307
**
 .087 -.168 .181 .038 -.122 .020 .085 -.270
*
 
KitU Foodinsec -.205 -.177 -.053 -.226 1 -.127 -.177 .103 .226 -.079 -.114 .062 .053 -0.271° 
KitZ Foodinsec .160 .023 -.008 -.198 1 0.296° .156 -.277° 0.250° .218 -.150 .033 -.109 -0.312° 
Mt Foodinsec -0.296° -.338° -.182 .239 1 -.098 -.434
*
 0.292° -.151 .222 -0.280° .071 .015 .163 
Iringa 
region  
Foodinsec
a
  -.114
**
 -.125
**
 -.172
**
    -.055
**
  .137
**
 -.096
**
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Irrigation 
scheme
c
 
 Livestock Cows Bicycle Ironroof Foodinsec Min_reli Min_tribe Young Immigrant Watershort
b
 Totalland Irriland Villgvt SocStat 
Is Min_reli -.097 -.135 .181 -.266
*
 0.229° 1 -.164 .196 -.050 -.255 -.017 -.051 -.079 .027 
Ik Min_reli .018 .036 .389
**
 .444
**
 -.307
**
 1 .202 .137 -.078 .051 -.056 .015 -.005 .259
*
 
KitU Min_reli -.132 .000 -.053 0.313° -.127 1 -.029 .103 -.144 .158 .128 0.253° -.220 -.004 
KitZ Min_reli .180 .107 .221 0.298° 0.296° 1 .350
*
 .049 .172 .250 .145 .265 .107 -.137 
Mt Min_reli .025 .000 .120 .000 -.098 1 -.059 -.111 -.258 0.304° -0.301° -0.303° -.370° .046 
Iringa 
region  
/               
                
Is Min_tribe .152 .208 -.072 -.090 -.123 -.164 1 .274
*
 .097 .012 -0.188° -0.173° .005 .044 
Ik Min_tribe .194 .311
**
 .092 .153 .087 .202 1 -.006 .210 -.132 -.143 -.052 -.015 -.059 
KitU Min_tribe .141 .218 .256 -.092 -.177 -.029 1 -.071 -.386
*
 -.287 .059 .230 .033 .077 
KitZ Min_tribe .162 .128 -.023 -.077 .156 .350
*
 1 0.325° .134 .250 -.172 .027 .128 -.093 
Mt Min_tribe -0.306° -.307° .054 -0.290° -.434
*
 -.059 1 -.059 .321 -.032 .144 -.057 0.347° -0.363° 
Iringa 
region  
/               
Is Young -.020 .084 .410
**
 -.013 .129 .196 .274
*
 1 -.117 .154 -.083 .037 -.112 .140 
Ik Young -.205 -.151 .089 .105 -.168 .137 -.006 1 -.100 -0.186° -0.189° -.234
*
 -.192° -.051 
KitU Young -.171 .138 .004 -.158 .103 .103 -.071 1 -.056 -.115 -0.285° -.206 -.407
*
 .139 
KitZ Young .106 .080 .015 -.040 -0.277° .049 0.325° 1 -.182 .102 -.189 .094 -.289° -.034 
Mt Young .054 .000 -.037 -.204 0.292° -.111 -.059 1 -.258 .091 -.028 .141 -.159 .018 
Iringa 
region  
Young  -.132
**
 .110
**
 .028
**
 -.055
**
     .004
*
 -.126
**
    
Is Immigrant 0.231° .399
**
 .016 .141 -.185 -.050 .097 -.117 1 .012 .194 .019 .174 .097 
Ik Immigrant -.082 -.045 -.191 -.040 .181 -.078 .210 -.100 1 -.149 -.021 .013 .078 -0.188° 
KitU Immigrant -.027 -.224 .165 .136 .226 -.144 -.386
*
 -.056 1 .250 .372
*
 .334 -.027 .295 
KitZ Immigrant .033 .134 .206 0.332° 0.250° .172 .134 -.182 1 .140 0.297° .133 .134 .192 
Mt Immigrant -.109 .000 .054 -.158 -.151 -.258 .321 -.258 1 -0.420° .234 .010 .205 -.145 
Iringa 
region  
/               
Is Watershort
b
 .046 .233 -.019 -.056 -.021 -.255 .012 .154 .012 1 .267 .140 .120 .135 
Ik Watershort
b
 .001 -.035 .016 -0.245° .038 .051 -.132 -.186° -.149 1 -.127 .021 -.188° -.064 
KitU Watershort
b
 .034 .100 -.158 -.262 -.079 .158 -.287 -.115 .250 1 .042 .061 -.187 -.010 
KitZ Watershort
b
 .112 .102 .105 .105 .218 .250 .250 .102 .140 1 -.200 -.242 -.050 .086 
Mt Watershort
b
 -0.328° -.330° .089 .204 .222 0.304° -.032 .091 -0.420° 1 -.183 0.317° .204 -.028 
Iringa 
region  
Watershort
a
  -.040
**
 -.041
**
 -.034
**
 .137
**
   .004
*
   -.021
**
    
Is Total land .354
**
 .418
**
 .202 .072 .073 -.017 -0.188° -.083 .194 .267 1 .702
**
 .381
**
 .380
**
 
Ik Total land 0.200° 0.226° .022 .135 -.122 -.056 -.143 -.189° -.021 -.127 1 .787
**
 0.162° .072 
KitU Total land 0.331° .207 .185 .223 -.114 .128 .059 -.285° .372
*
 .042 1 .687
**
 0.317° 0.342° 
KitZ Total land .029 .140 0.306° .089 -.150 .145 -.172 -.189 0.297° -.200 1 .650
**
 0.242° .309 
Mt Total land .163 .248 .272 -.039 -0.280° -0.301° .144 -.028 .234 -.183 1 .416
*
 .156 .031 
Iringa 
region  
Total land  .275
**
 .154
**
 .109
**
 -.096
**
   -.126
**
  -.021
**
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Irrigation 
scheme
c
 
 Livestock Cows Bicycle Ironroof Foodinsec Min_reli Min_tribe Young Immigrant Watershort
b
 Totalland Irriland Villgvt SocStat 
Is Irriland .528
**
 .314
*
 .300
*
 -.079 .176 -.051 -0.173° .037 .019 .140 .702
**
 1 0.223° .349
**
 
Ik Irriland .166 0.199° .053 0.202° .020 .015 -.052 -.234
*
 .013 .021 .787
**
 1 .292
*
 .119 
KitU Irriland -.062 -.039 .245 .231 .062 0.253° .230 -.206 .334 .061 .687
**
 1 .139 0.324° 
KitZ Irriland .106 .053 .149 .114 .033 .265 .027 .094 .133 -.242 .650
**
 1 -.117 -.001 
Mt Irriland .201 0.274° 0.333° .205 .071 -0.303° -.057 .141 .010 0.317° .416
*
 1 0.303° .175 
Iringa 
region  
/               
                
Is Villgvt .057 .301
*
 .099 .153 .005 -.079 .005 -.112 .174 .120 .381
**
 0.223° 1 .361
**
 
Ik Villgvt .028 .049 .112 .183 .085 -.005 -.015 -.192° .078 -0.188° 0.162° .292
*
 1 .360
**
 
KitU Villgvt 0.268° .067 .192 0.300° .053 -.220 .033 -.407
*
 -.027 -.187 0.317° .139 1 .021 
KitZ Villgvt -.117 .004 -.023 .061 -.109 .107 .128 -.289° .134 -.050 0.242° -.117 1 .537
**
 
Mt Villgvt -.060 -.092 .232 .259 .015 -0.370° 0.347° -.159 .205 .204 .156 0.303° 1 -.006 
Iringa 
region  
/               
Is SocStat .309
*
 .311
*
 .484
**
 .410
**
 -.131 .027 .044 .140 .097 .135 .380
**
 .349
**
 .361
**
 1 
Ik SocStat -.031 .094 .496
**
 .425
**
 -.270
*
 .259
*
 -.059 -.051 -0.188° -.064 .072 .119 .360
**
 1 
KitU SocStat .496
**
 .599
**
 .278 .334 -0.271° -.004 .077 .139 .295 -.010 0.342° 0.324° .021 1 
KitZ SocStat 0.286° 0.324° 0.258° 0.298° -0.312° -.137 -.093 -.034 .192 .086 0.308° -.001 .537
**
 1 
Mt SocStat .452
*
 .451
*
 .462
*
 .506
*
 .163 .046 -0.363° .018 -.145 -.028 .031 .175 -.006 1 
Iringa 
region  
/               
Is N 65              
Ik N 73              
KitU N 31              
KitZ N 34              
Mt N 24              
Iringa 
region  
N 278717              
Significance **99%;*95%;°90%  
a: Variables are defined differently in the survey and the National Sample Census of Agriculture 2002/2003.  
In the survey, water shortage problems are defined as having had too little water for farming in the irrigation scheme in any of the two dry seasons preceding the survey. In the census, water shortage problems mean 
that drought was the main reason for a difference between the total area planted and harvested (irrigated or not).  
In the survey ‘Ironroof’ indicates the respondent’s household lives in a house with an iron or tile roof. In the census, it can also include a roof of asbestos. 
In the survey, ‘foodinsecure’ indicates that the respondent’s household has experienced food insecurity in the two years preceding the survey. In the census, it means the respondent’s household always, often or 
sometimes had problems in satisfying the food needs of the household in year preceding the census. 
b: Not all irrigators answered to the question on problems of water shortage in the survey  
c: Codenames are used for the irrigations schemes 
Table 17: Pearson Correlations to Check for Real Inequalities in the Irrigation Schemes (Based on Own Survey) and in the Wider Region (Based on the National Sample Census of Agriculture 
2002/2003) 
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